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Introduction
29 May 1986 was an important day in the history of European integration. 
Such at least is the impression conveyed in an official account by the 
European Commission of what happened on that day. It reports a ‘solemn 
ceremony’ outside its headquarters in Brussels, staged to mark the official 
inauguration of the newly adopted Community flag. The ceremony, accord­
ing to the Commission,
took place in an atm osphere of festivity and youth: schoolchildren waving small
European flags, Com m unity civil servants in relaxed mood, astonished passers- 
by and Sandra Kim, the young Belgian singer from  an Italian family, performing 
her song ‘J’aime la vie’, which w on the 1986 Eurovision song contest. 
(Commission 1987a: 4; see also Bulletin 1986 [No. 4], point 2.1.81)
There was more music. While the Community flag (whose circle of twelve 
golden stars was similar to that on the much older Council of Europe flag) 
was being raised for the first time, the Communities’ Choir sang Beethoven’s 
‘Ode to Joy’, the Community anthem. In his speech to mark the occasion, 
Commission president Jacques Delors ‘expressed the wish that the blue and 
gold flag “might be a symbol for Europeans of endless hope nurtured by our 
ideal and our struggle”’. And Pierre Pflimlin, president of the European 
Parliament, ‘proclaimed the wish that this emblem be “the symbol of peace­
ful struggle for European Union”’ (Commission 1987a: 4).
Yet the story of the Community flag had many facets that went unmen­
tioned in the Commission’s cheerful rendering. For instance, strictly speaking 
the item raised at the flag-raising ceremony was not, after all, a flag. Rather, it 
was a Community ‘logo’, -  or ‘emblem’ -  that was eligible to be reproduced 
on rectangular pieces of fabric, among other objects. Such was the semantic 
compromise that had emerged when the Council of Permanent 
Representatives approved the quasi-flag on behalf of the member states, after
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years of intense lobbying by the European Parliament and the Commission 
and a series of reports partially devoted to the issue? Furthermore, the formal 
inauguration of the Community logo led to acrimonious wrangles about its 
use. Was it to be displayed mainly on Europe Day alongside national ‘logos’ 
or on national holidays as well? Should European athletes wear it at the 
Olympic Games, either in conjunction with their national emblems or even in 
their place? Should public works projects acknowledge Community subsidies 
by displaying the Community logo? Should the British government be repri­
manded for refusing to display it on car licence plates and on most public 
buildings on Europe Day? Should the logo find its way into classrooms, 
airports, train stations and onto postage stamps, as the European 
Commission and Parliament have frequently advocated since?
This study examines the events surrounding the adoption of the 
European logo and it probes into many other initiatives aimed at shoring up 
popular support for European integration. From the early 1970s there was a 
growing perception, mainly within the European Parliament and the 
Commission, that popular support for European integration was not solid 
and that this threatened the future development and even the survival of the 
Community? This stimulated various attempts to enhance the Community’s 
image through ‘identity policies’ (de Witte 1987:135) in areas such as culture, 
education and audiovisual policy. In addition to plans for a European flag and 
anthem this included efforts to promote a European lottery, ‘European 
rooms’ in national museums, student and youth exchanges, a European tele­
vision channel, the ‘correction’ of history textbooks, a ‘European dimension’ 
in national school curricula and many similar measures.
Yet these initiatives were neither uncontroversial nor unanimously 
successful. Some, such as proposals for a European flag, were eventually 
adopted and at least partially implemented. Others were accepted by the 
member states in the form of non-binding resolutions or declarations but 
were never put into practice. The third and largest category of ‘identity policy’ 
proposals stumbled from the outset over resistance mounted by shifting 
configurations of national governments, despite their skilful promotion by 
the Commission and the EP. By the late 1990s, both bodies had bowed to the 
limits of the politically possible and reneged on their more far-reaching 
cultural and educational ambitions. What remained were a raft of exchange 
programmes and public relations-style measures aimed at strengthening 
public support for specific EU policies such as enlargement and the single 
currency.
The Union’s cultural and educational policy record reflects the continued 
determination by national elites to defend social and cultural boundaries and 
their near-monopoly over the creation and dissemination of political 
symbols. This determination grew all the while they allowed economic and to 
some extent also political integration to deepen. Such findings in turn open 
up an important perspective on contemporary European integration in that
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they highlight the potential staying power of the European nation-state as a 
bounded cultural, psychological and ‘identitive’ unit. Beyond this, they illus­
trate the difficulties the EU faces in trying to cultivate popular identifications 
beyond the state and the limits this could impose on further political integra­
tion in Europe.
The study falls broadly into what Joseph Weiler (1996) has called the 
‘third debate’ in European integration studies -  a debate about legitimacy, 
identity and popular consent in the European Union.3 These questions have 
attracted much interest in recent years. Theoretically, this is due to several 
constructivist turns in integration studies (which in turn reflected broader 
developments in the social sciences at large), and their concern with concepts 
such as identity, subjectivity and the symbolic construction of political reality. 
Empirically, it was stimulated by phenomena such as a steadily diminishing 
turnout for elections to the European Parliament and the groundswell of 
popular opposition to the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s. Against the 
backdrop of dwindling popular support for European integration, many 
observers started to contemplate how the Union could improve its public 
image and whether policies in areas with high symbolic and ‘identitive’ 
potential such as culture and education could contribute to this.
All the same, as far as its treatment of political symbolism is concerned 
the ‘third debate’ literature has important shortcomings. For in contemplat­
ing whether policies in culture, education and related areas could boost 
popular support for the Union, many ‘third debate’ writings pay only the 
most cursory attention to what the Union has already done or attempted to 
do in these fields.4 Since, as this study shows, the Union does in fact have a 
relatively long record of actual and attempted ‘identity policies’, this empiri­
cal neglect in the ‘third debate’ literature is not warranted. It is not unlike 
writing a treatise on the theory of agricultural subsidies in the EU that makes 
no reference to the Common Agricultural Policy.
Yet even those writers who have considered EU political symbolism at an 
empirical level often have done so in an incomplete fashion. As with many 
other areas of European integration, there is a tendency to focus on ‘where the 
action is’, i.e. on those parts of culture and education where the Union made 
some inroads (such as student exchanges). Typically, such accounts tell of a 
relatively smooth and progressive supranational expansion into culture and 
education, broadly in step with integration in some other areas. However, this 
study shows that such conclusions are not justified. The Union did expand its 
activities into some cultural and educational areas such as language learning, 
university exchanges and the free movement of ‘cultural goods and services’. 
This involvement was often justified on broadly economic grounds and 
involved neither the dissemination of political symbols nor significant inter­
ference with existing national cultural and educational policies. By contrast, 
the Union made almost no progress in other, more symbolically and psycho­
logically charged areas of culture and education -  areas that ranged from
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'European civics’ in schools and EU-related public rituals to attempts to set 
up a publicly funded pan-European television channel in charge of airing 
‘denationalised’ programmes. National governments remained unwilling to 
open these areas to Union interference even as they allowed integration in 
many other areas to develop. By bringing these developments to the fore, the 
present study adds a badly needed empirical dimension to the literature on 
legitimacy, identity and popular support in the EU, and thereby tells of an 
important chapter in the history of European integration.
The book is organised as follows. Chapter 1 draws on the broader social 
constructivist literature to work out the key concepts of the study: political 
symbols, political symbolism, symbolic power and their link to communal 
identifications, political legitimacy and institutional ‘entity processes’. In 
brief, social constructivism treats symbols as markers that signify and foster 
the internalisation and thereby the legitimisation of political practices and 
institutions. This supports the assertion by many post-national theorists that 
the EU would not need to culturally homogenise its member populations in 
order to become seen as politically legitimate. Rather, it could follow the 
example of some multicultural domestic systems and opt for a ‘thin’ and 
largely ‘civic’ symbolic repertoire. Yet as the example o f ‘civic’ multicultural 
states also suggests, political legitimacy is not likely to emerge as a mere 
‘reflex’ to the establishment of EU-wide democratic institutions or as a mere 
by-product of intensified transnational communication and interaction. 
Instead, fostering political legitimacy always has a ‘top-down’ symbolic 
dimension. This entails the elite-driven construction and dissemination of 
symbolic categories which, if successful, stimulates more ‘bottom-up’-type 
communicative and deliberative processes. A political system’s reliance on 
political isymbolism of this kind increases in proportion to it becoming more 
visible and penetrating more deeply into the everyday lives of its subjects, 
constituting a necessary balance between ‘material’ (i.e. political and 
economic) power on the one hand and symbolic power on the other.
Chapter 2 further develops and illustrates this argument. Drawing on 
historical examples of political legitimisation in state- and nation-building 
contexts, it explores the techniques, themes and mechanisms that charac­
terised domestic political symbolism campaigns. Despite the obvious 
limitations of the analogy these examples are relevant for the EU. For one 
thing, they bear out the claim that institutional legitimacy does not result 
simply from interaction and exchanges but instead requires an elite-driven, 
‘top-down’ symbolic dimension. For another, they show that such ‘top-down’ 
symbolism tends to centre on cultural and educational policy broadly 
defined, which merits a focus on those areas in the context of the present 
study. The chapter concludes by showing that competing approaches to 
European integration lead to diametrically opposed inferences regarding the 
Union’s symbolic policy-making potential.
Chapter 3 begins the main empirical section of the book by examining
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cultural policy in the European Union. Its founding treaties denied the Union 
a cultural mandate, which helps account for why it stayed out of this domain 
until the early 1970s. That decade, however, saw cautious attempts to carve 
out a cultural role for the Union, most of which were spearheaded by the 
European Commission. What drove the Commission was a concern that 
popular support for the Union was fragile, and the belief that cultural policy 
could foster among its citizens what became variously referred to as a sense of 
belonging to the Community, a European consciousness or a European iden­
tity. Yet these early initiatives came to little. They were either vetoed by 
shifting alliances of national governments or, even if approved in principle, 
not implemented. An exception were some cultural exchange programmes 
and, especially after the Maastricht ratification crisis, various information 
and communication initiatives by the Commission. These centred on events 
sponsorship, promotional campaigns in the media and the distribution of 
public relations literature and involved a plethora of PR consultants, pollsters 
and focus group experts. Rather than seeking to shore up a broader overar­
ching sense of community among Europeans, these campaigns try to foster 
support for specific policies (such as the common currency) by highlighting 
their supposed economic utility. Yet even though Union PR has become 
much more sophisticated over the years, its overall scope and funding has 
remained modest and its actual impact on public attitudes ambiguous.
Chapter 4 turns to audiovisual policy. The first part of the chapter looks 
at Commission and EP-driven attempts to promote a pan-European televi­
sion channel, intended to confront its audience with non-national and thus 
supposedly European and Europeanising programmes. Yet a pan-European 
channel established with Commission support in 1985 faltered over a wide­
spread audience aversion to its attempted non-national programming format 
and the refusal by many national governments to  secure the Union-wide 
distribution of its signals. Similarly, member state governments vetoed most 
proposals by the Commission and the EP to help Europeanise the audiovisual 
productions sector by subsidising multinational coproductions, despite the 
Commission’s increasingly vociferous warnings that boosting European 
audiovisual output was essential to protect Europeans and ‘European culture’ 
from an inflow of US films and television programmes. What audiovisual 
measures the Union did adopt in the end consisted mainly of attempts to 
boost the production of domestic output and its circulation throughout the 
U nion, which did little to overcome the cultural and linguistic obstacles that 
tie many producers to their national markets. By the turn of the century, the 
Com m ission’s audiovisual initiatives had  becom e dom inated  by  econom ic 
and technological objectives, gradually dropping both its earlier ambitions to 
use broadcasting as a European identity forger and to solidify the concept of 
‘European culture’ by setting it up against the United States.
Chapter 5 deals with educational policy, the third major focus of the 
study. In the mid-1970s, the same concerns for the Union’s popular standing
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led the Commission and the EP to advocate the introduction of a ‘European 
dimension’ into the school curricula of the member states. This would 
encompass the teaching of ‘European civics’, the ‘correction’ of history text­
books, the display of Union paraphernalia in classrooms and the celebration 
of Europe Day in schools. Yet these proposals quickly became entangled in a 
dispute about legal competences and ran up against fervent opposition by 
some member states. Throughout the 1980s, the Union did manage to initi­
ate a range of tangible educational measures on the coattails of the Single 
Market programme, yet these were mostly limited to various educational 
exchanges and language learning schemes. Such ‘horizontal’ measures could 
in part be justified on economic grounds and they did not threaten the 
member states’ monopoly in shaping educational structure and content. 
Here, too, an exception was the Commission’s attempt to use schools as an 
outlet for its ‘information and communication’ campaigns. Yet this soon 
backfired as it provoked widespread accusations that the Union was targeting 
political propaganda at children. This chapter ends by reviewing a range of 
empirical studies which suggest that the ‘European dimension’ in national 
school curricula has remained largely elusive.
Chapter 6 assesses the wider significance of the Union’s far-reaching 
failure to extend its reach into key areas of political symbolism. On the one 
hand, this does not imply that its public standing is set for an inevitable slide. 
For at least in the short and medium term political symbolism is not the only 
means of sustaining institutional legitimacy and legitimacy is at any rate not 
the only source of popular consent. In fact, the m id-1990s saw the return of a 
kind of ‘instrumental acceptance’ of the EU among national mass publics 
which seems to have remained relatively stable in the years since. On the other 
hand, the observation that many national governments did not cease to 
protect their cultural and educational prerogatives jealously against Union 
encroachment all the while they allowed for marked progress in economic 
and to some extent also political integration contains one of the most impor­
tant lessons of European integration to date. It points to the continued 
determination of national elites to protect their near-monopoly over the tools 
of political identity creation from supranational interference. To the extent 
that, in the long-run, institutional legitimacy depends on a balance between 
political and symbolic power, it highlights the possible limits of European 
integration as a political and institutional project.
Notes
1 Though admittedly not a compromise that the Commission itself cared much to 
abide by: from the outset, it generally used the terms ‘Community flag’ or, bolder still, 
‘European flag’.
2 With the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty, what had commonly been 
referred to as the ‘European Community’ (EC) or the ‘Common Market’ became part
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of the newly established ‘European Union’ (EU). Throughout the book, I will gener­
ally use the term ‘Community’ when referring to pre-Maastricht events and ‘Union’ 
when talking about developments thereafter. When discussing the Community/ 
Union in a non-time-specific context, I use the two terms more or less interchange­
ably.
3 For good examples of third debate contributions see Beetham and Lord (2001), Thaa 
(2001), Kostakopoulou (1997), Laffan (1996), Obradovic (1996), Howe (1995) and 
Habermas (1991). The first debate, according to Weiler, bore on the formal legality of 
the Community’s constitutional premises, whereas the second debate revolved 
around ‘deontological’ questions, related to democratic decision-making procedures 
(or the lack thereof) in the EU.
4 To the extent that they do have an empirical focus, this often centres on public 
opinion poll data. An important book-length exception is Shore (2000).
1
Political symbolism and the social construction of 
the European Union
The belief that political symbolism fosters popular support for political insti­
tutions is widely shared. Much of the literature on nationalism and 
state-building singles out museums, ‘civics’ textbooks, memorial day celebra­
tions, public monuments and the like as critical tools of national identity 
construction. And some observers of the European Union (e.g. Baras 1989) 
have been quick to draw an analogy. They argue that for the EU to acquire 
lasting popular legitimacy it, too, would need to leave its imprint on the 
school curricula, memorial day calendars and television screens of its citizens.
All this raises many questions. What, precisely, is political symbolism and 
how and under what conditions can it foster institutional legitimacy? By 
extension, what does one need to look out for when trying to analyse politi­
cal symbolism in an empirical setting such as the European Union?
To address these questions this chapter turns to the broader literature on 
social constructivism. This literature provides the theoretical backdrop 
against which political symbolism can best be understood and out of which 
much of the recent interest in it has grown. Moreover, constructivist scholars 
have long focused on some of the very issues that are central to the study of 
political symbolism and institutional legitimisation: norms, identity, institu­
tional ‘entity processes’ and social categories, to name but a few.
This chapter thus ascertains both the contribution of social constructivist 
scholarship to understanding political symbolism and, by implication, the 
significance of political symbolism for the social construction of the 
European Union. To do so at some length is important. While terms such as 
‘political symbolism’ and ‘symbolic deficit’ are now commonplace through­
out much of the literature on the EU (to the point where many writers use the 
terms ‘social construction’ and ‘symbolic construction’ almost interchange­
ably), they have nonetheless remained underdefined and undertheorised. 
There is a need to work out in some detail what, precisely, symbols are, what
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they do, and how they are related to concepts such as political identification 
and institutional legitimacy. In turn, this provides a theoretical template to 
analyse historical examples of domestic political symbolism in Chapter 2 and, 
in the main part of this book, political symbolism in the EU from the Treaties 
of Rome to the present.
Social constructivism
What does it mean to say that the European Union is socially constructed? At 
first glance perhaps not all that much. After all, considering that at present the 
European Union exists whereas a few decades ago it did not, some kind of 
construction process must have taken place in the meantime. And further 
accepting that the EU is neither divinely ordained nor implanted in the 
genetic makeup of its inhabitants, this process could only have been social. In 
this broad sense, then, the claim that all aspects of social reality -  states, 
armies, political science departments, supranational unions and so on -  are 
socially constructed is as obviously correct as it is banal. Every analyst of 
European integration is at some level a ‘constructivist’.1
All the same, in the recent literature on the EU the term ‘social construc­
tivism’ has narrower connotations. Drawing on social constructivist work in 
disciplines such as sociology, anthropology and, more recently, political 
science and international relations, constructivist scholars of European inte­
gration share a range of core assumptions.2 These can be condensed into 
seven propositions.
The first proposition is implicit in the term itself. All social institutions 
are socially constructed, i.e. they emerge through human interaction. Unlike 
‘brute facts’ (such as cats, broccoli and asteroids) whose existence does not 
depend on human action and perception, social facts are rooted in particular 
intersubjective understandings about the world. This does not imply that the 
social world is always fickle: once constructed, many social institutions, prac­
tices and beliefs become deeply sedimented and thereby congeal and change 
only very slowly. Nonetheless, in principle social facts remain historically 
contingent and are thus subject to change, however slowly. During our life­
time the social world may be very sticky, but in the very long-run all that is 
social always changes beyond recognition (Searle 1995; Berger and Luckmann 
1991).
Second, in tracing the construction of social reality constructivists privi­
lege ideational over material factors. Material constellations and ‘substances’ 
(economic resources, territory, geographical distance etc.) ‘are given meaning 
only by the social context through which they are interpreted’ (Jupille, 
Caporaso and Checkel 2002: 7; also Chekel 1999; Adler 1997; Searle 1995). 
For instance, Finnish voters seem more concerned about immigration than 
their counterparts in Luxembourg, even though immigration levels are much
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higher in Luxembourg than in Finland; French elites are more worried by the 
spread of the English language than are Dutch elites, even though English has 
spread much further in the Netherlands than it has in France, and so on. In 
short, material facts acquire different meanings and elicit different forms of 
behaviour in different social circumstances. Social and political behaviour is, 
in the first instance, determined by socially produced ideas about the material 
world, not by the material world itself.
For social constructivists this has important theoretical implications. It 
leads them to reject approaches that overemphasise the impact of material 
forces on social outcomes while neglecting the social processes that give 
meaning to them. These include the more ‘vulgar’ strands of Marxism in the 
general social sciences (along with liberal and other types of economic deter­
minism), neorealism in International Relations and neoliberal 
institutionalism in the study of international integration? Moreover, it means 
that the various properties and laws often attributed to the social world are 
themselves ideational. Notions such as ‘the structural logic of the interna­
tional system’, ‘the inevitable trajectory of historical progress’, the ‘functional 
imperatives of the social system’ or whatever may appear natural and self- 
evident to their exponents, akin to laws of physics or biology. In part this is 
due to the self-confirming character of social expectations: once a critical 
mass of actors behaves based on the expectation that social reality operates in 
a certain way, it will operate in this way, thus lending credence to the initial 
expectations and so on. Ultimately, however, these concepts, too, are 
ideational and therefore socially contingent. For instance, the material condi­
tion of international anarchy (defined as absence of world government) may 
at present be largely associated with self-help, threats and security dilemmas, 
but one day it might come to signify, say, unconstrained opportunities for 
cooperation and collective security. Likewise, cultural diversity may invoke 
(often self-fulfilling) expectations of friction and clashes in some settings, but 
in others it may breed expectations of peaceful cultural coexistence and 
mutual enrichment. The point here is that only for as long as humans inter- 
subjectively believe that something has a certain meaning does it retain that 
particular meaning and shape social reality in a corresponding way (Theiler 
2003; Waever 1996; Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre 1993, Chapter 4; 
Wendt 1992).
The third aspect of social constructivism pertains to the relationship 
between actors and their identities and interests on the one hand, and the 
social structures and institutions within which they operate on the other. 
‘Rationalist* approaches throughout the social sciences typically postulate 
(sometimes only in the form of an ‘as if  assumption) that actors have fixed 
preferences. These may include objectives such as security, economic welfare, 
prestige or any other good that actors subjectively value. If they interact and 
build social institutions, this reflects above all their attempt to maximise their 
preferences. Institutions remain ‘thin’ intervening variables that regulate how
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actors interact in the pursuit of their preferences (by enforcing rules, distrib­
uting externalities, solving commitment problems and so on) but they do not 
affect these preferences themselves (Chekel 1999, 1998).
Social constructivists, by contrast, suggest that social interaction in 
general and social institutions in particular may have ‘thicker’ effects upon 
the participants, affecting their preferences and social identities. Individuals 
and institutions, social agents and social structures are mutually constitutive 
and dialectically intertwined. Agents interact and build institutions, but in the 
process institutions act back upon agents and affect their interests and iden­
tities, which in turn shapes their social interaction patterns and institutional 
outcomes and so forth. What this amounts to is an attempt to come to terms 
with the basic chicken-and-egg-problem that overshadows all social analysis: 
humans make their social world as much as they are made by it. To conceptu­
ally puncture this circle analysts need to assume a process of ongoing mutual 
constitution, thereby endogenising individual interests and identities in their 
analysis (Wacquant 1996; Berger and Luckmann 1991; Giddens 1984).
A fourth aspect of social constructivism (though one that is ‘bracketed’ 
by some constructivist scholars especially in IR [e.g. Wendt 1999, 1992]) 
hinges on the distinction between social identities and corporate identities:
Social identity captures the group’s defining characteristics (type identity) or the 
members’ collective conception of the group’s mission or role within a given 
social setting. Corporate identity . . .  constitutes a group’s very existence and its 
extension in tim e and space. . . .  Unlike social identities, then, corporate identi­
ties are configurations rather than mere properties o f otherwise given actors. As 
such, they can undergo ‘entity processes’ w ith respect to both their existence and 
extent. (Cederman and Daase 2003: 7-8; also Jackson and Nexon 1999)
A statement such as ‘Germany today sees itself as a European country’ has 
thus both a social identity and a corporate identity dimension: the former 
because it attributes aims and identifications to a presumed social actor; the 
latter because it postulates the existence of an actor called ‘Germany’, able to 
develop identities and preferences and to ‘see itself in a certain way.
Neither social nor corporate identities are ontologically real, of course: 
they are social constructs and as such their survival depends on the social 
reproduction of the particular intersubjective understandings that sustain 
them. For social researchers, in turn, this means that their analysis must 
endogenise not only social identities (i.e. interests and preferences) but also 
corporate identities (i.e. the making and unmaking of collective actors which 
‘hold’ such interests and preferences). In other words, they must treat corpo­
rate entities as dependent rather than independent variables, as ‘categories of 
practice’ rather than as ‘categories of analysis’ and as socially emergent rather 
than fixed (Brubaker 1996). Institutions and other corporate actors (coun­
tries, supranational unions, ethnic groups and so on) may change ‘their’ 
social identities and thereby acquire different interests and preferences.
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Alternatively» they may become caught in reverse ‘entity processes’ and disap­
pear: recent examples include Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and the Geology 
Department at Queen’s University Belfast.
Fifth, for social constructivists the process by which actors acquire social 
as well as corporate identities is one of social learning. Social learning involves 
internalisation. Following Durkheim’s famous postulate, to internalise means 
to incorporate the social world into the seif, leading towards a ‘symmetry 
between objective and subjective reality* (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 183) 
and a ‘correspondence between the objective classes and the internalised 
classes, social structures and mental structures’ (Bourdieu 1995: 164). The 
closer this fit between external and internal reality becomes, the more natural 
and self-evident the social world appears to its inhabitants, and the more do 
they take its existence and functioning for granted.
If acceptance of the social world is a function of its internalisation, it 
becomes dear why throughout time and space many different types of social 
arrangements have managed to procure social legitimacy. For such legitimacy 
is not intrinsic or immanent to these arrangements (depending on qualities 
such as, say, democratic procedures, commitment to social equality or respect 
for divine law), but instead results from its internalisation. Any type of social 
order has the potential to become socially legitimate (i.e. subjectively 
perceived as legitimate) among those subjected to it provided they internalise 
it sufficiently.
Sixth, for social constructivists the transmission and reproduction of 
social reality is symbolic -  so much so that many writers use the terms ‘social 
construction’ and ‘symbolic construction’ more or less interchangeably. At 
the same time, the concept of ‘symbol’ has remained elusive and lacks a 
universally accepted definition. Given that symbolism is central to this study 
it makes sense to dwell on its definition for a moment, starting with a distinc­
tion between primary and secondary symbols.
Primary symbols are the basic objectified and reified categories of social 
life -  the very identity-assuming corporate entities discussed earlier: 
‘Switzerland’, ‘the European Union’, ‘University College Dublin’, ‘the 
Republican Party’, ‘the Catholic Church’ and so on. Condensing the social 
world into objectified and bounded categories that are ‘entity-fied’ if not 
anthromorphised is a cognitive necessity for human beings. Social and polit­
ical reality is too complex, too fluid, too abstract, too fuzzy and too remote 
from our everyday experience ever to be apprehended in its totality. ‘Living in 
a society that extends well beyond our direct observation, we can relate to the 
large political entity only through abstract symbolic means’ (Kertzer 1988: 8; 
Cohen 1989). But subjectively these representations ‘are not viewed as 
symbolic constructions. Rather, they are thought of as objects that exist inde­
pendently o f people and their symbolic universe’ (Kertzer 1988: 6).
If France is thus a primary symbol, the French flag and anthem are 
secondary symbols. They represent and signify the symbolic category called
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‘France’ and, by extension, the multitude of social relationships and under­
standings which ‘France’ encapsulates and signifies. Secondary symbols 
(which can include objects, practices, gestures, words, images and music) are 
important in several ways. At the most rudimentary level they serve as 
markers and ‘mnemotechnic aids’ (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 88) which fa­
cilitate individuals’ apprehension and internalisation of the social categories 
to which they are tied. Second, while a given symbol is typically linked to a 
particular referent it cannot simply be reducedto that referent;, a symbol does 
not just ‘stand for something else’. If it did, as Anthony Cohen (1989:14) has 
pointed out, it would in many ways be redundant.
Instead, it is precisely to their ambiguity that symbols owe much of their 
significance. The same symbol can convey to different people (or even to the 
same person in different contexts) different associations and induce different 
emotions. This ambiguity makes symbols psychologically and socially impor­
tant. Psychologically, it allows symbols to aggregate meaning and gives 
individuals leeway to interpret and thereby mould representations of the 
social structures which these symbols symbolise (and which they are to inter­
nalise) so as to make them compatible with what they have previously 
internalised. Socially, it enables different people to subscribe to the same 
symbol without necessarily having to subscribe to identical norms. This facil­
itates social solidarity and cohesion even in the absence of complete 
normative agreement (Kertzer 1988: 11; Firth 1973).
Much more remains to be said about the role of symbols and, above all, 
about their creation and transmission. Chapter 2 returns to these issues in 
greater detail. But for now I turn to the final aspect of social constructivism, 
which is its concern with power.
Power, like symbolism, is difficult to conceptualise and the social science 
literature offers many competing and overlapping definitions. What unites all 
of them is a notion of inequality. In every society, the ability to define social 
reality -  social power -  is distributed unevenly. Social power in turn has two 
components: material and symbolic.
Material power refers to the ability of a given agent to shape the material 
world: to affect the distribution of resources, institutional relationships of 
obedience and control, physical force and so on. Symbolic power, by contrast, 
pertains to one’s ability to shape the ‘subjective’ side of the social world -  beliefs, 
perceptions, representations and intersubjective understandings. Wielding 
symbolic power means generating and transmitting symbols that for their part 
ensure the internalisation of a given social order. In other words, it involves
not only the resources required to impose one’s view on others, but also the 
authority to determine the shared meanings that constitute . . .  identities, inter­
ests and practices . . .  and to be able to get other actors to com m it themselves to 
those rules because they are now part of their self-understandings . . .  In this 
reading, power is primarily institutional power to  include and exclude, to  legit­
imise and authorise. (Adler 1997: 336 [emphasis omitted]).
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What such a rendering also suggests is that material power and symbolic 
power go together and mutually sustain and reinforce each other in some 
measure -  a claim that accords with a central tenet of social constructivism as 
discussed earlier: large parts of the material world are themselves socially 
determined, in that they are rooted in particular intersubjective understand­
ings about what the material world is, which in turn elicits social behaviour of 
a kind that gives social reality a shape that conforms to those very under­
standings, and thereby further reproduces and entrenches them. Therefore, 
affecting material reality by implication means affecting the ideas that shape 
it and the social mechanisms which in turn shape those ideas but which them­
selves depend on a material infrastructure. Accordingly, to every viable social 
and political order attaches a symbolic apparatus, just as, conversely, 
symbolic power presupposes power over material resources: schools, 
churches, museums and the like. In some measure, material power is 
symbolic power and vice versa.
Material and symbolic power are not simply two names for the same 
thing, however; wielding power in one field does not inevitably confer a 
corresponding degree of power in the other. Even where elites have almost 
total control over formal outlets of political symbolism (schools, the media, 
public rituals etc.), they may nonetheless fail to have much of a legitimising 
impact. This happened in Central and Eastern Europe throughout the 1970s 
and 80s as elite-controlled socialisation mechanisms gradually ceased to func­
tion. In social constructivist terminology, the result was a growing gap 
between objective and subjective reality, the rise of alternative symbolic 
spheres (finked to independent churches, trade unions, civil rights move­
ments and so on), and ultimately, the collapse of the regimes in question 
(Havel 1985).
Its partial autonomy from material power makes political symbolism 
interesting and the social construction of reality complex. In any given 
instance, the capacity of socially dominant agents to symbolically transmit the 
prevailing social and political order needs to be investigated rather than 
simply assumed. Moreover, where different social agents have competing 
political and material interests they will have different socialisation agendas, 
turning political symbolism into an arena of conflict and contestation. The 
frequent clashes in many countries between, say, secular state and church 
authorities about control of the school system and between different political 
parties about the ritual calendar bear this out (Green 1990; Kertzer 1988).
All the same, while symbolic power must thus be at the forefront of any 
constructivism-inspired research agenda it should not monopolise it. Social 
meanings, normative understandings and symbolic categories are not always 
the product of socially powerful agents imposing their definition of social 
reality on the subordinate. Instead, from Habermas to the Stanford School in 
sociology, many broadly defined constructivist approaches emphasise the 
potential for non-hierarchical, communicative and deliberative roads to
shared social understandings (but note the caveat below). Likewise, many 
analysts point to more voluntaristic, cognitively driven forms of norm diffu­
sion and internalisation (Meyer, Boli, Thomas and Ramirez 1997; Habermas 
1984; see Cederman 2001a and Finnemore 1996 for a critique). Beyond this, 
social constructivists must be careful not to overestimate systemic needs for 
legitimacy in the first place, i.e. the extent to which social conformity hinges 
on shared internalised meanings. Instead, they must factor in the role of 
pragmatic acquiescence, apathy, instrumental consent and various forms of 
coercion in generating social and political compliance. To return to the 
earlier example, a breakdown in symbolic transmission mechanisms and a 
growing "discongruence between objective and subjective reality’ choked off 
the symbolic effectiveness of the Central and East European dictatorships in 
the late 1980s. All the same, it was Gorbachev’s refusal to prop up their rule 
with Soviet tanks that spelled their ultimate demise. Legitimacy -  defined as 
the symbolic apprehension of a given social order -  matters, but it is not the 
only factor that determines the survival of this order?
These caveats, however, do not obliterate the core insights of social 
constructivism: ideational rather than material forces shape the social world 
in the first instance; agents and structures are mutually constitutive; internal­
isation and social learning legitimise and reproduce social reality; and 
symbols and symbolic power are central to this. What, then, does all that 
imply for the study of European integration?
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Social constructivism and European integration
One important clarification at the outset: social constructivism is not a theory 
of European integration. In and of itself it says nothing about its origins and 
future potential and about the factors that are driving or impeding it. Instead, 
the best way to view constructivism is as a broader social scientific paradigm, 
a conceptual prism through which more "middle range’ approaches to partic­
ular empirical phenomena such as European integration can be developed 
and assessed (see Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener 1999).
Trying to apply constructivist insights to European integration in this 
way is both promising and difficult. It is promising because, in principle, it 
helps us theorise underlying social and normative transformations which 
conventional perspectives cannot adequately capture. For example, while it is 
now common (far beyond the constructivism-inspired literature) to depict 
the Union as an "emerging actor’ and thus to imply an unfolding "entity 
process’, capturing such a process requires constructivist tools by definition. 
Since, as was argued, corporate actorhood is rooted in social norms, an 
approach that postulates fixed norms cannot explain the emergence (or the 
demise) of corporate actors -  be they states, supranational unions or what­
ever.
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The same is true for the social identities of the various actors implicated 
in the European integration process. In so far as European integration 
induces social learning and thereby alters norms and preferences among state 
elites and other actors, and in so far as these changes feed back into the inte­
gration process itself (thereby constituting an ‘agent-structure dialectic’), we 
cannot assume fixed preferences. Instead, our analysis must endogenise 
changing interests and evolving social identities.
All this is of course easier to assert in theory than to apply in practice. The 
central challenge lies with the two ‘in so far’ clauses in the preceding para­
graph. To argue that identities, preferences, norms, symbolic meanings and 
so on change is one thing, but to show that these changes actually stem from 
a particular social process (European integration, say) is quite another. What 
is still harder to demonstrate is that these changes matter in the sense of 
producing tangible political consequences that then feed back into the 
European integration process and influence its speed and direction. Critics of 
constructivism-inspired EU scholarship often make this their main complaint 
(e.g. Moravcsik 1999). In the EU as elsewhere, not all changes in norms, inter­
ests and identifications have the same origin and not all are politically 
relevant, Conversely, not all that is politically relevant thrives on underlying 
normative changes. In some respects, European integration probably is 
mainly about the pursuit of economic self-interest by national governments. 
The challenge for social constructivists is to separate those situations from 
others where ‘deeper’, ‘thicker’ and more constitutive dynamics are at work 
This is clearly not an easy task.5 To gain some handle on it, it makes sense to 
distinguish between three strands of social constructivism-inspired research 
on European integration.
Elite-centred constructivism
The oldest and best-established constructivist take on the EU focuses on 
social learning among decision-makers. As political elites (mainly within 
European institutions, but also to some extent within national bureaucracies 
and non-governmental organisations) become involved in the daily manage­
ment of European integration, they can acquire new, more Europeanised 
loyalties, identifications and normative orientations. This in turn strengthens 
their normative commitment to European integration and their determina­
tion to advance it.
Investigating norm change among elites has a long tradition in the liter­
ature on European integration which anticipates the recent constructivist 
turn by many decades. A good example is the neofunctionalist concept of 
‘political spillover’ and its notion of integration as a ‘process whereby politi­
cal actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new center’ 
(Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991; E. Haas 1958: 16; Chapter 2 in this volume). 
More recently, social-anthropological studies inside the European
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Commission and other international agencies claim to detect similar 
processes (e.g. Shore 2000; Zabusfcy 1995). Among political scientists, Peter 
Haas’ (1992) concept o f‘epistemic communities’ and Chekel’s (2002) work of 
norm-diffusion in the Council of Europe are part of the same tradition.
For students of European integration a focus on elite learning is promis­
ing in many respects. Given that it pertains to political decision-makers its 
findings prima facie are politically relevant (but note the caveat below). 
Moreover, the underlying assumptions which guide this research, namely that 
social interaction and shared group situations can promote new social and 
corporate identities, find support from across the social sciences, above all 
from social-psychology (Hogg and Abrams 1988; Tajfel 1981). Finally, since 
elite-centred studies focus on a relatively small number of individuals (e.g. 
Commission officials) they are able to conduct in-depth personal interviews 
and engage in participant observation. That makes them less prone to the 
fallacy of wanting to infer norms and identities purely from behaviour and 
behavioural outcomes and tends to produce more empirically nuanced and 
sophisticated findings.
At the same time, to be theoretically interesting and empirically relevant, 
elite-centred constructivists must do more than demonstrate that integration 
affects elite identifications. Instead, they must also show that elites are actu­
ally able to pursue their Europeanised preferences to the point where this has 
political consequences. This brings them into overlap with more established 
debates in the integration literature, revolving around the relative power of 
various actors in the EU, the potential for political engineering by suprana­
tional officials and so forth (see Chapter 2 in this volume). All the same, even 
if normative changes at the elite level were found to occur, and even if these 
were found to promote integration, this would still say little about the EU’s 
impact at the mass level. This is the focus of the second strand of construc­
tivism-inspired scholarship on the EU, to which I turn next.
Transactionalist constructivism
Exploring the normative dimensions of international integration at the 
popular level, too, is deeply rooted in the literature, predating the emergence 
of a self-consciously constructivist strand of EU scholarship by many decades. 
By far the greatest credit goes to the pioneering studies by Karl Deutsch and 
his associates throughout the 1950s and 60s (e.g. Deutsch et al. 1957; Deutsch 
1954; see also Puchala 1981; Pentland 1973).
For Deutsch, integration (both domestically and internationally) entails 
a growing volume of interaction and ‘social communication’ between the 
societies involved; trade, telephone calls, letters, tourism, cross-marriages, 
railway journeys, exposure to each other’s media, music, languages and 
lifestyles and so forth. Such mutual exposure and interaction in turn can 
induce social learning (Deutsch used this very term), and a gradual change of 
attitudes between the affected populations. These may become marked by a
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growing mutual responsiveness and trust and by a reduction in negative 
stereotypes. According to Deutsch, psychological transformations of this kind 
can carry political changes in their wake. Initially they may lead to the forma­
tion of a ‘pluralistic security community’, characterised by some overarching j 
‘we-feeling5 and the elimination of all expectations of violence but no signifi­
cant merger of institutions. Ultimately, a ‘pluralistic security community5 
may evolve into an ‘amalgamated’ one, i.e. a supranational federation or some 
other type of unified or partially unified overarching political system.
Yet neither outcome is inevitable, according to Deutsch. On the one 
hand, the overall volume of transactions may remain too low to generate 
sufficient psychological and political momentum. On the other hand, too 
much interaction at too rapidly growing a rate can be disintegrative. Since < 
interaction always has the potential to generate friction, it can overburden i 
capacities for psychological and institutional adjustment.6 Therein, for 
Deutsch, lie the relative merits of ‘pluralistic’ as opposed to ‘amalgamated’ 
security communities. A premature leap into political integration may back­
fire, since the very high volume of interaction this presupposes as well as 
generates may overload the system at large and thereby erode its very foun- ; 
dations. >
Deutschian transactionalism has attracted many criticisms: notably for 
failing to differentiate more sharply between cause and effect, for its difficul­
ties in measuring and quantifying transactions and for its fixation on 
behaviourist methodology (Adler and Barnett 1998; Puchala 1981; Connor 
1972). However, in what follows I put these criticisms to one side, showing i 
instead that Deutschian thinking has influenced the contemporary construc­
tivist literature on the EU in two distinct ways.
A first group of transactionalism-inspired scholars detects a growing 
cultural homogenisation among the EU’s member populations -  a gradual 
levelling of lifestyles, social attitudes, consumption patterns, commercial 
cultures and so on. This includes national ‘morality regimes’ in areas such as ; 
drugs, sex and abortion (Kurzer 2001), practices on citizenship, multicultur- > 
alism and immigration (Soysal 1994) and a gamut of tastes, habits and social 1 
preferences (Bomeman and Fowler 1997; Kaelble 1987). Following Deutsch, 
these writers all suggest that such levelling processes somehow thrive on 
‘interaction’, though they typically cast their theoretical nets more widely. 
Some incorporate parts of the norm diffusion model developed by the j 
Stanford School in sociology, while others focus on common market-induced \ 
regulatory arbitrage and its corrosive effect on national cultural particulari- , 
ties. Whatever their precise angle, these approaches share the belief that 
interaction ultimately fosters cultural sameness.
This raises several issues. First, while national norms and policies on, say, 
gay marriage and cannabis use might be converging, the same does not apply • 
to many other issue areas (such as language and media consumption) where 
almost no levelling has occurred (see Collins 2002; Chapter 4 below). Second,
S y m b o l ism  a n d  th e  so c ia l  c o n s t r u c t io n  of th e  eu 19
even where cultural and institutional homogenisation is clearly evident this 
often represents a more general Western phenomenon rather than a specifi­
cally European one. Spain and Finland may be adopting similar norms on 
cannabis consumption and animal rights and they might be building increas­
ingly similar-looking airports and shopping malls; but the same is also 
happening in places far beyond Europe’s shores. Therefore, even those who 
claim to witness a ‘European society’ in the making (Kaelble 1987) would 
have to recognise that much of what it contains is not specifically European. 
By extension, more global, as opposed to just European, processes of cultural 
diffusion are bound to generate much of it.
The final objection is the most important one: the homogenisation of 
cultural form in some areas does not necessarily equate to a homogenisation 
of meaning, much less to the growth of overarching European identifications 
and political loyalties. After all, some of the most vicious conflicts of recent 
times have involved populations that share a great deal of cultural similarity 
-  Rwanda, ex-Yugoslavia and Northern Ireland illustrate the point. 
Conversely, theorists of consociational democracy have long shown that 
continued cultural fragmentation does not necessarily preclude the develop­
ment of shared political identifications (Theiler 2004b; McRae 1983; Lijphart 
1977, 1968). Underpinning such observations is a key postulate of social 
constructivism as discussed earlier: ideas, not material forces shape the social 
world in the first instance, and whatever meaning attaches to the material 
world is itself socially determined. Against this backdrop, the wider political 
significance of the various transactionalism-inspired cultural European­
isation accounts is far from obvious.
Post-nationalism and the ‘tandem* hypothesis
The second strand of mass-centred constructivism takes such objections on 
board. Often termed (somewhat confusingly in the context of European inte­
gration studies) ‘post-nationalism’, it is not primarily concerned with the 
homogenisation of material culture or of relatively narrow social norms. 
Instead, it focuses on what it sees as the emergence of a broader normative and 
symbolic space among Europeans and of an overarching ‘civic’ identity to 
accompany it. This shared ideational realm is seen to include adherence to polit­
ical and constitutional principles (liberal democracy, rule of law, human rights, 
separation of powers, etc.), together with values such as social tolerance, multi­
culturalism and the welfare state. For post-nationalist scholars, such values can 
develop even in the absence of cultural and linguistic homogeneity and indeed 
dissolve the need to bring about such homogeneity in order to sustain an emerg­
ing pan-European democratic system. Jürgen Habermas’s well-known concept 
o f‘constitutional patriotism’ encapsulates such a faith in the viability of shared 
‘civic’ identifications and democratic practices in the EU, drawing inspiration 
from multicultural democracies such as Switzerland, Canada and the United 
States (Fine and Smith 2003; Habermas 1991).
Communicative action and constructivist dialectics are at work all 
through the post-national story. Social and institutional linkages in EU- 
Europe drive the evolution and diffusion of Eberal democratic norms and 
practices, leading to a shared European public space. Over time, this enables 
a supranational democratic process to take root, which strengthens and legit­
imises the EU’s institutional and constitutional framework. This in turn helps 
to further consolidate EU-wide democratic and deliberative processes, 
further solidifying shared norms and symbolic meanings and so forth. These 
mutually reinforcing developments help transcend Rousseau’s famous 
chicken-and-egg dilemma according to which democracy strengthens a sense 
of community but also presupposes it (see Cederman and Kraus 2002). For 
post-nationalists, democracy, community and demos beget and gradually 
strengthen each other.
Different post-national accounts have different nuances, discussion of 
which would go beyond the scope of this chapter (see Kostakopoulou 1997; 
Weiler 1996; Delanty 1995; Howe 1995). Yet the underlying assertion inform­
ing all of them has both normative and analytical appeal. In most normative 
readings, an EU signified by liberal democratic principles would be preferable 
to one predicated upon, say, claims to racial homogeneity, cultural similarity 
or a belief in the intrinsic supremacy of the Judeo-Christian heritage. From an 
analytical perspective, the central claim of post-national approaches is equally 
well taken, if seen against the backdrop of core constructivist assumptions as 
outlined earlier. Since symbols are markers that signify, transmit and thereby 
foster thie internalisation of political structures and institutions, nothing in 
principle stands in the way of purely ‘civic’ themes becoming the defining 
markers of an overarching European polity. It is the degree to which symbols 
are disseminated and internalised, not the nature of those symbols, which 
determines the social legitimacy of a political system in the first instance (see 
Chapter 2 below).7
All the same, one central question overshadows all post-national 
approaches to the EU. Even if one accepts that transnational communication 
and democratic deliberation strengthen transnational identifications and 
demos-formation, this does not imply that the latter are a mere reflex to the 
former. Otherwise, democratic systems ipso facto could never face any legiti­
macy problems in the first place. Instead, for some otherwise sympathetic 
critics of post-national blueprints, transnational political legitimacy does not 
result from democratic interaction alone, but instead requires ‘specific iden­
tity-building mechanisms that are at least partly independent of democratic 
decision-making’ (Cederman and Kraus 2002: 7). More specifically, it 
requires a cultural and symbolic infrastructure to support, channel and 
mould communicative and deliberative processes and to cultivate among citi­
zens the competences they need to participate in such processes in the first 
place as well as the communal identifications that make them want to partic­
ipate. Such an infrastructure, in turn, requires the involvement of political
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elites and the use of symbols and symbolic power in the ways discussed
earlier. In short, in this rendering an interplay involving ‘top-down’ and
£bottom-up’ processes generates viable political identities. It alone produces
‘communicative capacity that enables deliberation and generates a sufficiently
strong we-feeling that can carry the weight of effective and democratic gover­
nance’ (Cederman 2001a: 157).
Theoretically, this ‘tandem’ hypothesis reflects the earlier point that the 
social world is the product of seemingly spontaneous and uncoordinated 
social interaction and of reality-defining symbolic impositions by elites which 
help structure this interaction. Historically, most accounts of political legit- 
imisation in domestic settings make much the same point: broad-based 
political mobilisation and democratic participation grew alongside the 
creation and dissemination of symbolic categories by state elites. Typically, 
this entailed a large measure of outright cultural and linguistic homogenisa­
tion, even in many states that are officially defined in largely ‘civic’ terms -  
France is a good example (Brubaker 1999; Calhoun 1997; Hobsbawm 1994;
Weber 1976). But even where state elites renounced cultural assimilation they 
nonetheless fostered overarching communal sentiments and political loyalties 
by other means: they created shared myths and symbols, and used schools, the 
mass media, military conscription, public rituals and many similar devices to 
disseminate them. Even Switzerland, the empirical jewel in the crown of 
almost every post-nationalism theorist, was no exception. More recent histor- .]
ical accounts of Swiss state-building emphasise its elite-driven aspects, in 
opposition to more traditional conceptions of Switzerland as a purely volun­
taristic ‘nation of will’ that to some extent still permeates the country’s official 
national ethos (Altermatt, Bosshart-Pflüger and Tanner 1998; Hettling 1998).
What does all this mean for a constructivist take on European integra­
tion? Regardless of how close an analogy between state-building and f
European integration one is prepared to accept (more on this in the next 
chapter), the basic theoretical point remains: as did the former, the legitimi- ?
sation of the EU requires the ‘top-down’ cultivation of symbolic categories 1
and communicative capacities which, if successful, enables more ‘bottom-up’ ]
processes of communicative action and democratic deliberation to take root <5
and thereby lead to the formation of overarching political loyalties and polit- 1
ical identifications. For this to be effective, the symbolic categories in i
question would have to become j
so internalised that they become part o f the fabric o f subjectivity and the indi- j
vidual’s sense o f self [ .. .  They] include notions like ‘European citizen, a ‘good 1
European’, a ‘European problem ’, ‘com m on European values’, ‘European j
culture’ and ‘Europeanness’ itself.. . .  Constructing Europe requires the creation 
o f ‘Europeans’, no t simply as an objectified category o f EU passport-holders and j
‘citizens’ but, m ore fundamentally, as a category o f subjectivity. (Shore 2000: |
29-30) 1
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This raises many questions, to be sure: ‘How much’ in the way of a shared 
‘European subjectivity’ is needed to sustain the EU? And what, precisely, 
would it need to ‘consist of? The next chapter returns to these issues. But 
first, it is useful to take a conceptual step back by differentiating between 
three potential sources of legitimacy and levels of legitimisation in the 
European Union.
Three roads to legitimacy
The first type of legitimisation relies on the concept of ‘utilitarian support’ 
that reverberates throughout much of the literature on European integration. 
Utilitarian support grows when national publics become convinced that their 
interests are best served by membership of the European Union and/or by the 
pursuit or expansion of particular EU policies. There are no a priori restric­
tions as to what these interests may consist of, although most analysts assume 
that economic welfare concerns take centre stage. Moreover, individuals may 
either focus on their own personal welfare, or on that of a corporate category 
they identify with and whose perceived interests thus partially become their 
own (such as a state, region or interest group).
For some analysts utilitarian support can be captured outside a construc­
tivist framework. After all, material welfare is often seen to constitute a fixed 
preference which requires no social construction and which does not change 
due to participation in the EU. Regardless of whether or not one accepts this, 
utilitarian gains (especially future ones) are often a matter of perception and 
as such they are subject to symbolic (re)definition. Take recent EU campaigns 
to promote public support for enlargement. Frequently, these revolve around 
attempts to dissociate the new members in Central and Eastern Europe from 
perceptions of threat (e.g. ‘organised crime’, ‘immigration flood’, ‘not fully 
civilised’) in order to link them to notions of benefit and opportunity (‘new 
export markets’, ‘rich cultural heritage’ ‘youthful new democracies’ and so 
on). As shown in later chapters, the same logic informs the EU’s perennial 
efforts to make its public image appear less technocratic and more caring and 
in tune with the practical concerns of ordinary citizens.
The second mechanism capable of enhancing the EU’s popular legitimacy 
requires the rise of (a) new interests and preferences among national publics 
and (b) a belief that these are best served by the EU. In as far as the nation­
state is the interest-referent, this involves redefining national interests in 
order to make them more compatible with European integration. Sustained 
efforts by Irish political elites over the past three decades to ‘reimagine’ 
Ireland as a mainstream European country are a good example, as are 
attempts by post-war West German elites to define their country as a Western 
democracy whose ‘natural destiny’ lies ‘in Europe’ (see Hayward 2002).
Exploring how interests become redefined in this way requires a broadly
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constructivist line of inquiry. It presupposes that social identities are fluid 
rather than fixed, and that their evolution is dialectically related to the 
European integration process. As a polity participates in this process its pref­
erences change, which in turn affects its participation in the EU and so on.
At the same time, what is at stake at this level of legitimisation are changes 
in social identity, not corporate identity. In other words, while the social 
identities attributed to the member states may become more amenable to 
European integration, this does not in and of itself turn the EU into a 
perceived corporate actor and identity category in its own right. It does not 
entail a European ‘entity process’. It is this latter development which, if it 
occurs, constitutes the third potential source of legitimacy for the EU.
As suggested earlier, a European ‘entity process’ would entail growing 
perceptions of the EU as a real existing unit and actor and the parallel reifica­
tion of ‘Europeans’ as a community with needs, aspirations and the capacity 
for agency. It would turn ‘Europe’ (or the EU) into an objectified, reified and 
internalised category, and a shared point of reference around which overar­
ching communicative and deliberative processes could revolve. As ‘Europe’ 
would enter into the self-definitions of its citizens, they would identify with it 
and make its perceived interests and aspirations their own. Moreover, since 
the overarching communal category would now be bound up with their iden­
tity they would value its preservation as an end in itself rather than just as a 
means to achieve other ends. This would give it a self-referential claim to 
survival and in some measure insulate it from calculations of utilitarian gain 
(Waever 1996).
Eventually, the rise o f‘Europe’ as a corporate actor and overarching iden­
tity category could come to submerge the corporate actorhood of the member 
states. In a less far-reaching scenario, the EU would evolve into a comple­
mentary category of belonging, representing the outermost level of 
identification in a Russian dolls-type arrangement. Either development 
would entail the acquisition of a symbolic repertoire to signify and sustain an 
overarching European communal category as well as the boundaries that 
would separate a new inside from a new outside. Following the ‘tandem’ logic, 
this would need to have a ‘top-down’ as well as a ‘bottom-up’ dimension. It 
would require the construction of new symbolic categories by elites as well as 
more broad-based communicative and interactional patterns to consolidate 
and reproduce these categories and thereby place them on a self-sustaining 
basis.
As suggested, there are no a priori limits as to what type of symbols such 
third-level legitimisation processes might draw on. In most state- and nation­
building settings they had some ‘thicker’ cultural or ethnic flavour, but in 
principle purely ‘civic’ symbols, too, could come to signify an overarching 
European communal and corporate category. The next chapter will elaborate 
further on this ‘thick versus thin’ distinction. In any case, several factors help 
determine what kinds of symbols are employed in a given setting. They
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include pre-existing social and cultural conditions (the greater the degree of 
existing cultural diversity, the stronger might be the temptation to resort to 
thinner, non-cultural symbols), prevailing normative orientations (e.g. 
whether cultural assimilation is deemed an acceptable option), as well as 
more general elite preferences (e.g. whether they conceive of the EU primarily 
as a ‘civic’ or also as a cultural project). Mechanisms of elite socialisation as 
captured by ‘elite-centred constructivism’ described earlier help account for 
these preferences.
Cultivating perceptions that institutions meet existing interests, changing 
these interests and fostering new corporate identities are thus the three possi­
ble routes to political legitimacy, in the EU as much as in any other 
institutional context. Historical accounts of state- and nation-building 
suggest that all three were involved in every instance, albeit in various propor­
tions. States appealed to the (often material) self-interests of their citizens 
while also seeking to re-shape pre-existing local and regional communal iden­
tifications to make them more amenable to inclusion in an overarching 
political category. AU the while the state itself acquired a corporate identity of 
its own, either submerging local and regional affiliations in the long term (as 
in many unitary states) or incorporating them into a co-centric circles of alle­
giance scheme (as in federal and consociational systems).
‘Entitativity’ and boundaries
But why not stop at the second, or even only at the first level of legitimisation, 
short of engendering an overarching sense of community, ‘entitativity’ and 
collective actorhood? Most theorists of European integration follow their 
‘domestic’ counterparts and rule out this possibility.® They insist that ulti­
mately the EU cannot acquire lasting legitimacy unless it evolves into an 
overarching European community. This claim is often defended on ‘practical’ 
as well as psychological grounds.
‘Practical’ explanations build on the earlier point that political systems 
(especiaUy democratic ones) can only function if their members inhabit a 
framework of shared meanings -  constituted by basic normative orientations, 
cognitive reference points and a common symbolic repertoire to express and 
disseminate them (Thaa 2001). Such meanings, the argument goes, can only 
emerge and be sustained in bounded communal settings, as these give shape 
to and protect stable communicative and interactional patterns that produce 
and reproduce shared meanings in the first place. Psychological explanations, 
by contrast, highlight the Rousseauvian point that legitimacy, and especially 
democratic legitimacy, rely on underlying psychological conditions which 
only community can foster. One important factor is the alienating potential 
of majority decisions on the overruled; but if ‘the majority has decided’ 
becomes ‘w h a v e  decided’ a sense of being dominated by others disappears.
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Similarly, communal sentiments can foster popular acceptance of redistribu­
tive policies and of various obligations which overarching institutions impose 
upon their subjects. If these perceive an obligation towards these institutions 
as a duty towards other community members or towards the internalised 
communal ‘entity* at large, they are less likely to experience alienation and 
more likely to comply (Thaa 2001; Scharpf 1998; Etzioni 1968,1965). Finally, 
as suggested, the ‘end in itself-status and self-referential claim to survival that 
flows from ‘third-level’ legitimacy helps insulate the institution in question 
from utilitarian cost-benefit calculations and thereby makes it less vulnerable 
to changes in underlying material conditions.
Underlying both accounts is a broader theoretical point regarding the 
function of communal boundaries. More specifically, boundaries are not 
simply the result of what is going on inside them; they do not just reflect 
shared communal sentiments, political commitments and ‘entity perceptions’ 
among those whom they enclose. Instead, just as social processes and ‘entities’ 
define boundaries, boundaries can promote internal cohesion and fuel ‘entity 
processes’ (Cederman and Daase 2003; Cederman 2001b; Brubaker 1996; 
Abbott 1995; Bourdieu 1994, 1980; Simmel 1955). Social ‘things’ constitute 
boundaries as much as boundaries make social ‘things’.
Strengthening boundaries and making them more visible can promote 
‘entity processes’ and thus third-level legitimacy in three ways. First, it makes 
a given social category more discernible and thus easier to internalise. Second, 
it makes that category more salient as boundary awareness promotes 
outgroup awareness, which in turn increases the salience of the ingroup. 
Finally, by accentuating perceptions of external difference, boundaries 
increase perceptions of internal similarity, thereby facilitating internal cohe­
sion and the emergence of communal sentiments (Theiler 2003; Hogg and 
Abrams 1988). On account of this logic, then, political institutions are more 
likely to emerge and to survive if (a) they are embedded in a bounded 
communal ‘entity’ and (b) they manage to accentuate the boundaries of this 
entity, above all by differentiating it from outgroups. The extension of this 
claim is that political institutions will seek to preserve and, if necessary, culti­
vate boundary awareness among their subjects, and that those that succeed in 
doing so are more likely to prevail than those that do not.
Neither claim is theoretically invincible. In the first place, accentuating 
boundaries with outgroups is not the only conceivable way of fostering 
communal sentiments and overarching ‘entitativityV More broadly, strong 
first- and second-level legitimacy might obliterate the need for moving to the 
third level in the first place. Nonetheless, to say that the rise of a bounded 
overarching European sense of community and corporate identity is not the 
only conceivable route to political legitimacy does not invalidate the notion 
that such third-level processes would be conducive to it. As indicated, all 
historical examples of state legitimisation point to the presence of third-level 
mechanisms, albeit to varying degrees (more on this in the next chapter).
26 P o l it ic a l  sy m b o l is m  a n d  Eu r o p e a n  in t e g r a t io n
W ithout third-level political legitimacy, the onus on the other two sources 
might well become unrealistically high.
To briefly sum up this chapter: social constructivism stresses the primacy 
of ideational over material factors, and the dialectical relationship between 
individual agents and institutions. Of the various ways of applying construc­
tivist principles to European integration, those that centre on the potential 
emergence of a pan-European symbolic and communicative space are the 
most sophisticated. They reflect constructivism’s emphasis on ideas. At the 
same time, these approaches must incorporate not just social communica- 
tions-type ‘bottom-up’ dynamics but also ‘top-down’ ones that revolve 
around symbolic legitimisation strategies by political elites. Finally, the 
chapter identified three specific sources of political legitimacy. These are (1) 
a growth in perceptions that institutions meet existing interests; (2) a change 
in those interests; and (3) the emergence of a new overarching corporate 
identity. The next chapter seeks to put more empirical flesh on the relatively 
bare theoretical bones sketched so far before the second part of the book turns 
to actual and attempted political symbolism in the European Union.
Notes
1 The common French term ‘la construction europeenne’ captures this much better.
2 Key constructivist texts in sociology include Bourdieu (1995), Searle (1995), Berger 
and Luckmann (1991) and Giddens (1984). For important theoretical additions see 
Emirbayer (1997) and Abbott (1995). For applications of constructivist thinking to 
International Relations see Cederman and Daase (2003), Guzzini (2000), Jackson and 
Nexon (1999), Wendt (1999, 1992), Chekel (1998), Adler (1997), Ringmar (1996), 
Wsever, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre (1993) and Onuf (1989).
3 Such criticism against materialistic approaches to the social world is nothing new, of 
course. As fimile Dürkheim (1922) famously observed, every social fact can only be 
explained in terms of other social facts as opposed to underlying material or psycho­
logical factors. Otherwise, we could not account for the vast amount of cultural 
complexity and diversity across time and space.
4 On the wider issue see Held (1988, Chapter 4), Abercrombie and Turner (1978) and 
Mann (1970).
5 Reserving constructivist insights for long-term processes and ‘rationalist’ ones for the 
short-term cannot fully resolve this problem. It is true that identities (both social and 
corporate) are more likely to change over the long haul: very few of today’s corporate 
actors existed a thousand years ago. At the same time, once constructed, many social 
practices, beliefs and institutions become deeply sedimented and thereby congeal 
over long periods of time (Cederman 2001a; Berger and Luckmann 1991). 
Conversely, when social and corporate identities do change, this often happens very 
rapidly, through sudden breaks and disjunctures rather than through incremental 
evolutionary transformations (Theiler 2003). In the end, both Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union died very quickly, just as, a few decades before, the political transfor­
mation of post-war Western Europe was as profound as it was rapid and in many ways 
unexpected.
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6 Moreover, it may well depend on a range of contextual variables such as the ‘themes’ 
around which contacts revolve (Hogg and Abrams 1988; Connor 1972).
7 Though language in particular has an ambiguous status in this context. To the extent 
that it serves as communal signifier, linguistic homogenisation is not needed to 
promote political legitimacy as alternative, more ‘civic’ signifiers can do the job. 
However, language also has a more practical function in that it is linked to commu­
nicative and deliberative competence which for its part can facilitate the emergence 
and entrenchment of shared ‘civic’ values (see below). And while the Swiss example 
shows that overarching democratic processes can take root without a common 
language, most other states have tried to promote some measure of linguistic 
homogenisation, or at least an overarching lingua franca alongside local and regional 
languages.
8 An exception were the early Functionalist blueprints of integration. Elaborated in the 
inter-war period by David Mitrany and his collaborators, they advocated the gradual 
replacement of the states-system with an arrangement of de-territorialised, de- 
communalised and mutually disconnected institutions whose scope and powers 
would reflect solely their respective functional remit (McLaren 1985; Mitrany 1966). 
But the early Functionalism found few adherents. Its critics denounced it as overly 
technocratic and rationalistic, arguing that supranational institutions not rooted in a 
corresponding supranational community are either impossible to achieve or doomed 
to suffer from a chronic lack of legitimacy and popular identifications (see Pentland 
1973).
9 For example, in his earlier work Habermas himself does not insist on community as 
a precondition for effective communicative action. In this rendering, communicative 
action can lead to shared meanings provided the participants share broadly commen­
surate cognitive and normative horizons. They do not, however, necessarily have to 
partake a bounded communal context in the sense defined above. Yet in at least some 
of his more recent writings on post-nationalism and ‘constitutional patriotism’ in the 
EU Habermas postulates more stringent conditions, depicting supranational commu­
nal sentiments as a prerequisite for a viable supranational political system. His aim is 
of course to show that these sentiments could be ‘civic’ as opposed to cultural or 
ethnic, but they would be communal all the same. Incidentally, very few critics of the 
‘constitutional patriotism’ blueprint criticise it from this angle. Instead, most are 
preoccupied with doubts as to whether a ‘thin’ supranational community would be 
‘thick enough’ (but see Kostakopoulou 1997; see Thaa 2001 for a differing interpreta­
tion of Habermas’s concept of post-nationalism).
1
Political symbolism in practice
Whereas the last chapter dealt with political symbolism in theory, the present 
chapter analyses its practical workings. Drawing on examples of political 
legitimisation in domestic settings, it explores the tactics, techniques, themes 
and mechanisms that defined domestic political symbolism drives. How were 
political symbols developed, disseminated and maintained? What makes ‘top- 
down’ symbolic initiatives more likely to induce the kind of ‘bottom-up’ 
processes which in turn lead to shared political identifications and institu­
tional legitimacy? Finally, what can we infer from this regarding political 
symbolism in the EU, bearing in mind the obvious limits of such an analogy?1
The last point is important. It calls for some preliminary remarks on the 
appropriateness of drawing limited parallels between domestic politics and 
contemporary European integration. Above all, there is a need to address 
potential objections to the effect that the very open-endedness and sui generis 
character of the EU rules out valid analogies with any other political system, 
the modern state included. Two arguments, however, help counter such 
objections.
First, a limited analogy between state-building and European integration 
does not imply that the two are qualitatively the same, either in terms of 
process or ‘end product’. For example, it does not suggest that the EU will 
have to become a nation-state-type entity in order to acquire popular legiti­
macy. What it does presuppose is merely that in some aspects the two 
phenomena are sufficiently similar to make a comparison between them 
meaningful. This is the minimum condition for any kind of fruitful social 
comparison, and in the present case it is clearly satisfied. At both the state and 
the European level there is a need to foster popular consent for political insti­
tutions and practices. In both cases, moreover, there are three potential routes 
to legitimacy. As discussed in the last chapter, they range from a growth in 
perceptions that shared institutions meet existing interests to the emergence
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of new overarching corporate and communal identifications. Finally, in both 
cases the underlying mechanisms of political legitimisation would be compa­
rable, including the role of symbols and the general means of their 
transmission. This being said, the specific types of symbols and transmission 
mechanisms liable to be used in the early twenty-first century EU might well 
be different from those used inside states (which of course strongly differed 
among themselves as well). Moreover, depending on the general political 
development of the EU, the intensity of their transmission and their overall 
salience might remain much lower without compromising their effectiveness 
-  an issue I return to further below. In short, the examples discussed in this 
chapter serve to illustrate symbolic form and method rather than intensity 
and ‘content’.
Culture, audiovisual policy and education, and the symbolic construction of 
political identities
Political symbolism is not a new concern in the literature on state legitimisa­
tion, nation-building and related subjects. In fact, much of this literature has 
become rather preoccupied with it, sometimes inspired by and sometimes 
preceding the various constructivist waves in recent years. Different writers 
capture the process by which political reality is symbolically transmitted and 
mediated under different headings: ‘symbolic politics’, ‘political symbolism’, 
‘political pedagogy’, ‘political ritual’ and ‘political aesthetics’ are among the 
most frequently used (Dörner 1996; Kertzer 1988; Edelman 1967; also A. P. 
Cohen 1989; A. Cohen 1969).
Exploring political symbolism in action is difficult, however, bearing in 
mind the earlier point that every aspect of social reality has a symbolic dimen­
sion and that all social and political behaviour therefore has symbolic 
consequences. But if all politics is symbolic, political symbolism becomes 
synonymous with ‘politics’ and vanishes as a distinct field of inquiry. In order 
to overcome such definitional problems the present study concentrates on 
cultural, audiovisual and educational policy, taking them to be the most 
important outlets for political symbolism. These areas are broad and require 
definitional work in their own right, but they are nonetheless more circum­
scribed than is ‘political symbolism’ at large. As is argued below, cultural, 
audiovisual and educational policies typically reflect symbolic intent. 
Moreover, while not all such policies are designed to achieve political ends, 
the fit is relatively close the other way round. Most state- and nation-building 
drives concentrated heavily on cultural and educational (as well as, in later 
stages, audiovisual) policy, and those areas were often subjected to ferocious 
rivalry between different elites with competing political socialisation agendas 
(e.g. between church and secular authorities over school curricula). Likewise, 
as later chapters show, in the European Union most policies aimed at
strengthening public support for integration fall under the responsibility of 
Commission departments in charge of culture, audiovisual policy and educa­
tion. Before proceeding, it is helpful to briefly define these policy areas.
Cultural policy, to begin with, is a vague concept. Theoretically, this 
corresponds to the vagueness of the term ‘culture’. Empirically, it is due to the 
fact that state practice has differed widely. Most Western democracies have 
ministries whose brief includes culture. Especially in Anglo-Saxon countries 
these are often in charge of ‘heritage matters’. The powers of these ministries 
vary, however. Some enjoy extensive competences whäe others do little more 
than hand out a few subsidies. In many federal systems (such as Germany, 
Switzerland and the United States), culture -  along with education -  falls 
primarily under the competences of the federal sub-units. Many countries 
also channel public money into autonomous or semi-autonomous cultural 
organisations, such as Pro Helvetia in Switzerland and the National En­
dowment for the Arts in the United States. In the UK, lottery money has 
become a major source of cultural funding. What is more, governments often 
address cultural issues under other policy headings, such as sports, tourism, 
employment, regional policy and indeed education.
Throughout this study I adopt a definition of cultural policy whose 
underlying conception of ‘culture’ lies half-way between one that restricts it 
essentially to the arts and one that equates it with everything humans practice, 
produce and believe (as anthropologists and cultural theorists often do). 
More specifically, I take cultural policy to include every policy whose primary 
aim is to have some kind of aesthetic impact, be it through physical objects 
(e.g. museums, monuments, paintings), acoustics (music), language (e.g. lit­
erature, poetry, dictionaries, oratory) or aural/visual performance (theatre, 
dance, etc.). ‘Aesthetic’ in this context does not refer to beauty standards, but 
instead ‘to sensuous perception, (to something] received by the senses’ 
(Oxford English Dictionary 1989).
To give some examples, redesigning postage stamps qualifies as a cultural 
policy, as does the building of a museum, the restoration of a national 
monument, the sponsoring of a folklore festival and the change of rules on 
the use of the Irish language in the Irish civil service. The public commemo­
ration of a historical event counts as a cultural policy as does the annual 
holding of a minute of silence to commemorate fallen soldiers, the hiring of a 
public relations firm to promote a particular government policy and the 
drawing up of contingency plans for the televised state funeral of the Duke of 
Edinburgh. All these policies have, and are intended to have, an aesthetic 
impact, in the sense of being ‘received by the senses’. Moreover, given that 
they are mostly initiated by political elites they tend to have a political dimen­
sion, if only in the sense that some however diffuse and unarticulated political 
intent goes into their making. The extent to which this political dimension is 
overt and clearly detectable depends of course on the policy and on the polit­
ical regime in question. Some cultural policies wear their political aspirations
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on their sleeve, while others are at least on the surface dominated by more 
apolitical features and objectives.
This definition of cultural policy is very broad yet conceptually it is pre­
cise. The key term is ‘primary aim’. Building a new airport or a new prison, 
too, has a sensual and thus aesthetic (and, as was argued, by extension always 
also a symbolic) impact, as indeed does any conceivable policy in any con­
ceivable policy area. But for the most part this is not the primary purpose of 
such projects. However, there are many mixed cases. Building a new parlia­
ment or a new capital city has a strong utilitarian element, but typically also a 
very much intended aesthetic and indeed political one. The same applies to 
the design of state-related artefacts such as money, border signs, passports, 
licence plates and uniforms.
Later chapters show that such a broad definition of cultural policy is not 
just conceptually useful but also corresponds rather neatly to actual practice 
in the EU. The Commission’s Directorate-General whose brief includes 
culture is not merely responsible for the arts. Instead, it deals with a wide 
range of issues that include (or at various times have included) the graphic 
design of driving licences and passport covers, ‘information and communica­
tion’ campaigns, Europe Day celebrations, the organisation of ‘European 
yacht races’ and the building of ‘European pavilions’ at world exhibitions, to 
name but a few.
Audiovisual policy is a sub-field of cultural policy. It pertains to all areas 
of film and programme production and to the dissemination of audiovisual 
content through radio and television broadcasting, video cassettes, DVDs, 
CDs, the Internet and other means. Examples of audiovisual policies include 
organising a film festival, subsidising film and television productions, licens­
ing radio stations, setting content quotas for broadcasters, amending 
censorship laws and so on. While audiovisual policies of this kind are often 
intended to have an aesthetic and indeed political impact, the economic and 
technological stakes in the audiovisual sector are higher than in many other 
areas of cultural policy, leading to more ‘mixed motive’ policies.
Educational policy, finally, pertains to all areas of formal and generally 
institutionalised learning: kindergartens, schools, universities, adult educa­
tion, teacher training and the like. Particular educational policies may seek to 
regulate curricular content (through textbooks and teaching syllabuses), 
teaching methods, exams, school discipline, classroom decorations and 
school rituals such as pledges of allegiance and school prayer. This definition, 
too, is largely in line with that adopted by the EU itself, and it reflects the core 
competences of most national (and sub-national) ministries of education.
As does any policy in any given policy area, all educational policies have 
an aesthetic impact. To the extent that this is their primary aim they, too, 
could be treated under the broader heading of cultural policy as defined 
above. At the same time, some educational policies have other primary aims, 
which range from the transmission of utilitarian skills (such as reading and
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writing) to social selection and knowledge assessment. What is more, with 
regard to many educational policies it is impossible to separate utilitarian and 
aesthetic/symbolic objectives, since they are intended from the outset to meet 
both and thus represent ‘mixed motive’ cases. For example, a textbook might 
be designed to improve pupils’ reading skills while at the same time present 
them with national imagery or particular ideological positions.
At this point, the question ‘what can cultural, audiovisual and educa­
tional policies do to help generate political legitimacy?’ can broadly be 
answered as follows: such policies can help legitimise political institutions 
and practices by designating and transmitting symbols that are tied to these 
institutions and practices and thereby promote their internalisation. The 
present section examines more closely what this can entail in practice, relying 
on examples drawn from the literature on domestic institutional legitimisa- 
tion. These examples help to illustrate the theoretical argument outlined in 
the last chapter. They also render the actions of the European Commission 
and the European Parliament, as they are analysed in subsequent chapters, 
more intelligible. For in drawing up their cultural, audiovisual and educa­
tional policy proposals, both bodies were often inspired by similar policies at 
the national level and consciously sought to imitate and adapt them to an EU 
context. In what follows I begin with cultural policy and then turn to audio­
visual policy and education.
As was argued, cultural policies have an aesthetic impact and as such are 
potential vehicles for political aesthetics and political symbolism. Political 
symbolism, to recall, refers to the creation and transmission of political 
symbols, i.e. symbols that are ‘attached’ to political institutions and practices 
and facilitate their internalisation. Applied to institutional legitimisation 
inside states two questions arise from this: First, what kinds of symbols were 
used? Second, how were they transmitted?
On the first question, the literature on state legitimisation2 offers many 
examples of what political symbols can consist of: national flags, anthems, 
costumes, poems and landscapes, heroes and heroines, buildings and monu­
ments, to name some of the most recurrent ones. Some of these were ‘purpose 
built’ and made as it were from scratch: designing a national flag, composing 
an anthem and inventing an architectural style for national monuments all 
represent symbol-making of this kind. Most symbols, however, are desig­
nated symbols. They consist of pre-existing objects, practices, myths, 
traditions, images and sentiments that at some point became politicised and 
attached to state-related political institutions and practices. Thus landscapes 
became national landscapes and real or imagined historical figures were 
posthumously turned into national heroes and heroines. The Hermann myth 
in Germany, the ‘Gallic ancestors’ in France, Wilhelm Tell in Switzerland and 
the lacustrian settlements on Swiss lakes all represent historical myths-cum- 
facts that states incorporated into their symbolic repertoire (Patman 1999; 
Kaeser 1998; Dörner 1996; Coakley 1992; Citron 1991). The fusion of politi-
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cal symbols with religious themes, gender conceptions, ethnic markers and 
the like is of course part of the same phenomenon (Smith 1992,1991).
Political symbols can only be effective if their intended recipients regard 
them as credible and if they can relate to them. For this reason they must be 
targeted. Historically, this need arose especially where groups with different 
cultural, religious or ethnic traditions merged into a single state. For instance, 
children from all Swiss cantons learn roughly the same national myths and 
historical events in their school textbooks, but these are adapted to suggest 
continuity and compatibility with their respective local and regional histories, 
myths and traditions (Schmid 1981). To the same end of maintaining sym­
bolic continuity, local, cantonal and federal symbols often appear alongside 
each other.
The Swiss example is instructive in yet another regard, as it illustrates the 
distinction drawn in the previous chapter between three different levels of 
legitimisation. As was suggested, even the Swiss polity developed a shared 
sense of overarching community and ‘entitativity’, indicating third-level 
legitimacy mechanisms at work. Nonetheless, as Switzerland remained 
culturally and politically decentralised and as the different sub-units 
preserved their own corporate identities, the first two levels are more and the 
third level less significant compared to more centralised states. In fact, 
throughout the ninetheenth century Swiss state-building revolved in large 
part around making regional (especially cantonal) interests appear to benefit 
from membership in the confederation (first-level legitimisation). In addi­
tion, it entailed some remoulding of local and regional identities, especially 
those of the Catholic cantons after their defeat in the civil war (second level 
legitimisation). For its part, the overarching Swiss ‘entity5 and communal 
category is marked by mainly ‘civic’ as opposed to ethnic or cultural signifiers. 
This does not come at the expense of its solidity (more on this below). 
However, it enables it to coexist more easily with the social and corporate 
identities of the cantons and localities, which for their part are often more 
‘thickly’ textured. In Switzerland as in many other places, symbolic comple­
mentarity underpins political legitimacy.
If political symbols are to promote the internalisation of the norms and 
institutions for which they stand they must be transmitted. Here, too, the 
literature offers many insights into what this can entail and how cultural 
policy contributed to it.
One way to transmit symbols is by grafting them onto widely seen and 
circulated objects. These can include passport covers, postage stamps, coins 
and bank notes, educational certificates and the tails of aircraft. Political 
symbolism also became woven into more narrowly defined cultural output: 
films, poetry, paintings, songs, television serials, statues, novels, theatre plays, 
the work of linguists and historians and so forth. As suggested, the straight­
forwardness with which cultural policy is used in this way depends on the 
policy in question and on the nature of the regime that pursues it. For
■F'-.
example, under Nazi rule German cultural policy openly dictated cultural 
content and severely punished transgressors (Mosse 1991). By contrast, con- 
temporary cultural policy in established Western democracies mostly avoids 
overt interference. In such settings, efforts to infuse cultural output with po- U" 
litical symbolism can at the most be subtle. As shown in later chapters, the 
EU’s decision to commission a European history textbook from a team of £ 
sympathetic historians without, however, prescribing its content was an ex- U' 
ampler of this, as is its sponsorship of various cultural and sporting events that | :
return the favour by displaying the European flag.
Transmitting political symbols often relied on public events of various U 
kinds: national exhibitions, athletic competitions, processions, folklore festi- J 
vals, state funerals, remembrance day ceremonies, youth and women’s | 
gatherings and public parades are among the most recurrent examples £ 
(Houlihan 1999; Spillman 1997; Bendix 1992). At some of these events polit- 
ical symbolism took centre stage while at others it receded subtly into the £ 
background. With the advent of electronic mass media such events started to 
reach audiences beyond those who were physically present. The early BBC -U 
became famous for its diligent coverage of royal coronations, weddings and H 
funerals (Morley and Robins 1989). Electronic media also allowed for ‘virtual’ U
mass events, such as royal Christmas broadcasts and presidential addresses to 
the nation (see below). fc
Internalising political institutions and practices is a form of learning, and £ •
learning benefits from doing as opposed to merely watching. Thus, many f  
public events turned their audiences into active participants: they made them 
march, sing, run, pray, share a minute of silence, pledge allegiance, carry £ 
torches, wear national dress, stand up to salute the flag or join together in £ 
roaring applause or laughter. These participatory elements transformed such U 
events into ‘experiences’, imbuing them with emotional significance and £ 
increasing the likelihood that the participants would absorb the political 
imagery presented to them (Hettling 1998, 1997; Shils and Young 1975). U
Learning also benefits from repetition. Accordingly, many rituals and U
mass events took place regularly and, over time, evolved into traditions. 
Following Hobsbawm’s classic definition, an invented tradition is ‘a set of 
practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a rit- 
ual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of U 
behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies a continuity with the f?
p as t.. .  where possible .. .  with a suitable historic past’ (Hobsbawm 1993a: 4; £
see also Hobsbawm 1993b). This notion of ‘invented tradition’ thus fits well ;; 
into the present discussion, though the last point needs some elaboration. 
Repeating an event over an extended period by default establishes a ‘tradition’ f 
and gives it a historical dimension. Yet, as Hobsbawm’s own definition 
suggests, this does not necessarily imply that the themes and symbols in ques- £
tion connect to a real or imaginary past. Some invented traditions clearly do 
seek to establish such a link, but others do not, or even seek to signify a radical
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break with the past. Still others suggest break and continuity at once. For ex­
ample, through their selection and presentation of artefacts, French museums 
in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution sought to root revolutionary 
ideals in a legacy of antiquity and the Enlightenment, but at once depicted 
them as a radical leap far beyond anything history had hitherto come up with 
(Poulot 1997; also Davis 1996). As is discussed in later chapters, the European 
Union designed many of its cultural policies to convey a similar set of mixed 
-  or parallel -  messages. While portraying the Union as the political embod­
iment of Europeans’ alleged cultural unity and shared roots in the past, they 
at once celebrate it as a radical break with European history to date and are 
drenched in allusions to the ‘new age’ for the ‘new Europe’.
The last chapter suggested that fostering overarching communal identifi­
cations and ‘entity processes’ entails the construction of boundaries which in 
turn involves self-differentiation from others. In state- and nation-building 
contexts cultural policy typically took centre stage in this. For example, from 
the outset German state-budding had strong anti-French connotations, signi­
fied by a barrage of anti-French songs, popular plays, poems and paintings. 
Likewise, attempted cultural emancipation from Britain defined Irish state­
building after independence, with the cultural markers cultivated by political 
elites ranging from the Irish language and music to the Gaelic Athletics 
Association (Cronin 1999; Dörner 1996; Hobsbawm 1993a).
Switzerland, too, became internally more cohesive as a result of the isola­
tion and danger it faced during both world wars. After the Nazi takeover in 
Germany, Swiss political elites adopted a series of cultural ‘Swissification’ 
policies to support the government’s ‘spiritual defence of the homeland’ 
strategy and to encourage cultural self-differentiation from its northern 
neighbour. In the German-speaking part this included efforts to promote 
Swiss-German dialects as well as films, plays and exhibitions that adapted 
Swiss political mythologies (such as Wilhelm Tell) to the situation at the time. 
Incidentally, once these themes had become internalised they acted back 
upon Switzerland’s stance towards the outside world, leading the Swiss 
electorate to opt for a reclusive foreign policy with regard to the EU and 
other international organisations (Theiler 2004a; Sciarini, Hug and Dupont 
2001). Rather than just transmitting social reality, symbols always help to 
constitute it.
Still on the subject of boundaries, interaction across them has an ambigu­
ous effect. As was argued, following Deutschian thinking it may (though not 
inevitably) help to improve mutual perceptions between the participating 
populations. Applied to cultural policy, the Franco-German cultural 
exchange programmes after the Second World War are often seen as a 
successful example of this (Letze 1986; Farquharson and Holt 1975). At the 
same time, interacting with others across group boundaries does not neces­
sarily erode these boundaries, regardless of whether or not it improves mutual 
perceptions. Rather, by enabling people to experience them it can strengthen
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perceptions of social difference and the presence of the ingroup in the 
consciousness of its members, making it more salient in the process. Both as 
individuals and as groups, interacting with others can make us more aware of 
ourselves and of what divides us from others (Cohen 1989; Barth 1969). 
Consequently, even seemingly internationalist cultural policies -  transna­
tional youth exchanges, sports fixtures, theatre festivals, literary translations 
and so on may promote internal cohesion and, by extension, contribute 
third-level legitimisation processes (see Billig 1995).
Turning to audiovisual policy, its potential role in political symbolism is 
implicit in the discussion so far. Like other forms of cultural output, films, 
radio and television programmes can, in principle, generate and transmit 
symbolic meanings that promote the internalisation of social and political 
reality. Before illustrating this, two major caveats are in order.
First, modern liberal democracies typically establish relatively strong 
safeguards to insulate broadcasters -  above all public service ones -  from 
overt political interference. In such settings the symbolic role of the mass 
media can at the most be subtle and indirect, reminiscent of other cultural 
policies discussed above.
Second, research on mass media impact has undergone fundamental 
shifts in recent decades. This included a move away from basic ‘transmission 
models’ of communication to those that highlight the different ways in which 
audiences receive, interpret and ‘decode’ information. Influenced by various 
theoretical strands ranging from behaviourism to Marxist-inspired ‘false 
consciousness’ and ‘hegemonic control’ conceptions, earlier accounts postu­
lated a relatively straightforward relationship between the intention of the 
transmitter of a message and its content on the one hand and its effect on the 
recipients on the other. By extension, they believed that the mass media had 
a crucial role in shaping social and political identifications, sometimes going 
as far as to depict it as a kind of ‘hypodermic needle’ with which meaning 
could be ‘injected’ into audiences, and their political identifications manipu­
lated at will.
By contrast, newer theories of mass communication no longer see audi­
ences as unprotected against manipulative ploys of electronic image 
providers. Often inspired by Stuart Hall’s classic work on ‘encoding’ and 
‘decoding’ (Hall 1980; also McQuail and Windahl 1993; Morley 1992; Ravault 
1986), they postulate that viewers ‘decode’ and demystify mass media images 
in relation to other messages supplied to them through vernacular channels 
of communication. These channels link them to their own ‘interpretative 
communities’, provide a code of interpretation, and mediate between 
message transmitter, message content and message recipient. Especially if 
transmitted in a trans-cultural or trans-social context, the manner in which 
different audiences ‘decode’ mass media content may thus vary significantly 
and does not conform to a simple stimulus-response model.
As the ‘status of the viewer has been upgraded regularly during the course
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of communications research’ many analysts concluded that ‘the media can be 
consumed oppositionally . . .  and not only hegemonically’ (Liebes and Katz 
1989: 204). Exposure to mass media messages can come to play a role of 
‘provocation rather than seduction’ (Ravault 1986: 276) and induce a 
‘boomerang effect’ which mobilises those at the receiving end against the 
messages relayed to them — and ultimately against the source of transmission 
itself. Similar doubts about the political effect of mass communication have 
long prevailed in political science. For example, as far back as the early 1970s, 
Walker Connor cautioned against attempts to ‘telescope’ ethnic assimilation 
in culturally fragmented states merely by augmenting inter-cultural 
communication (Connor 1972), In a similar vein, political sociologists have 
increasingly questioned the efficacy of the mass media in fostering consent for 
political institutions across different parts of the social spectrum (Held 1988).
Mass communication is thus unlikely to enjoy the almost magical powers 
of political persuasion that some earlier theorists had afforded it. However, 
this does not obliterate its potential contribution to political symbolism, 
merely making it less certain, less straightforward and more conditional upon 
other variables. Mindful of these caveats and drawing on the earlier discus­
sion, this contribution can take three different forms.
A first factor is media content, i.e. the ‘text’ of the messages conveyed to 
audiences. Crucially, even seemingly apolitical content -  such as coverage of 
national sports teams competing or archetypal ‘national’ characters in televi­
sion serials -  may affect (but, following the above argument, is never certain 
to affect) political identifications in a particular way. The role of the early 
BBC as discussed earlier illustrates this.
Second and related to this, films and, above all, radio and television 
broadcasts can facilitate communal experiences among viewers, strengthen­
ing the boundaries of their shared group category and its internal cohesion. 
In this rendering, the actual content of what is being consumed is less impor­
tant than the act of consuming it in -  albeit virtual -  togetherness, often 
amplified by its subsequent discursive rehearsal in face-to-face social contexts 
(e.g. conversations at work about a television programme seen the previous 
night). Films and broadcasting may thus function akin to the print media in 
Benedict Anderson’s well-known account of nationalism, creating shared 
experiences and allowing audiences to ‘imagine’ themselves as a community 
welded together on a shared journey through time (Anderson 1991).
Finally, a more Habermasian rendering highlights the role of the mass 
media as the cornerstone of the public sphere in modern societies, as a kind 
of node for broader communicative and deliberative processes. It is of course 
this very notion which serves as the main rationale for the continuation of 
public service broadcasting systems in many Western democracies. On this 
account, the mass media are a catalyst for political diversity and contention 
but also, potentially, for social cohesion and institutional legitimisation in 
their overall effect. As suggested in the last chapter, such more ‘bottom-up’
legitimising dynamics are especially strong if they interact with more 'top- 
down’ symbolic elements as implicit, for instance, the other two forms of 
mass media use.
What is true for many cultural policies applies to education as well: the 
claim that educational policies can promote political legitimacy is almost 
undisputed. It reverberates throughout the historical state- and nation-build­
ing literature and is supported by many sociological accounts, from 
Dürkheim (1922) onwards (see also Percheron 1985; Meyer 1977; Bourdieu 
1971).
These accounts typically hold education to be an effective symbolic tool 
for several reasons. A first factor is the long period of time individuals 
normally spend passing through the school system. Also, their motivation to 
absorb school-transmitted knowledge tends to be strong as their prospects for 
social and economic advancement partially depend on it. What is more, in so 
far as the education system is directly subjugated to political power, educa­
tional content and method can be centrally steered and adapted quickly to 
meet the needs of particular socialisation agendas (e.g. through state-run cur­
riculum development and assessment agencies, examination boards and the 
like).
A further important factor is that individuals start to undergo schooling 
at an early age. This is especially critical when the institutions and practices 
that are to be legitimised are themselves changing rapidly -  situations brought 
about, for example, by political integration at the intra- and interstate levels 
alike. Por in the case of adults who have been socialised in a pre-integrative 
setting, the most that can be achieved is their re-socialisation into a post-inte- 
grative context. Yet what has been acquired during childhood socialisation 
can rarely be completely ‘de-intemalised’. Adults thus rem ain a potential 
source of opposition to integration; pre-integrative ‘memories’ remain latent 
and may become, as it were, reactivated. Children, by contrast, have as yet 
acquired few political representations (but see Piaget and Weil 1951). This 
makes them more amenable to acquiring new political loyalties and identifi­
cations and these will be particularly stable and resistant to change.
The sociological emphasis on mass education as a tool to foster political 
identifications reverberates throughout the more historically oriented state- 
and nation-building literature. Their grip on emerging mass education sys­
tems -  and especially elementary schooling -  boosted the ability of national 
elites to pursue their national socialisation-cum-intemalisation agenda 
against efforts by rivalling agents with competing agendas, such as the church 
or local feudal regimes. According to many accounts the rise of nationalism 
as a mass phenomenon was inexorably linked to the formation of universal 
schooling. As H. J. Graff, commenting on the role of popular education, ob­
served:
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The ‘greatest function’ o f the m odem  school was to teach a ‘new patriotism ’ . . .  
The school was first a socialising agent. The message was com municated most
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effectively together w ith reading and writing. The school’s task included no t only 
national and patriotic sentiments but establishing unity in a nation long divided 
by region, culture, language, and persisting social divisions o f class and wealth. 
Learning to read and write involved the constant repetition of the civic national 
catechism, in which the child was im bued with all the duties expected o f him: 
from defending the state, to  paying taxes, working, and obeying laws. (Quoted in 
G uibernau 1996: 69; see also Green 1990)
These observations also suggest that the utilitarian aspects of formal edu­
cation do not make it less suitable as an outlet for political symbolism. Rather, 
they might well enhance it as they provide a basis to which political myths and 
symbols can be ‘grafted’. While learning to read and write, pupils can at once 
internalise a given social and political order.
Yet the potential contribution of mass education to political legitimacy goes 
beyond its immediate socialising function. First, in many states universal mass 
education developed alongside notions of universal citizenship and universally 
held rights and obligations. In many ways the two went hand in hand.
Beyond defining and extending national culture, mass education defines almost 
the entire population as possessing this culture, as im bued with its meanings, and 
as having the rights implied by it. Mass education . . .  allocates persons to citi­
zenship -  establishing their membership in the nation over and above various 
subgroups. And it directly expands the definition of what citizenship and  the 
nation mean and what obligations and rights are involved. (Meyer 1977: 70)
Second, formal education systems also help reify and exalt particular fields of 
knowledge bound up with the political legitimisation cause. ‘National civics’, 
‘national history’ and the like are thus important not only because they help 
transmit symbolic meanings to pupils studying these subjects, but also 
because they are formal educational subjects in the first place, enjoying the 
social prestige and moral authority conferred upon officially sanctioned 
knowledge. In this sense, mass education can help socialise all members of 
society into a particular national framework, not just those who happen to 
attend schools at any given point in time.
At the same time, the basic principles that govern the effective use of 
cultural policy for political legitimisation purposes apply to education as well. 
To illustrate this, a focus on culturally plural and politically decentralised 
states is once more instructive. In those states, the political centre does not 
hold a monopoly on education policy. Instead, local and regional authorities 
retain important educational powers (e.g. near complete formal control over 
school curricula in Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, the United States and 
many other federal and quasi-federal systems). As suggested, the main chal­
lenge facing the political centre in those systems is not to weaken or discredit 
sub-unit symbolism, but instead to ensure that symbols pertaining to the 
different institutional levels are transmitted alongside each other in ways that 
suggest compatibility rather than competition.
Symbolism and legitimacy in the European Union
Overall these observations square well with what has been argued in the previous 
chapter. In domestic settings, political legitimacy did not emerge simply as a 
reflex to the creation of overarching political institutions and democratic prac­
tices, nor was it simply the product of interaction and exchanges. Instead, as the 
‘tandem’ hypothesis suggests, successful state legitimisation always involved a 
measure o f‘top-down’ political symbolism by elites, for which cultural, educa­
tional and at later stages also audiovisual policies served as important outlets. 
Frequently, political elites aimed for and achieved cultural and linguistic 
homogenisation. But even in systems that remained culturally divided with only 
limited central institutions (such as Switzerland) it entailed a measure o f‘cogni­
tive homogenisation’, leading to a shared awareness of and responsiveness to 
overarching myths and symbols among all population groups.
Furthermore, even in these culturally plural and politically decentralised 
states some third-level legitimisation occurred. This entailed the formation of 
an overarching sense of communal membership and ‘entitativity’, and, by 
implication, of boundaries separating insiders from outsiders. All the same, 
where the centre remained relatively weak such third-level processes could 
remain correspondingly modest, as could the salience of overarching 
communal identifications. The sub-units retained their own corporate iden­
tities and the symbolic repertoire to maintain them.
By keeping a balance between authority and legitimacy (or, to use the 
earlier terminology, between material power and symbolic power), these 
systems heed a critical postulate that reverberates throughout much of the 
comparative politics and political sociology literature: a political system needs 
to attract political loyalties in proportion to its perceived power and salience, 
i.e. in proportion to which its subjects are aware of its norms, institutions and 
policy outputs and consider them significant? And herein precisely lies one of 
the ‘secrets’ of stable multicultural systems: since in those systems too aggres­
sive a push by the political centre for third-level legitimacy could threaten the 
ability of the sub-units to maintain their respective corporate identities, they 
restrict the powers and visibility of the political centre to the point where it 
only requires a relatively limited amount of third-level legitimacy in the first 
place. The need for legitimacy is always relative to the salience of what is to be 
legitimised.
What does all this imply for the European Union, recalling once more the 
limits of an analogy between the EU and domestic political systems as 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter? First, it seems unlikely that in the 
EU political legitimacy could emerge as a mere by-product of transnational 
interaction and exchanges, or as a mere reflex to an expansion of suprana­
tional institutions or democratic procedures. Rather, as in domestic settings, 
it would involve a measure of ‘top-down’ symbolic construction, designed to 
stimulate ‘bottom-up’ communicative and deliberative processes. Cultural,
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audiovisual and educational policies could once more take centre stage in 
this, even though the precise themes and symbols liable to be employed 
successfully in the EU might bear little resemblance to those used in domes­
tic contexts (more on this below).
Second, even if the EU remained politically weak and decentralised this 
would not prima facie exempt it from the need to acquire third-level legiti­
macy. It would not obliterate the necessity of an overarching ‘entity process’ 
and the emergence of some shared communal identifications among 
Europeans. However, the salience of this European corporate identity could 
remain relatively low, provided the scope and powers of supranational insti­
tutions remained correspondingly limited. The classic neofunctionalist 
concept o f ‘authority-legitimacy transfers’ captures this well. As long as EU- 
related institutions and practices assume a low degree of authority and 
visibility in relation to their national counterparts, the latter can (and indeed 
must) remain the main focus of political loyalties and identifications. But as 
EU institutions become more politically salient the need for corresponding 
loyalty shifts also grows (Pentland 1973:104; Haas 1970:633-636). In the EU, 
too, material and symbolic power must grow together.
There are further potential parallels between plural domestic systems and 
the EU. As did the former, the EU would need to establish a symbolic conti­
nuity and compatibility between its own symbols and those used by its 
member states as part of their domestic political symbolisms. The diversity of 
national contexts in the EU would require a rigorous symbolic targeting, if 
not with regard to the actual symbols used, at least in respect of the means and 
intensity of their transmission. What is more, the EU, too, would need to 
weave its political symbols into the everyday lives of its citizens, yet without 
at the same time appearing to symbolically overpower them. And the trans­
mission of EU-related symbols would again be more effective if it were linked 
to the creation of ‘experiences’, even if only in surrogate form through the 
mass media. Finally, in all this the underlying challenge for the EU would be 
one of finding a symbolic vocabulary to which all its member populations 
could relate -  clearly not an easy task, given the wide range of different 
cultural contexts and historical experiences in EU-Europe (see Smith 1992, 
1991).
‘Thick’ and ‘thin’ symbolism
At this point, the traditional distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ political 
symbols and identifications once more comes into view. It preoccupies much 
of the contemporary literature on the EU just as it interests many writers on 
nationalism and state legitimisation. Many older contributions to the state- 
and nation-building literature equated the presumed ‘thickness’ of particular 
national symbols (i.e. their degree of ethnic-cum-linguistic-cum-religious 
‘content’) with their strength and persistence and with the durability of the 
communal identifications they sustain. Some writers on European Integra­
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tion echo these assumptions. They contend that the European Union, too, 
would have to predicate itself on some kind of ‘thick’ ethnic or cultural basis, 
though they disagree as to what, precisely, this would entail. ‘Euro-essential- 
ists’ search for Europe’s underlying ‘meaning’ and argue that Europeans need 
to ‘rediscover’ their shared cultural roots as a precondition for developing 
shared political commitments (e.g. de Rougemont 1985). Others adopt a 
more constructivist stance. They sense a need to make Europeans believe that 
they share a cultural heritage by inventing traditions and possibly fostering 
some cultural homogenisation in the process (see Cederman 2001a). Despite 
these differences, however, both groups agree that in the EU as elsewhere only 
‘thick’ identifications can be strong.
More recently, many critics have come to question such claims. Relying 
on the examples of (once more) Switzerland and some other mainly ‘civic 
nations’, they point out that even though those systems have only ‘thin’ (i.e. 
mainly ‘civic’) overarching markers and even though they enjoy only limited 
salience, these markers are nonetheless very firmly entrenched and the 
communal identifications they sustain are equally stable -  much more so in 
fact than in some more ‘thickly’ defined polities. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
this is the basic claim underpinning post-national approaches to European 
integration, and it stands on firm theoretical ground. Social psychologists and 
social anthropologists have long shown that the ‘content’ of particular group 
markers says little about the stability of corresponding group identifications. 
‘Everything’, in this rendering, ‘may be grist on the mill of symbolism’ 
(Cohen 1989: 19; also Percheron 1985: 187). Likewise, the kinds of symbols 
appropriated by a given political system are not always a reliable guide to its 
character and workings. In short, reflecting the signifier-signified separation 
suggested by constructivist theory, symbols act, in the first instance, as 
conveyors of whatever meaning has been attached to them. In Clifford 
Geertz’s useful definition, a symbol can be ‘any object, act, event, quality or 
relation, which serves as a vehicle for a conception -  the conception is the 
symbol’s ‘meaning’ . . . ’ (Geertz 1973: 91; see also Brubaker 1999; 
Kostakopoulou 1997).
Two qualifications are in order. The first pertains to the difference 
between solidity and salience. For example, I may have internalised the cate­
gory ‘Swiss’ very firmly and thus identify consistently, unambiguously and 
solidly as Swiss. Nonetheless, my Swissness may not actually matter to me a 
great deal in everyday life and thus not be particularly salient to me. Some of 
my other social identities (ping-pong player, university lecturer, male, trade 
union member, etc.) may take up a greater share of my self and thus have 
greater salience in guiding my beliefs and behaviour. In other words, salience 
has more to do with the ‘size of the share of the self something occupies than 
with its ‘stability of position in the self. This brings salience into conceptual 
affinity with what some strands of social psychology refer to as ‘attitude 
importance’ (Krosnick 1988). More concretely, it means that political systems
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and communal identifications may be strong and stable yet not very salient at 
the same time. In fact, as was argued, in many decentralised and multicultural 
systems it is precisely the low salience of the political centre that helps account 
for its solidity and popular acceptance?
Second, in the EU as elsewhere the signifier-signified separation may be 
very far-reaching but it is not infinite. Por contrary to what some post­
modern approaches assert, signifiers are not entirely ‘empty’. Thus, if the EU 
became defined in, say, racial terms, it would be unlikely ever to constitute 
itself as a liberal democratic polity. But at the same time, their choice of 
‘ethnic’ signifiers has not prevented many states in  the EU and beyond from 
forming stable democratic systems -  largely ‘blood-based’ citizenship laws in 
many Western democracies are a good example. Perhaps, symbols are more 
prone to rule in than to rule out: successful liberal democracies must have at 
least some ‘civic’ symbols pertaining to shared democratic values and prac­
tices, but these may be embedded in a wide variety of non-‘civic’ themes 
without endangering their viability or credibility (see Auer 2004). The basic 
point, however, remains: within the limits defined by its overall liberal demo­
cratic ethos, we should not, in the first instance, focus on the ‘content’ of 
whatever myths and symbols the EU manages to acquire -  be they cultural or 
‘civic’, ‘thick’ or ‘thin’. Instead, what matters most is the intensity and tacti­
cal skill with which these are being disseminated, as this determines their 
propensity to be internalised and to induce ‘bottom-up’ communicative 
processes on which the emergence of lasting political legitimacy ultimately 
hinges.
Yet, to take this logic one step further, the very need to make EU symbols 
compatible with those of its member states might call for a symbolic register 
very unlike that used in any existing domestic context. The more the Union 
succeeded in developing such an alternative symbolic vocabulary, the more 
might it prevent fears that it was treading on the symbolic territory of the 
member states and the insecurities and backlashes this could provoke. In the 
EU as in plural domestic settings, symbolic compatibility between different 
institutional levels is an important part of effective political symbolism.
The question of impact
The present discussion must end on a cautionary note. It touches on the 
earlier observation that the effectiveness of political symbolism ultimately de­
pends on its reception. But reception-centred studies are difficult to carry 
out, on the living and still more so on the dead. For this reason, there is no 
sure way of knowing how well any given symbolic policy actually ‘worked’ in 
domestic contexts. Differently put, it is easier to detect the presence of ‘top- 
down’ symbolic strategies than it is to ascertain whether they stimulated the 
kind of ‘bottom-up’ responses through which political legitimacy ultimately 
emerges.
Indeed, mere presence of political symbolism strategies does not guaran­
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tee their effectiveness. There are many examples where political symbolism 
was pursued ferociously but nevertheless foiled to produce political legiti­
macy. Many would-be states and nations never made it past the drawing 
board of a few ambitious elites and cultural entrepreneurs while many others 
disintegrated: Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia are recent 
examples.
It is tempting to attribute such legitimisation failures to incompetent 
political symbolism. Yet even if political symbolism meets all the criteria 
spelled out in this chapter its effectiveness is never assured. Instead, it 
depends in part on what Hobsbawm refers to as a ‘felt need’5 among the 
populations at which these policies are directed -  a need which is not open to 
unlimited ‘top-down’ manipulation. To put the same point more crudely, if 
the ‘product’ is unattractive the most sophisticated ‘marketing’ strategy will 
not make it popular. In part, then, the success of political symbolism in the 
EU would depend not only on how aptly it was designed and executed. 
Rather, it would hinge on the Union’s general evolution in relation to the 
needs, interests and aspirations of its member populations.
To further complicate matters, the converse may also be true. Even where 
(a) a given political system enjoys popular compliance (or at least a lack of 
active popular resistance) and (b) symbolic policies in culture, the audiovi­
sual sector, education and related areas are being pursued, this still does not 
demonstrate how much the former actually contributes to the latter. As was 
suggested, legitimacy is only one reason for political compliance. Coercion, 
apathy and ignorance are among the others, and these different motivations 
are often very difficult to disentangle. This does not mean that political 
systems can completely forgo legitimacy in the long term. Nor does it mean 
that such legitimacy can emerge in the total absence of ‘top-down’ symbolic 
strategies. What it does mean, however, is that the relationship between polit­
ical symbolism and political compliance is subject to many social, economic 
and political variables. This is true domestically as much as it would apply to 
the European Union.
These caveats highlight the limits of what the present study can hope to 
achieve. On the one hand, the EU’s record in instrumentalising culture, 
audiovisual policy and education for symbolic purposes may well be an 
important indication of its long-term viability and potential for political 
growth. But on the other hand, the presence of such ‘top-down’ symbolic 
policies would not guarantee their success, just as their absence would not 
inevitably spell the Union’s demise. Like all other parts of social reality, 
European integration involves many tendencies and probabilities but few 
certainties and inevitabilities.
P o l it ic a l  sy m b o l ism  in  p r a c t ic e 45
Symbolic policy-making
The literature reviewed in this chapter shows how cultural, audiovisual and 
educational policies became tools for political symbolism at a domestic level. 
Beyond this, it offers yet another important insight: before political elites 
could instrumentalise cultural, audiovisual and educational policy in this way 
they first had to gain control over it. Often this occurred in the face of strong 
opposition from competing elites. The many struggles between, for example, 
religious and secular authorities over school curricula and the ritual calendar 
illustrate this. In the European Union this would be no different. To become 
symbolically active the EU, too, would need to gain an effective foothold in 
the relevant policy areas, which in turn raises the question of whether and 
how it might be able to do so.
On the face of it this would not seem to be an easy task. As is discussed in 
later chapters, the Union was established as a largely economic entity and its 
founding treaties barred it from symbolically sensitive areas such as culture, 
audiovisual policy and education. Rather like foreign policy and defence, the 
power to employ legitimising and identity-conferring symbols was to remain 
a national prerogative.
However, the absence of an explicit legal mandate for EU involvement in 
a given area does not always constitute a barrier in practice. Initial prohibi­
tions may weaken over time due to an interplay of formal and informal 
processes: EU practice stretches legal boundaries, which are then adjusted or 
reinterpreted only to be pushed outwards again by still more ambitious poli­
cies and so on. This process may be helped along by activist jurisprudence by 
the European Court of Justice, interest group pressure as well as conscious 
‘political engineering’ by the Commission (more on this below).
Yet such an expansive process is far from automatic and many policy 
areas have proven relatively immune to it. In determining whether or not it 
occurs, elite preferences are clearly an important variable. Analysts of the EU 
from all periods and persuasions generally assume that supranational elites 
(mainly within the Commission) are, on average, keener on expanding the 
Union’s remit than their national counterparts. Elite-centred constructivism 
as discussed in the last chapter seems to explain this well. Positioned at the 
centre of integration, supranational elites in this rendering become gradually 
‘denationalised’, identify ever more strongly with the integrative cause and 
become ever more keen to promote it. In fact, such an account points to a 
central tenet of all constructivist approaches to integration, namely that pref­
erences -  both national and supranational -  are not fixed. Instead, they are 
continuously moulded and re-moulded by the integrative process; they are 
endogenous rather than exogenous to it. Consequently, when judging the 
potential for integration in any given policy area it is not sufficient to take a 
snapshot impression of competing preferences at a given point in time, 
project these into the future, assess the balance of power between different
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actors and based on this infer likely policy developments. Instead, we need to 
ascertain how preferences might be transformed by integration, how this 
would affect the Union’s policy prospects, and how this in turn would feed 
back into the integration process so as to once more affect the interests and 
preferences of various actors.
Given the very large number of variables involved and the uncertainty 
that comes with trying to predict human interests and behaviour this is clearly 
very difficult. At the same time it is not a new challenge. And of all approaches 
to European integration it is classical neofunctionalism that tries hardest to 
apply the endogenisation principle to the practice of integration, subsuming 
it under the well-known concept of ‘spillover’. In what follows, I briefly 
discuss the three types of spillover postulated by neofunctionalists and then 
examine how these might conceivably apply to culture, audiovisual policy and 
education. To conclude, I turn to an alternative approach to European inte­
gration. It, too, seeks to endogenise preferences yet as far as the Union’s 
political symbolism prospects go it turns neofunctionalist spillover predic­
tions on their head.
Spillover versus ‘countervailing pressures’
Neofunctionalism predates the constructivist turn in European integration 
studies by many decades and is thus not generally held to fall within the 
constructivist paradigm. All the same, neofunctionalists anticipated some of 
the key postulates of social constructivism, above all the claim that social 
identities, social behaviour and social structure interact in a dialectical 
fashion. This justifies some engagement with neofunctionalist theory, even 
for those who reject the economic and technological determinism of which 
(especially many earlier) neofunctionalists stand rightly accused. Central to 
neofunictionalist thinking is the concept of spillover, which comes in three 
variants.
The concept of functional spillover holds that integration in one policy 
sector generates pressures to take further integrative steps in that same or in 
related sectors in order to fully reap -  or further augment -  the welfare bene­
fits that induced the initial integrative move. Welfare, in this context, is 
defined! largely in economic terms. Further integration might also become 
necessary to alleviate strains, inefficiencies, or distributional distortions that 
result as an unintended consequence of an earlier integrative decision 
(Schmitter 1996; Harrison 1990; Pentland 1973; Haas 1967, 1961; Lindberg 
1963).
Applied to political symbolism, functional spillover might promote the 
EU’s policy prospects in several ways. Central is the notion of the ‘authority- 
legitimacy balance’ as discussed earlier: as the Union’s salience and visibility 
increases, so does the need for corresponding ‘legitimacy transfers’ to main­
tain popular consent.
At the same time, reflecting the influence of behaviourism throughout
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the social sciences at the time, most neofunctionalists expected national 
publics to shift their political loyalties more or less automatically as they 
would come to realise that the European Union could meet their economic 
welfare needs more effectively than their national governments. By contrast, 
some later neofunctionalist writings suggested that this might not happen 
after all and that supranational institutions thus needed to acquire a measure 
o f‘identitive power’ in the form of legitimising myths and symbols (Pentland 
1973, Chapter 4; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). All other things being equal, 
this need is bound to increase during periods in which the Union’s economic 
attractiveness is low, since this calls for alternative motivations for support. It 
is also likely to grow in response to or in anticipation of integrative ‘leaps’, 
such as the Union’s expansion into new policy areas or the accession of new 
member states. What is more, according to this logic such pressures can be 
expected to operate not only at the EU level but inside the member states as 
well. European integration is, among other things, a policy pursued by 
national governments and as such it is subject to their desire to see support 
for it secured.
The neofunctionalist notion of political spillover has intellectual roots in 
liberal pluralist and ‘group theory1 approaches that became popular among 
many political scientists from the 1950s onwards. It focuses on the role of 
non-governmental interest groups with particular aims and policy agendas, 
such as trade unions, employer federations and consumer associations. For as 
long as the decisions they sought to influence were primarily taken at the 
national level most of these groups organised nationally and their political 
loyalties and expectations were focused on national institutions and decision­
making processes. But once supranational institutions have started to acquire 
an initial amount of competences, interest groups start to shift their political 
activities to the supranational level as do their members’ political expecta­
tions and, ultimately, their political loyalties. Likewise, they start to organise 
transnationally, for instance by forming pan-European umbrella organisa­
tions and by entering close formal and informal ties with the Commission 
and other supranational bodies (George 1991; Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991; 
Pentland 1973, Chapter 4; Haas 1964,1958).
Political spillover, too, would seem to have the potential to advance the 
Union’s position in culture, the audiovisual sector and education. Not least, 
both policy areas depend heavily on public funding, which makes various 
cultural and educational interest groups more likely to engage in political 
lobbying. All the same, from a political symbolism perspective one obstacle to 
this might well be that those cultural and educational policies with the great­
est symbolic potential -  ‘European civics’ in school curricula, say -  tend to be 
economically insignificant. Two factors would determine whether these 
would nonetheless attract interest group pressure on their behalf. The first is 
the extent to which interest groups with a strong and explicit pro-integration 
agenda -  such as the Federal Trust in the UK -  would come to champion an
EU involvement in culture and education to further their aims. The second 
factor is the Commission’s ability to devise policy packages that ‘smuggle’ 
more symbolically oriented cultural, audiovisual and educational proposals 
in with those that are more economically charged and thus more likely to 
attract interest group support. This overlaps with cultivated spillover to 
which I turn next.
The concept of cultivated spillover centres on the idea that supranational 
elites -  primarily within the Commission but also within the European 
Parliament, the Court of Justice and other bodies -  consciously drive integra­
tion beyond its initial remit. As suggested, this has strong affinities to elite- 
centred constructivism. It assumes that supranational elites change their 
loyalties and are able to advance integration above all by ‘interject[ing] ideas 
and programmes into the [integrative] process that cannot be reduced to the 
preferences of national or subnational groups’ (Schmitter 1996: 6; also 
Pentland 1973, Chapter 4; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Haas 1961).
Cultivated spillover accounts emphasise the Commission’s monopoly of 
issuing legislative proposals to the Council and its more or less informal role 
as bureaucratic facilitator, mediator and information provider. National offi­
cials are seen to rely on the Commission to reduce transaction costs and 
uncertainty associated with gathering and exchanging information amongst 
themselves. Commission information also helps them overcome ‘information 
scarcity’, for example as regards the preferences of other actors and policy 
consequences. For its part, the Commission can manipulate the information 
it provides to national decision-makers in a way that encourages them to take 
further integrative decisions. For instance, it might exaggerate the extent to 
which integration has created distortions and inefficiencies and to which 
further integration could correct these. Similarly, in this rendering the 
Commission can influence intergovernmental bargaining by working out 
package deals that link different issue areas, by engineering coalitions between 
different member states, by playing different governments against each other 
and by devising face-saving formulas and side-payments that enable more 
reluctant governments go along with integrative decisions?
Of all three spillover types it is the cultivated variety that prima facie has 
the greatest potential to advance the Union’s role in culture and education. 
Almost by definition, a committed and self-consciously expansive 
Commission would be keen to strengthen support for integration by increas­
ing its symbolic presence at the mass level. In trying to obtain the necessary 
powers the Commission might adopt several of the strategies discussed above. 
More specifically, anticipating the potential sensitivity of the more symboli­
cally charged parts of culture, audiovisual policy and education, the 
Commission might seek to ‘package’ proposals for policies in those areas in 
a way that de-emphasises their symbolic objectives in favour of economic 
ones. Alternatively -  or parallel to this -  it might represent the strengthening 
of popular support for the EU as a ‘function’ in need of being fulfilled in order
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to secure the survival and further development of the Union, and depict poli­
cies in culture, the audiovisual sector and education as necessary to 
accomplish this goal. In this sense, cultivated spillover and functional 
spillover are closely linked. For ‘functional needs’ to have behavioural conse­
quences they must be perceived as such.
All three spillover concepts are vulnerable on several counts: functional 
spillover for overestimating the intrinsic ‘connectivity1 of different issue areas 
and the economic origins of political behaviour; political and cultivated 
spillover for exaggerating the importance of interest groups and of bureau­
cratic elites respectively. But in what follows I put these more general 
criticisms to one side in order to concentrate more specifically on the rele­
vance of spillover accounts to political symbolism. The main objection is this: 
whether or not spillover occurs in other fields, culture, education and other 
symbolically charged areas are subjected to a different logic altogether: as 
‘material’ integration advances, it releases countervailing pressures that make 
‘symbolic’ integration less, not more, likely over time.
The best way to render this ‘countervailing pressures’ argument is by 
bringing together two distinct strands of thinking about the EU. So far these 
have mostly been treated in isolation, but they complement and reinforce 
each other. The first strand builds on the Deutschian idea that interaction 
between different population groups may produce an overarching identity 
but may also have the opposite effect. Even if it makes the participating soci­
eties ‘objectively’ more homogenous (e.g. in terms of consumption patterns) 
it may reinforce ‘subjective’ divisions and the psychological affirmation of 
communal boundaries. As suggested, this is not a new insight: in comparative 
politics and anthropology it informs various ‘conflictual interaction’ and 
‘symbolic boundary reconstitution’ approaches (Cohen 1989; Connor 1972; 
Barth 1969), and many social psychologists have made broadly similar claims 
(Hogg and Abrams 1988; Tajfel 1981).
Applied to the EU, ‘conflictual integration’ accounts build on the notion 
that most West European nation-states have remained firmly entrenched. 
They continue to be reproduced through stable symbolic mechanisms, not 
least involving national policies in culture and education. Consequently, 
national identifications have become neither psychologically unfulfilling nor 
otherwise ‘dysfunctional’. There is little ‘demand’ (or, in Hobsbawm’s terms, 
little ‘felt need’) for adopting new, Europeanised political loyalties and 
communal allegiances, and there is strong resistance to surrendering existing 
national ones. With supranational identifications absent and national 
communal categories salient, electorates fear that further integration could 
undermine the viability of their national boundaries. This in turn triggers 
‘societal security’ reflexes, signs of which range from anti-immigrant and 
anti-EU parties in many member states to a growing preoccupation with 
protecting national food standards, languages, music and television program­
ming against foreign ‘contamination’ (Theiler 2003; Wsever 1996; Waever,
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Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre 1993, Chapter 4). Relying on the concept of the 
‘authority-legitimacy balance’, all this might simply be taken to bear out the 
urgency of giving the EU a greater symbolic role. But for ‘conflictual integra­
tion’ theorists this is not a feasible option. It would boost the Union’s social 
and cultural intrusiveness which they see as the main cause of opposition to 
it in the first place. After all, even among otherwise EU-friendly electorates a 
large majority has consistently opposed a Union involvement in socially and 
culturally sensitive areas such as cultural policy and education (Theiler 1999a; 
Eurobarometer 1973 et seq.'). In this rendering, as symbolic policies become 
more necessary in the EU they become less viable at the same time.
Turning to the elite level, some theorists claim to have identified a similar 
logic at work. Much of their argument stems from applying the principles of 
consodational democracy to the European Union, and the understanding of 
conflicting elite objectives to which this gives rise.
At the heart of ‘Euro-consociational’ approaches is the observation that, 
like domestic consociations! systems, the European Union is a cartel of elites: 
it is managed and kept together by its member governments through contin­
uous bargaining and compromise. National governmental elites are driven by 
two main objectives. First, they recognise the benefits of integration to their 
respective member states and must therefore, among other things, secure 
sufficient domestic support for it. But, second, they do not want integration 
to weaken their respective national constituencies to the point where it could 
threaten their own position. After all, ‘the status and authority of the 
members of the cartel are dependent upon their capacity to identify segmen­
tal [i.e. member state] interests and to present themselves as leaders and 
agents of a distinct clearly defined community’ (Taylor 1991: 114; also 
Chryssochoou 1994; Hix 1994).
Yet these two objectives are not easy to reconcile. On the one hand, 
national elites want to take part in integration out of economic and political 
self-interest. But on the other hand, this ‘may generate within the elites an 
increasing anxiety about the implications of strengthening the horizontal 
links between the segments since that would also tend to weaken their 
constituencies’ (Taylor 1991: 114). According to ‘Euro-consociationaT theo­
rists, national elites try to break out of this dilemma in several ways. Above all, 
as economic and political integration proceeds they become more protective 
of social and cultural boundaries, trying to preserve the cultural distinctive­
ness of their member states in a Europe of weakening economic and to some 
extent also political boundaries. Likewise, they become more protective of 
their own symbolic power vis-ä-vis their constituents and more sensitive to 
the prospect of having it usurped by supranational institutions. If popular 
support for integration becomes problematic they will choose other remedies, 
including potentially a reversal of certain integrative policies. Paradoxically, 
then,
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comprehensive international arrangements [such as the EU] may in some ways 
challenge rather than reinforce the process o f developing a transnational socio- 
psychological community. They may release pressures that encourage the 
encapsulation o f nations, and fundamentally a l te r . . .  the teleology of integration 
theory by indicating an end situation which has built into it pressures which 
preserve segmental autonom y within a cooperative system -  a symbiotic arrange­
ment. (Taylor 1991: 113)
Combining the two logics just discussed, a potentially powerful ‘countervail­
ing pressures’ alternative to the earlier ‘spillover’ accounts emerges. Elite and 
mass preferences conjoin to make symbolic integration less likely as integra­
tion in other areas progresses. While the ‘authority legitimacy balance’ 
demands that growing material (i.e. political and economic) power must be 
matched by growing symbolic power, the ‘countervailing pressures’ logic 
suggests that the former may make the latter less likely.
The two lines of reasoning just outlined thus make opposing claims and 
lead to opposing predictions regarding the EU’s symbolic policy-making 
potential. All the same, in practice they are not necessarily incompatible. 
Instead, they may work alongside, counteract and partially offset one another, 
producing partial solutions and compromise arrangements in the process.
To illustrate this it is helpful to return briefly to the domestic level, focus­
ing on the very consociational systems from which ‘Euro-consociationalists’ 
draw their empirical inspiration. As indicated, in those states (with 
Switzerland usually serving as the paradigmatic example) the overarching 
centre did acquire a measure of symbolic power, albeit sometimes against 
strong initial objections by local and regional authorities and only to a limited 
extent. While the centre cultivated overarching myths and symbols, it left a 
great deal of symbolic autonomy to the sub-units. The different symbolic 
spheres are compatible or even symbiotic rather than competing and form a 
more or less stable equilibrium. Moreover, while processes of overarching 
community and corporate identity formation (i.e. third-level legitimisation) 
transpired in every stable consociational system, they remained relatively 
weak and did not usurp the corporate identities and communal boundaries of 
the sub-units. Finally, as interaction between their constituent populations 
grew, consociational systems protected the social and cultural boundaries 
dividing them, through minority language charters, linguistic territoriality 
rules, cultural subsidy schemes, decentralised school curricula and the like 
(Laponce 1988; McRae 1983; Lijphart 1977, 1968).
Perhaps, then, we should expect something along these lines to transpire in 
the EU as well: a partial ‘sharing’ of symbolic power, but accompanied by strong 
symbolic decentralisation and autonomy protection schemes. In this rendering 
national governments might accept the use of cultural, audiovisual and educa­
tional policies to shore up support for integration in areas where they want it to 
occur and find public acceptance as well as to accommodate pressure by the 
European Parliament and the Commission. But at the same time, they do not
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want integration to become a state-transcending undertaking and thus remain 
determined to preserve the bulk of their cultural and educational prerogatives 
and to protect the member states as the primary units of mass identification.
The policies emerging out of such a scenario would thus share a range of 
characteristics. First, they would be aimed at strengthening public support for 
specific and relatively narrowly circumscribed projects (e.g. the common cur­
rency) rather than at the creation of more diffuse and all-embracing feelings 
of Europeanness -  in many ways they would be more like public relations 
measures than building blocks of a European ‘nation-building’ strategy.
Second, in such a scenario EU-pursued political symbolism would be 
complementary to rather than competing with existing national symbolisms. 
For instance, instead of replacing national ‘civics’ lessons or history textbooks 
it would involve the distribution of complementary European material in 
schools. And instead of leading to the replacement of national symbols with 
European ones, it would entail the dissemination of complementary symbols 
displayed alongside their national counterparts.
Finally, while in this scenario the Commission and the European 
Parliament might be able to carve out a role for themselves in designing and 
implementing particular cultural, audiovisual and educational measures, 
national governments would nonetheless insist on various safeguards and the 
ability to apply ‘emergency breaks’ to prevent supranational bodies from 
unilaterally expanding their cultural and educational remit beyond a level 
they dleemed compatible with the continued role of the member states as the 
primary units of mass identification. To the same end, they might establish 
various mixed implementation bodies, insist on regular policy reviews, ensure 
that cultural and educational funding remained closely tied to specific, pre­
approved projects, and so forth.
All this, of course, remains to be empirically investigated rather than just 
theoretically deduced. The next three chapters examine political symbolism 
in the European Union, from the Treaties of Rome to the present. In line with 
the argument so far they focus on cultural policy, the audiovisual sector and 
education. How did political elites in the EU at various levels seek to shore up 
support for European integration through cultural and educational policies? 
Did such initiatives have popular appeal? What resistance did they encounter, 
from national publics and/or from elites with competing symbolic agendas? 
Lastly, what conclusions can we draw from this regarding the relative signifi­
cance of the two alternative logics just discussed and, more broadly, the future 
development of the European project?
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Notes
1 I use the terms ‘state legitimisation’ and ‘state- and nation-building’ to depict situa­
tions in which state institutions sought to legitimise themselves in the eyes of their
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subjects. In some instances this went hand in hand with, or followed closely in the 
wake of, state founding. Examples are the creation of Germany and Italy in the late 
nineteenth century. In Italy the task at hand was famously epitomised by Massimo 
d’Azeglio’s exclamation ‘We have made Italy: now we must make Italians’ (quoted in 
Hobsbawm 1993a: 267). In other cases, political elites sought to attract mass loyalties 
in already well-established states, e.g. in nineteenth-century Britain or the French 
Third Republic. Some writers use terms such as ‘national consciousness formation’ or 
'nationalisation of the masses’ (Mosse 1991) to label this process. But in the present 
context 'state legitimisation’ is more useful. It highlights the key variable at stake, 
namely the creation of popular consent for a given political order.
2 This literature has grown significantly in past years, generally subsumed under the 
heading of ‘nationalism research’. Canonical works in the English language include 
Hobsbawm (1994), Anderson (1991), Smith (1991) and Gelllner (1983). For more 
specific case studies see also the excellent contributions in Gillis (1996). Also see 
Brubaker and Cooper (2000) and Billig (1995) for important critiques.
3 Habermas’s (1976) influential account of what he terms ‘legitimation crisis’, for 
instance, rests in part precisely on this notion (also Held 1988, Chapter 4).
4 All this raises the question of whether there is an intrinsic link between salience (as 
opposed to strength and solidity) and the kinds of signifiers used in a given political 
system. In other words, could such a system rely on purely ‘thin’ signifiers yet at the 
same time be very centralised and enjoy a very high degree of salience and third-level 
legitimacy? From a social constructivist angle nothing would seem to prevent this in 
principle. Yet since very centralised democracies require a very high degree of system- 
wide interaction and communication and since there are no subordinate corporate 
identities to take into account, elites might be more tempted to press for linguistic 
and cultural assimilation. Self-styled ‘civic’ polities that are in reality culturally and 
linguistically homogenised (such as France) illustrate this. Applied to the EU, this 
calls for a slight qualification of the earlier point: if the EU were to evolve in such a 
way as to erode the political viability and corporate identities of its member states 
(that is, into a centralised European state), achieving some degree of cultural 
homogenisation which in turn would lead to ‘thick’ communal markers might 
become (or, at any rate, be perceived as) a practical necessity. However, at present this 
seems to be a very faint prospect at best.
5 Hobsbawm (1993b: 307). This stress on ‘need’ is implicit in numerous accounts 
which attribute the success of nationalist movements to individuals’ search for 
meaning and belonging in the face of uprooting developments such as urbanisation, 
secularisation, and the breakdown of traditional local hierarchies and communities.
6 Not surprisingly, neofunctionalists typically link the effectiveness with which the 
Commission can ‘cultivate’ integration to the skill and determination of leading 
supranational officials of the day, above all Commission presidents. They attribute 
expansive periods in the EU’s development in part to the calibre and ambition of the 
Commission leaders who presided over them (such as, most recently, Jacques Delors), 
whereas they partially blame weaker Commission presidents for periods of stagnation 
(Ross 1995; Sandholtz and Zysman 1989).
3
Cultural policy
Despite much enthusiasm in the early post-war European unification move­
ment for bringing a ‘cultural dimension’ to European integration,1 neither the 
treaty that set up the European Coal and Steel Community nor the subse­
quent Rome Treaties gave the Community any powers in cultural policy. The 
only direct reference to culture in the original EEC Treaty resides in Article 
36. It stipulates that, in exceptional cases, the Community may suspend its 
free trade provisions to assure the ‘protection of national treasures possessing 
artistic, historic or archaeological value’. This provision thus established a 
cultural exemption clause liable to be invoked by national governments, not 
a legal basis for a cultural involvement by the Community.
There was one actual and one potential exception to the Community’s 
exclusion from the cultural field. First, according to standard legal interpre­
tation Article 36 never amounted to a wholesale exception of cultural ‘goods 
and services’ from the Community’s free trade and freedom of movement 
provisions. In principle, these were to apply to culture as much as to any other 
economic activity. Second, in some renderings a conceivable way of involving 
the Community in culture was through Article 235 of the EEC Treaty. It 
authorised the Council of Ministers, acting unanimously, to initiate ‘action 
by the Community’ in areas not explicitly mentioned in the treaty, if this 
‘should prove necessary to attain . . .  one of the objectives of the Community 
and [the EEC Treaty]’. The significance of Article 235 for cultural policy 
remained disputed, however. Some argued that the EEC Treaty’s call for an 
‘ever closer Union’ contains an ‘allusion to European culture’ (Massart- 
Pierard 1986: 34), yet for many others this far exceeded the limits of 
permissible treaty interpretation (e.g. Blanke 1994; Faroux 1993).
In any case, during its first two decades the Community had no broader 
cultural or public relations ambitions, save for a small ‘information unit’ 
attached to the Commission (mainly in charge of liasing with journalists) and
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the occasional publishing of brochures and leaflets aimed at schools or a 
wider public. It was only in the late 1960s that the Community’s far-reaching 
cultural abstinence became questioned: in Community rhetoric first, and 
subsequently through tangible policy initiatives.
The rise of 'European culture’ and ‘European identity’ in Community 
discourse
The late 1960s saw the launch of a series of official pronouncements -  some 
by the Commission, some emanating from intergovernmental gatherings -  
which suggested a growing concern with public attitudes towards European 
integration. These pronouncements had a common theme: if the Community 
was to thrive in the long term and possibly move into new areas such as 
foreign and monetary policy or direct elections to the European Parliament, 
it would need to do more than demonstrate its economic utility. Instead, it 
would need to generate a new quality of popular commitment, described 
variously with terms such as ‘awareness of the non-material values of 
European unity’, ‘European consciousness’, ‘European values’ and ‘European 
identity’.
Among the first examples of such rhetoric is the ‘Declaration by the Eu­
ropean Commission on the occasion of the Achievement of the Customs 
Union on 1 July 1968’:
But Europe is not only of customs tariffs. Europe does not belong only to the 
manufacturers, the farmers or the technocrats . . .  Europe is not only the Europe 
of the Governments, o f the Parliaments o r o f the adm inistrators. It m ust also be 
the Europe o f the peoples, o f the workers, o f youth, of m an himself. All -  or 
nearly all -  still remains to be done. (Commission 1972 [1968]: 69)
Of a similar bent was the declaration issued at the Paris Summit some three 
years later, this time by the heads of state and government themselves. It pro­
claimed that ‘economic expansion...  is not an end in itself.. . .  It must emerge 
in an improved quality as well as an improved standard of life. In the 
European spirit special attention will be paid to non-material values . . . ’ 
(Bulletin 1972 [No. 10]: 15-16).
Of all such pronouncements, however, it was the ‘Declaration on Euro­
pean identity’, issued at the Copenhagen Summit in 1973 which signifies the 
most forceful entry of this type of rhetoric into the Community’s official 
vocabulary. In many ways a ‘woolly and confusing text’ (de Witte 1987: 135; 
also Delahaye 1979) it refers to the ‘framework of common European civili­
sation, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing 
convergence of attitudes to life’, which would give the ‘European Identity [sic] 
its originality and its own dynamism’. Moreover,
56 P o l it ic a l  sy m b o l is m  a n d  e u r o p e a n  in t e g r a t io n
the European Identity [sic] will evolve as a function o f the dynamic o f the con­
struction o f a united Europe. In their external relations, the Nine propose 
progressively to  undertake the definition o f their identity in relation to other 
countries or groups o f countries.
In some respects these various declarations seemed like rhetorical window 
dressing. They lacked tangible proposals on how the envisioned European 
identity should be promoted, and their grandiloquence often seemed little 
more than a rhetorical compensation for their lack of policy substance. All the 
same, for the Commission, the European Parliament and at least some 
member state governments they reflected a genuine concern for the 
Community’s public standing. This reverberated throughout a series of inter­
nal Commission documents and working papers, which blamed the 
Community’s stagnation at the time in part on its technocratic image and lack 
of emotional mass appeal.2 Most visibly, these concerns led to the creation of 
the Eurobarometer research unit in 1973. Punded by the Commission, 
Eurobarometer’s task was to conduct regular opinion polls throughout the 
Community, providing the Commission and national policy makers with 
scientifically compiled time-series data on public perceptions of the 
Community and particular policies in different member states (see Reif and 
Inglehart 1991; de Witte 1987). In short, by the early 1970s, many policy­
makers believed that popular attitudes towards European integration had 
become a problem, and that European culture, European values and 
European identity could offer a solution. The various identity declarations at 
the time were one manifestation of this belief.
But what was the actual policy impact of these declarations, given that 
they lacked tangible proposals? With hindsight two factors seem relevant 
above all. First, at the level of elite discourse these pronouncements marked 
an incipient European 'entity process’, helping to gradually solidify the idea 
of the Community as a real existing corporate actor and carrier of particular 
European meanings and values. Throughout all these declarations, European 
identity, European values, European culture and the like were depicted as 
self-evident facts, merely in need of being ‘rediscovered’ or ‘strengthened’ 
rather than constructed or invented. This in turn became a rhetorical under­
pinning of most subsequent cultural policy proposals by the EP and the 
Commission, heralding a broader trend whereby ‘the notion of “European 
identity” .. .  became progressively transformed and reified, and then 
presented as a fixed, bounded and “natural” category, through successive 
policy initiatives’ (Shore 1993: 788; Perriaux 1990). As will be shown, by the 
1980s this had led to the appearance in Commission and EP discourse not 
only of a shared European heritage, a European identity and European values, 
but also, in places, of a European culture and a European people. Making 
Europeans more aware of these became the foremost declared aim of 
Community cultural policy.
Second, by acknowledging E uropean identity, European culture and  the
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Eke as something at least in principle worth promoting, national govern­
ments provided the Commission and the European Parliament with a general 
heading under which they could place their subsequent initiatives for a 
cultural (and also, as discussed in Chapter 5, educational) involvement by the 
Community. It allowed them to portray these initiatives as merely giving 
substance to an objective whose widespread recognition was already on the 
record. For a long time to come, almost every cultural proposal by the 
Commission and the EP referred to the Copenhagen Declaration and to its 
theme of European identity promotion. As is shown next, this process took a 
long time to build up critical momentum. Nonetheless, by the late 1980s it 
had led to some tangible cultural involvement by the Community for the first 
time.
From the Tindemans to the Adonnino Report
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s attempts to involve the Community in 
culture had two components. First were the various grandiloquent but vague 
‘European identity’ declarations just discussed, rapidly making their way into 
more and more pronouncements by the Commission and the EP while also 
becoming a set-piece feature of many Council and European summit state­
ments. These declarations had no direct policy impact but, as suggested, their 
depiction of European identity, European culture and European values as 
both self-evident facts and problem areas (because not yet sufficiently ‘redis­
covered’, ‘affirmed’, or ‘brought to the fore’) established a basis on which 
more tangible cultural proposals could be predicated. These in turn came in 
two varieties: first, comprehensive cultural ‘package initiatives’, unambigu­
ously aimed at increasing the Community’s symbolic visibility and mass 
appeal; second, more low-key proposals that concentrated on cultural 
exchanges and other circulation-enhancing measures and were often justified 
on economic rather than identity-centred grounds.
The first comprehensive cultural policy initiative formed part of the 
‘Report on European Union’, submitted by the Belgian Prime Minister Leo 
Tindemans to his European Council colleagues in 1976. Tindemans had been 
given the task of drafting a wide-ranging blueprint for the Community’s 
future development and for its progression towards what was vaguely termed 
‘political union’. While the bulk of his report dealt with the Community’s 
expansion into foreign and monetary policy and a broadening of EP and 
Commission powers, one section, titled ‘A citizen’s Europe’, suggested ways 
of broadening the Community’s popular appeal.
Tindemans’s stated logic was clear: to overcome the prevailing 
‘Eurosclerosis’ at the time and to expand into new policy areas the 
Community would have to shed its technocratic image and attract popular 
loyalties and commitment of a kind that had hitherto proven elusive. These,
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in turn, would not simply emerge as an automatic by-product of economic 
and political integration but instead would require carefully devised policies. 
Some of Tindemans’s proposals to this end had a strong utilitarian flavour 
(e.g. improving consumer rights in the Community) whereas others were 
mainly circulation and exchange-centred (e.g. improved communication 
links, cultural and educational exchanges and a ‘European Foundation’ in 
charge of organising them). A third category of proposals sought to enhance 
the Community’s symbolic presence in the everyday lives of its citizens 
through what Tindemans called ‘external signs of our solidarity. Suggestions 
under this rubric were relatively sparse, however, centring on proposals for a 
common European passport cover design and a range of additional symbols 
whose nature was to be decided at a later stage.
Other than bringing the heads of state and government to profess their 
‘very great interest’ in its recommendations at the Hague Summit in 
November 1976 (Bulletin 1976 (No. 11], point 2501), the Tindemans Report 
led to no tangible cultural or symbolic measures. It did, however, prompt the 
Commission to submit a range of follow-up proposals to the member states, 
the most comprehensive of which was its 1977 initiative for ‘Community 
action in the cultural sector’ (Commission 1977). The bulk of it concentrated 
on better freedom of movement provisions for ‘cultural goods and services’ 
and ‘cultural workers’, both of which were justified largely on economic 
grounds and depicted to fall squarely within the Community’s existing 
economic mandate. Complementing this, the Commission also proposed 
more symbolically charged measures that went further than those suggested 
by Tindemans. So it called for ‘European rooms’ in national museums (to 
highlight works ‘which form part of the Communitys heritage’), 
‘Community cultural institutes’, and a series o f‘365 broadcasts, each of which 
will last five minutes and be devoted to a great European of the past or 
present’. In addition, the Commission proposed ‘Europiades’ broadcast on 
Eurovision throughout the Community. Their impact on viewers, along with 
that of similar Community-sponsored mass events, should be assessed 
through ‘high level scientific studies’ in order to maximise their 
Europeanising effect on popular attitudes.
Yet the Commission’s 1977 initiative, too, came to nothing. Despite an 
almost desperate sounding supporting resolution by the European 
Parliament in 1979 (EP 1979: 50-51), the Council refused even to debate it. 
Overt resistance was spearheaded by Denmark and the UK, but with the tacit 
support of other member states. France had generally been open to classic 
inter-governmental cooperation in culture (along the lines of the many 
Franco-German programmes pursued since the end of the Second World 
War) but rejected a cultural involvement by the Community. The British 
government broadly shared this position. Germany, for its part, was driven by 
Länder fears of an erosion of their cultural prerogatives, which became 
steadily stronger over the years?
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The failure of these early cultural initiatives carried several lessons. First, 
it highlighted the crippling effect of the Community’s lacking legal mandate 
in culture and the ‘fundamental lack of legality and legitimacy5 (Sandell 1996: 
268) that overshadowed all cultural initiatives as a result. The Commission’s 
attempts to use proposals for the better application of freedom of trade and 
movement stipulations to culture (where it did have a legal mandate) as a 
‘cover’ for more proactive and symbolically charged cultural initiatives 
(where it had no legal mandate) ultimately proved ineffective. The delicate 
balance of power between the Commission and the Council of Ministers -  
which governs decision-making in areas where the Community does have real 
treaty-based powers -  was tilted almost completely in favour of the latter as 
far as culture was concerned. Without a legal mandate, the Commission was 
forced to submit its cultural proposals in the form of ‘communications’ and 
‘draft resolutions’, neither of which had a clear legal standing. As for the 
member states, they were free to ignore these at will, simply pleading legal 
objections.
In this sense, Britain and Denmark’s accession to the Community in 1973 
had an ambiguous effect. On the one hand, in both countries popular support 
for the Community was much lower than in the original six. This gave an 
additional sense of urgency to the Commission’s calls for measures to 
improve the Community’s public standing. But on the other hand, those two 
countries also became the staunchest sceptics of any cultural involvement by 
the Community. Other countries that were more favourable and thus could 
to some extent counterbalance British and Danish obstructionism -  namely 
Greece, Spain and Portugal -  did not join the Community until the 1980s.
Beyond this, the rhetorical framing of the Commission’s 1977 initiative 
might well have been a tactical mistake. Proposals for ‘European cultural 
institutes’, ‘European showrooms’ in  museums and the like reeked too much 
of self-conscious attempts at European ‘nation-building’ to be acceptable 
even to those governments that might not have opposed less grandiloquent 
initiatives. As one former Commission official put it, the 1977 initiative and 
the rhetoric that accompanied it reflected more the uncompromising 
‘commitment to the European ideal’ by the Commission officials who drafted 
them than pragmatic policy considerations (interview, February 2001).
After the defeat of the Tindemans Report and the Commission’s 1977 
proposals it took almost a decade for another comprehensive cultural initia­
tive to emerge. It originated with a decision taken at the Fontainebleau 
Summit in June 1984 to appoint a committee chaired by the Italian MEP 
Pietro Adonnino to examine ways in which the Community could, in the 
words of the European Council, ‘strengthen and promote its identity and its 
image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world’ (Bulletin 1984 [No. 
6], point 1.1.9 [subheading 6]). The Adonnino Committee was to deliberate 
parallel to the Dooge Committee on institutional reform that was to prepare 
the impending overhaul of the founding treaties in the Single European Act.
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Two factors helped bring the Adonnino Committee into being. The first 
was the unexpectedly low popular turnout at the European Parliament elec­
tions in June 1984. Many Commission officials as well as some of their 
colleagues inside the member states took this as a warning sign that the 
impending Single Market programme might encounter unexpectedly high 
levels of public resistance (interviews European Commission, June and 
September 2000; Janssen 1985). At the very least, it suggested that democra­
tising the Community and making it more visible might not, in and of itself, 
enhance its popular appeal. The notion that popular support for the EU had 
once more become a ‘problem’ strengthened the hand of the Commission, 
the EP and some member state governments (led this time by Italy) in 
convincing more sceptical governments to accept the Adonnino Committee.
Second, in part the Adonnino Committee was also a consolation prize, 
compensating the European Parliament, the Commission and the more 
culture-ambitious member states for the absence of cultural policy from the 
upcoming Single European Act. This became an increasingly likely prospect 
at the time, despite vigorous lobbying by the European Parliament (especially 
in its Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union [EP 1984]).4 Since Britain 
and Denmark had already signalled that they would veto attempts to give the 
Community legal powers in culture, the Commission itself had largely given 
up on pursuing the issue. Instead, it concentrated on trying to use the Single 
Act to expand into less controversial areas such as environmental policy 
(interview European Commission, June 2001; Delors 1985).5 The Adonnino 
Committee, by contrast, was much easier to swallow for even the most scep­
tical member state governments. Its recommendations would not be legally 
binding and could thus be ignored more or less at will if they were deemed to 
be legally or substantially offensive -  the fate of the Tindemans Report had 
amply demonstrated this.
The Adonnino Committee presented two reports to the member states 
(both in ‘A People’s Europe’ 1985). Following the by then customary division, 
the first report concentrated on ‘utilitarian’ support measures, especially the 
‘easing of rules and practices which cause irritation to Community citizens 
and undermine the credibility of the Community’. Among other things, it 
suggested an increase in customs allowances for travellers within the 
Community, the relaxation of internal border controls and better social secu­
rity and taxation provisions for intra-Community migrants.
The second report, by contrast, dealt with cultural policy and education. 
While many of its proposals centred on exchanges, others sought to increase 
the Community’s symbolic visibility in the everyday lives of its citizens -  
measures the report deemed ‘essential to European identity and the 
Community’s image in the minds of its people, [... and where] support for 
the advancement of Europe can and must be sought’. They included sugges­
tions for the Community to sponsor transnational audiovisual 
coproductions, European postage stamps, a ‘European academy of science,
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technology and art’ (‘Europe needs an institution with international influence 
to highlight the achievements of European science and the originality of 
European civilisation’) and a Euro-lottery. Its weekly draw would be televised 
throughout the Community and the prize money paid out in ECU. By being 
‘an event with popular appeal’, such a lottery could ‘make Europe come alive 
for the Europeans’ and thereby ‘help promote the European idea’. Under the 
heading ‘information policy’, the Adonnino report recommended that the 
Community and national governments cooperate more closely to, among 
other things, ‘point out to people what the costs would be if the Community 
did not exist’. It also demanded the replacement o f ‘inadequate and obsolete 
signs’ at internal borders with ‘border signs of a common design’ and the in­
troduction of a European flag. It would be used ‘without of course affecting 
the use of national flags’ and accompany the frequent playing of Beethoven’s 
‘Ode to Joy’ which was to be designated as the official Community anthem.
The two Adonnino reports were approved in principle by the heads of 
state and government at the Brussels and Milan Summits respectively 
(European Council 1985: 31). Many Commission officials, however, doubted 
the member state governments’ real intentions, recalling the similarly warm 
formal welcome they had extended to Tindemans’s ‘citizen’s Europe’ agenda 
a decade earlier (interviews European Commission, lune 2000). And the 
wider reception of the Adonnino Report was sceptical at best. Many commen­
tators likened it to a hastily assembled collection of uncoordinated 
brainstorming sessions; and suggestions such as those for a European lottery 
and postage stamps quickly attracted widespread ridicule and comments to 
the effect that they ‘are easily to be deemed dysfunctional’ (Janssen 1986:212, 
my translation6; also Janssen 1985).
Nonetheless, circumstances had changed from the previous decade. One 
factor was the general revival of the integrative process in the mid-1980s. It 
was one thing to argue, as had Tindemans and the Commission in the 1970s, 
that a boost in popular commitment was needed to lead the Community out 
of stagnation, if this stagnation could ultimately be blamed on the very 
governments at which these pleas were directed; it was quite another to argue 
that measures already implemented or about to be implemented (i.e. direct 
elections to the EP and the Single Act) needed to be made more popular. The 
accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1980s gave added momentum 
to Adonnino’s cultural policy drive. Together with Italy and (on occasion) the 
Socialist government in France, these were more receptive to a Community 
involvement in culture and less worried about legal transgressions and ambi­
guities. This helped counterbalance the more sceptical members led, as 
always, by Denmark and the UK.
Most importantly perhaps, this time round the Commission acted much 
more skilfully than in the wake of the Tindemans Report. Rather than issuing 
yet another comprehensive cultural package initiative, it used the momentum 
generated by the Adonnino Report to put forward a steady flow of relatively
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narrowly circumscribed follow-up initiatives. And to ensure that these would 
be debated in an appropriate forum, it managed to bring about regular meet­
ings of the national ministers of culture.
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The ‘small steps’ approach to culture
Some three years prior to the Adonnino Report the Commission had scored 
a major success when the national ministers of culture met for the first time. 
To alleviate concerns by Denmark, the UK and Germany (the latter driven by 
the habitual Länder fears), they first met informally and then under a ‘mixed’ 
semi-Community-related, semi-intergovernmental label ‘Ministers of culture 
meeting within the Council’ (Ryngaert 1987; Polaczek 1982).
Many of the initial meetings were dominated by French culture minister 
Jack Lang’s incessant but ultimately futile calls for mandatory quotas on 
foreign audiovisual imports (further discussed in the next chapter). But after 
the Adonnino Report and under sustained lobbying by the European 
Parliament and the Commission they nonetheless led to a cascade of concrete 
cultural initiatives. For example, in 1985 the culture ministers agreed on a 
programme to market European films outside the Community and on a 
European sculpture competition (Bulletin 1985 [No. 5], point 2.1.59 etseq.). 
In 1986 they adopted a programme for ‘transnational cultural itineraries’ 
(Bulletin 1986 [No. 2], point 2.1.89; Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs 
1986a). In 1986 there followed three resolutions pertaining to the private 
sponsoring of ‘cultural events’ and cooperation in architectural heritage 
protection and art conservation (Ministers with responsibility for Cultural 
Affairs 1986a, 1986b, 1986c). Furthermore, the culture ministers agreed to 
sponsor a ‘European film and television year’ (Ministers responsible for 
Cultural Affairs 1986b), literary translations (Council 1987a), and to enhance 
promotional activities organised by the Commission (see further below). 
There followed the creation of a ‘European cultural month’, held in addition 
to the annual designation of a ‘European city of culture’ (Bulletin 1990 [No. 
11], point 1.3.193) and various resolutions on the training and exchange of 
‘arts administrators’ and on transnational theatre promotion (Council 1991a, 
1991b). Lastly, the Community helped sponsor a growing number of cultural 
prizes for architects, film producers, writers, literary translators, town twin­
ning organisers and the like. They ranged from the ‘European prize for 
literature’ and the ‘European prize for translation’, to the ‘gold stars of town 
twinning’ prize (Bulletin 1990 [No. 11], point 1.3.12; Bulletin 1993 [No. 10], 
point 1.2.176; Commission 1990b, 1990c).
Apart from some Community-sponsored events and prizes that fell 
under the direct auspices of the Commission, most of these initiatives 
amounted to little more than intergovernmental declarations of intent. They 
were legally non-binding and implemented by the member states alone with
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the Commission obtaining at the most some form of observer status 
(Ryngaert 1987: 586). What is more, while most of these measures were justi­
fied in part with the need to foster support for the Community, they had, on 
the face of it, only a limited potential to actually do so. Some, such as 
Community-sponsored restoration schemes for national monuments, had 
little in the way of a tangible ‘European dimension’ to begin with. Even the 
‘European city of culture’ programme involved (and still involves) above all 
the use of Community funds to support local cultural projects, garnished with 
some Europe-wide tourism promotion. It lacks a strong conceptual link to 
European integration, let alone to specific Community policies and institu­
tions. Other measures did feature a -  however embryonically conceived -  
‘European dimension’, but mainly in the sense of boosting transnational 
cultural exchanges. Also, most of them focused so strongly on ‘high culture’ 
(classical music, sculpture exhibitions, literary translations) that their mass 
appeal was limited from the outset -  aggravated by their minuscule funding 
in relation to the Community’s population size.
Nonetheless, placed in the overall context of the development of 
Community cultural policy these initiatives were significant. Within a few 
years they had led to the actual initiation of a number of concrete cultural 
policies, the Community’s continued lack of a legal mandate in culture 
notwithstanding. And while they were mostly initiated at an intergovern­
mental level, this occurred nevertheless within a notional Community 
context: most were initially proposed by the Commission, participation was 
restricted to the member states of the Community, all Community members 
participated in them, and most gave the Commission some nominal (though 
often largely observer status-type) role in their implementation. Finally, 
though all these initiatives started out with only very modest funding, this, 
too, had the potential to grow. After all, once the Community begins to fund 
a given project in any given area, demand almost inevitably comes to outstrip 
supply. Its supporters can then use this as evidence that the project in ques­
tion meets an underlying ‘need’ and lobby for its expansion. As is shown 
below, this is precisely what the Commission sought to do with many of its 
cultural actions in subsequent years, albeit with mixed success.
How to account for these post-Adonnino programmes? A first factor was 
the Commission’s cleverness in ‘packaging’ and rhetorically justifying them. 
On the one hand, it ‘economised’ many of these initiatives. Its main declared 
cultural objective became the creation of a borderless ‘cultural space’ in which 
‘cultural goods and services’ could be exchanged freely. This fit in well with 
the mobility-centredness of the Single Market programme and it pushed back 
the conceptual boundary between cultural policy (where the Community had 
no mandate) and economic and social policy (where it did have a mandate) 
in favour of the latter. On the other hand, together with the EP the 
Commission continued to invoke identity-related arguments, maintaining 
that cultural policies were needed to shore up support for European integra­
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tion and that the member states had acknowledged as much by approving the 
Adonnino Report. In the 1970s, the Commission had portrayed this as neces­
sary to catapult the Community out of its stagnation; in the 1980s, it depicted 
it as indispensable to sustain the Community’s rising fortunes at the time.
The joining of Greece and later Spain and Portugal in the early to mid- 
1980s further boosted the Commission’s cultural clout. First, as suggested, 
together with Italy these countries soon became the most ardent supporters 
of a Community involvement in culture. Second, a disproportionate number 
of new Commission staff recruited from these three countries joined the 
administrative units in charge of culture and education, thereby raising the 
profile and relative status of these policy areas within the Commission and 
leading to their growing professionalisation.7 Throughout the 1980s the 
Commission accumulated specialised expertise in areas ranging from the 
taxation of ‘cultural workers’ to the economics of the audiovisual productions 
sector, and it compiled a steady stream of internal briefs, assessments, memo­
randums and draft reports in part concerned with these areas. This in turn 
prepared the ground for a cascade of cultural proposals put forward in the 
second part of the 1980s. These achieved, at the very least, a kind of ‘nagging 
effect’ upon the member states, making it more difficult for them to simply 
ignore the Commission’s cultural initiatives or to dismiss them out of hand as 
they had done throughout the preceding decade.
The first Community symbols and public relations campaigns
If the Adonnino Report boosted the Community’s standing in cultural policy, 
its greatest impact was in the area of political symbols and public relations. 
For instance, even though demands for a fully-fledged European flag re­
mained unacceptable to some member states (the British government led the 
objectors8), the Commission and the EP ultimately managed to obtain 
approval for a ‘European logo’. It featured a design of twelve stars arranged 
in a circle, similar to that already used by the Council of Europe. ‘Once 
adopted, [... the European logo] was of course used on flags -  but these 
lacked! official status’ (Wallace 1990: 122). What is more, the prelude to 
Beethoven’s ‘Ode to Joy’ was declared the Community’s official anthem, this 
time without much visible opposition from the member states (Bulletin 1986 
[No. 4], point 2.1.81).
Following Adonnino’s recommendations the Commission also expanded 
its public relations activities. Most were funded by the Commission’s infor­
mation budget under the auspices of its Directorate-General X. In addition to 
its traditional brief of ‘information’, DG X had by then also been given 
responsibility for cultural policy and, in recognition of the Adonnino Report, 
for ‘people’s Europe’ issues. And it was in this latter field that DG X soon 
developed a flurry of activities. For example, advised by a public relations
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firm it stocked up ‘EC-shops’ in Brussels with pencils and mugs engraved 
with the European logo and with ‘I love Europe’ T-shirts. For added effect it 
decorated its own Brussels headquarters with ‘Europe, my country5 posters 
and commissioned promotional videos for general distribution. Titles to 
choose from included ‘A European Journey5, ‘Jean Monnet, Father of 
Europe5, ‘The Tree of Europe5 (‘an original feature which will make all 
Europeans aware of the common roots of their past5) and ‘After Twenty 
Centuries’. This video, proclaimed the Commission, could teach Europeans 
about their ‘shared experiences at political, intellectual and cultural level’ 
over the past 2000 years (quoted in Shore 1996: 485). In addition, the 
Commission sponsored a European yacht race, a festival for European car 
collectors, various bicycle races, a ‘walk for Europe’ and many similar events 
(Commission 1987b).
The corporate feel inherent to many of the Commission’s public relations 
activities did not meet with unanimous approval, not even by the normally 
very sympathetic European Parliament. One telling incident occurred in 
1986, when a group of MEPs was given a preview of a promotional video 
produced by a French public relations firm for the Commission.
W hat followed was a pastiche o f advertising images, holiday brochure-type 
depictions o f European places and peoples. . .  These supposedly positive and ‘up­
beat’ images were set to music; a synthesised pop remix o f a M ozart symphony. 
The video culm inated in  a scene of American tennis star John McEnroe winning 
a European Tennis tournam ent, bu t instead o f holding up to the cheering crowd 
a cup or trophy, the 'champion’s hands were clutching an enorm ous plastic 
eurocheque, announcing in ECU the value of his prize-money. At the end of the 
presentation, there was a stunned silence followed by some angry exchanges 
which later culminated in at least one MEP tabling a formal com plaint to the 
Commission for squandering public money. (Shore 1993: 790)
All the same, their homespun quality did not reduce the importance of these 
early measures for the development of public relations policy in the European 
Community. Like parallel forays into more conventional areas of cultural 
policy at the time, they established precedents and paved the way for a much 
more extensive involvement in the 1990s and beyond. In fact, in 1990 ‘infor­
mation and communication5 received, for the first time, a separate entry in 
the Community’s budget, and its funding grew rapidly in the years thereafter 
to an annual average of around forty million ECU in the first few years of the 
1990s (see the budget section in the Commission’s annual General Report on 
the Activities o f the European Union).
Parallel to this grew the Commission’s eagerness to define and implement 
a coherent information strategy. From the late 1980s, and against the back­
drop of the impending end-of-1992 Single Market deadline, the Commission 
released annual ‘Priority information5 and ‘Priority publications’ 
programmes’ into which it channelled the bulk of its ‘information and
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communication’ budget (e.g. Bulletin 1990 [No. 3], point 1.1.190; Bulletin 
1990 [No. 7-8], point 1.3.304). In 1989-1990 the three -  somewhat vaguely 
defined -  ‘priority themes’ about which the Commission sought to ‘inform’ 
its citizens were ‘making a success of 1992’, ‘enhancing 1992’, and ‘preparing 
for post-1992’ (Bulletin 1989 [No. 2], point 2.1.84). The year after they were 
‘the building of a new Europe’, ‘Europe at the service of its citizens’ and 
‘Europe: a world partner’. For each of these themes the Commission 
produced leaflets, newspaper advertisements, ‘information events’, and 
various exhibitions in the member states as discussed further below.
A significant proportion of the Commission’s PR budget at the time went 
into sponsorship of large-scale public events. For instance, in July 1991 a 
Commission subsidy of 300.000 ECU helped launch the first ‘European 
Youth Olympic Games’ (Bulletin 1991 [No. 4], point 1.2.146). One year later, 
the Commission sponsored a ‘Community pavilion’ at the world exposition 
in Seville. It housed a display titled ‘from Renaissance Europe to the renais­
sance of Europe’ which attracted around two million visitors (Commission 
1992a: 391; Bulletin 1992 [No. 3], point 1.2.221). But by far the most signifi­
cant event sponsored by the Commission at the time were the Olympic 
summer and winter games in 1992.
DG X  at the Olympics
To both Olympic games the Commission made a sizeable contribution: four 
million ECU to the winter Olympics in Albertville and six million to the 
summer games in Barcelona.9 In return, the Community obtained a substan­
tial symbolic presence at the games. The Community logo was displayed at 
their televised opening and closing ceremonies and these also featured ‘chore­
ographed scenes devoted to the Community’. In addition, the Commission 
sought to have a direct impact on location. The Community press service 
distributed information material aimed primarily at ‘opinion leaders’ who 
attended the games, and the Community logo featured on ‘300 banners at 
Albertville and 1800 banners in the streets of Barcelona’. A travelling 
Community exhibition, called ‘Euromobile’, attended both games, handing 
out information leaflets and Community paraphernalia.
Parallel to all this the Commission pursued several accompanying meas­
ures ‘with a view to making the Community message more explicit and more 
effective’ and to ensure that ‘the opportunities for communication offered by 
the sponsoring of [... the Olympic Games] could be exploited to optimum 
effect’. On these the Commission spent a further 4.5 million ECU. This 
publicity drive entailed ‘Euromobile’s’ tour of seventy European cities. 
Members of the public were lured into the exhibition with video footage from 
the Olympics on high definition television screens. Once they had entered 
they received information literature and small European flags. 
Complementing this the Commission ran a newspaper advertising campaign 
throughout the Community. It highlighted the Community’s Olympic in­
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volvement and compared the Community to winning sports teams (‘A thou­
sand faces, a single force’; 'The European Community: More is possible when 
you pursue the same idea’).
All the while it was planning, implementing and assessing the impact of 
its Olympic campaign, the Commission was clearly worried that it could 
backfire in public opinion. In its own words, it saw a ‘danger that the exercise 
might be interpreted as “political propaganda” . . .  or as a “waste of taxpayer’s 
[sic] money”’. When accusations of precisely this kind did surface, notably in 
the UK and Denmark (coupled with complaints that the use of the Olympics 
for political advertising violated the Olympic Charter), the Commission 
launched a strategy of trying to ‘counteract these accusations or at least at­
tenuate their impact and pre-empt any chain reaction throughout the 
Community press’. This included meetings with journalists attending the 
Olympics, in order, among other things, ‘to convey the notion of an invest­
ment useful to the organisers [of the games]’.
The Commission’s involvement with the Olympic games had several 
aspects that gave it a pioneering role in the general development of the 
Union’s public relations campaigns. Remarkable, in the first place, was its 
scope and financial backing. It exceeded that of any comparable measure the 
Commission had hitherto undertaken. Moreover, the fact that in designing, 
implementing and assessing its Olympic offensive the Commission was 
assisted by a plethora of external experts and PR consultants heralded a 
growing professionalisation of Community public relations. This shone 
through not least in a hitherto unprecedented degree of reflexivity, leading 
the Commission to expect that some citizens could reject its Olympics 
campaign as political propaganda and to draw up contingency plans for 
rebutting such criticisms.
Certainly by the standards of most commercial mass-media-based adver­
tising and public relations campaigns such an anticipation of potential 
‘oppositional reading’ outcomes is nothing out of the ordinary (see Chapter 
2 above). Yet for the Commission it represented a leap in sophistication over 
many of its previous attempts to shore up popular support, especially those 
launched under the ‘people’s Europe’ heading in the late 1980s. In particular, 
it bore witness to a growing understanding by the Commission’s information 
strategists that even if they conveyed seemingly positive images and messages 
about the Community this would not ipso facto improve its public standing. 
Though its Olympic campaign, too, ultimately sought to increase the 
Community’s visibility and symbolic presence, the Commission’s antici­
pation that this might backfire represented a departure from the crude ‘the 
more the Community makes itself felt in the consciousness of its citizens the 
more these will inevitably come to support it’ assumption that had dominated 
its earlier approach.
At the same time, with hindsight Commission officials concede that their 
Olympics campaign did not sufficiently heed these principles and that this
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caused it to backfire in some member states. They criticise the campaign for 
having been overly ‘propagandist’ and having led to the Community’s ‘over­
projection’ (interviews European Commission, June 2000). At the same time, 
the overall impact of this and subsequent public relations campaigns on 
popular attitudes towards European integration is difficult to ascertain, as is 
discussed below.
Cultural policy in the Maastricht Treaty
While these various cultural and PR initiatives were proposed, debated, 
implemented and had their impact assessed, the Community experienced the 
first legal development since the Single European Act. The negotiations that 
led to the Maastricht Treaty formally began with the launch of the two 
Intergovernmental Conferences on Political and Monetary Union in 
December 1990. The treaty was signed one year later. After a long and crisis- 
prone ratification process it came into force in November 1993.
In the period leading up to the Maastricht Treaty there was a relatively 
widespread anticipation that this time round the Community would receive 
some formal mandate in culture (and, as is shown in Chapter 5, also in educa­
tion). In the first place, unlike the Single Act the Maastricht Treaty was not to 
be a purely economic document, which made it harder for member states to 
reject the Commission and the EP’s lobbying for cultural powers on the 
habitual grounds that culture was not a primarily economic area (see Witte 
1991). What is more, the cultural programmes that had been launched in the 
meantime were of dubious legality as was, by some accounts, the compromise 
formula of the ‘Council and the ministers of culture meeting within the 
Council’. The German government in particular was keen to end this ambi­
guity and place the Community’s existing cultural actions on more solid legal 
foundations. Moreover, driven by Länder fears that the Community could 
encroach on their cultural prerogatives, it wanted a cultural clause to limit the 
kinds of cultural activities the Community could pursue in the future (inter­
views European Commission, June 2000; Blanke 1994: 6610).
The other member states were, as always, divided on the issue. A first 
group, not surprisingly coalescing around Denmark and the UK, advocated 
the legal status quo. On the other end of the spectrum, a group of southern 
member states (Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece) as well as Ireland signalled 
that they would be prepared to accept a more extensive cultural mandate for 
the Community but did not formally work out a common position on the 
issue (Blanke 1994: 66). In any event, as is shown next, it was the German 
position that broadly won out.
Three separate passages in the Treaty on European Union (1992) allude to 
culture and cultural policy. For a start, Part One of the treaty, titled 
‘Principles’, features Article 3p (changed to Article 3q in the subsequent
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Amsterdam Treaty), which stipulates that the activities of the Community 
shall include ‘a contribution to education and training of quality and to the 
flowering of the cultures of the Member States’. Yet since Article 3p elaborates 
neither on what this ‘contribution’ should consist of, nor on what would 
make national cultures ‘flower’, its meaning remains very vague at best, 
pending potential future decisions by the European Court of Justice as to 
whether it should serve as an interpretative clause of sorts in determining the 
legality of particular policies?1
A second reference to culture resides in Article 92 of the Maastricht 
Treaty (Article 87 Amsterdam). Paragraph 3d therein reiterates and further 
elaborates on the exemption of some cultural ‘goods and services’ from the 
Community’s free trade provisions already contained in the original EEC 
Treaty. It stipulates that among the measures that ‘may be considered to be 
compatible with the common market’ are ‘aid to promote culture and 
heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and 
competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common 
interest’?2
The third, and for our purposes by far the most significant, allusion to 
culture is contained in Article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty. It gives the 
Community, for the first time, a limited cultural mandate:
The Com m unity shall contribute to  the flowering o f the cultures o f the Member
States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time 
bringing the com m on cultural heritage to the fore.
Article 128 further specifies that
Action by the Com m unity shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between
M ember States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in 
the following areas: im provem ent o f the knowledge and dissemination o f the cul­
ture and history of the European peoples; conservation and safeguarding of 
cultural heritage of European significance; non commercial cultural exchanges; 
artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector.
In addition, Article 128 entitles the Community to foster cultural cooperation 
with third countries and international organisations. Lastly, it demands that 
‘the Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under 
other provisions of this Treaty’.
The cultural objectives spelled out in Article 128 are thus ambiguous. 
They oscillate between the themes of, on the one hand, putting the 
Community in charge of fostering cultural unity, and, on the other hand, 
entrusting it with the preservation of cultural diversity. Indeed, so pervasive 
is this ambiguity that at times either interpretation could be applied to the 
same sentence (for instance when the treaty refers to the ‘culture and history 
of European peoples’). Overall, however, the rhetorical balance in Article 128 
tilts towards the ‘diversity’ as opposed to the ‘unity2 side. In the first place,
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even when Article 128 does appear to allude to the ‘unity’ theme, it does not 
invoke a ‘European culture’. Instead, while it starts out by referring to the 
‘common cultural heritage’ which the Community should ‘bring to the fore’ 
it then quickly slides into the still weaker term ‘cultural heritage of European 
significance’. Arguably, even national or local cultural heritage can be of 
‘European significance’. The notion that Article 128 favours ‘diversity’ over 
‘u n i t /  becomes more plausible still if read in  conjunction with Article 3p in 
the ‘Principles’ section of the Maastricht Treaty. As shown, it calls upon the 
Community to contribute to the ‘flowering of the cultures of the member 
states' (emphasis added) while a ‘common culture’ or even only the ‘common 
cultural heritage’ is not mentioned.
Equally significant is the legal status of the measures that can be adopted 
under Article 128. Two types of measures are possible. First, the Community 
can ‘adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States’; second, it may issue ‘recommendations’. 
Neither is legally binding.13 The terms ‘incentive measure’ and ‘harmonisa­
tion’ are both ambiguous. Overall, however, under any reasonably literal 
interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty the Community’s cultural powers are 
essentially confined to encouraging cooperation between the member states. 
It may not issue legally enforceable standards, even if these were deemed to be 
of a ‘non-harmonising’ kind.
Worth noting, lastly, are the procedural requirements the Maastricht 
Treaty spells out for cultural policy decisions to be adopted. Such decisions 
are subject to the co-decision procedure as outlined under Article 189b of the 
treaty (Article 251 Amsterdam). This involves, notably, consultations with 
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions and 
requires approval by the European Parliament. Most importantly, Article 128 
subjects all cultural decisions to the unanimity requirement in the Council 
and hence leaves them vulnerable to the veto of any single member state.14
In short, then, the Maastricht Treaty sought to square the circle between 
different cultural objectives that in many ways had seemed difficult to recon­
cile. First, it reflected a desire to enhance the Community’s ‘cultural 
dimension’. This went some way towards appeasing the EP and the 
Commission which had pressed for a legal mandate in culture throughout 
and it was in line with the Maastricht Treaty’s mission of catapulting the 
Community beyond the status of a purely economic entity. Second, the 
Maastricht Treaty put the cultural policies already in place on a more solid 
legal basis, thereby addressing a (especially German) distaste for legal ambi­
guity. Third, it created potent safeguards to ensure that these measures could 
not be expanded or modified without the unanimous consent of all member 
states. Finally, by adding a harmonisation prohibition and ruling out legally 
binding measures, the member states ensured that such changes would, in any 
event, have to remain within very narrow parameters.
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 did not alter the Union’s legal standing in
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culture, save for adding one further restriction. It converted the old Article 
128 of the Maastricht Treaty into a new Article 151, and changed Paragraph 4 
therein to read as follows: ‘The Community shall take cultural aspects into 
account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in 
order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures' (emphasis added). It 
is not entirely clear on whose behest the ‘diversity of cultures’ clause was 
inserted. At the time it attracted very little public attention, and given their 
own ‘unity in diversity rhetoric’ it would have been hard for the Commission 
and the EP to oppose it openly. Moreover, in strictly legal terms the new 
clause meant little, given that, as suggested, even the old Article 128 already 
privileged the ‘diversity’ over the ‘unity’ theme. In fact, strictly speaking the 
‘diversity of cultures’ provision does not even apply to cultural policy, given 
that Article 4 refers to ‘actions under other provisions’. Nonetheless, if 
nothing else the new clause served as a reminder to the Commission and the 
EP that the Community’s cultural role was subject to very tight restrictions. 
As is shown next, this was reflected in the new batch of cultural initiatives that 
materialised from the mid-1990s.
From Raphael, Kaleidoscope and Ariane to Culture 2000
Within the Commission’s cultural policy unit in DG X, different officials read 
the Maastricht Treaty in different ways. Some saw it as an imperfect but 
nonetheless promising basis for new Union initiatives and advocated that 
such initiatives be submitted to the member states without delay in order to 
sustain whatever cultural momentum the treaty had created. Others were 
much more sceptical. They, too, wanted to submit new policy initiatives, but 
took both the unanimity clause in Article 128 and the harmonisation prohi­
bition as a bad omen for the Union’s future cultural policy prospects 
(interview European Commission, June 2000). Nonetheless, after the 
Maastricht Treaty had come into force events moved relatively quickly. 
Following a cascade of Commission reports and communications the Council 
approved what became the Union’s cultural flagship programmes in the post- 
Maastricht era.
The precise sequence of events that gave birth to these programmes need 
not concern us here in detail. For its part, the Commission (always staunchly 
supported by the EP) released several reports in which it professed its enthu­
siasm regarding the cultural clause in the Maastricht Treaty and attached 
cultural wish lists which often exceeded what, according to most standard 
interpretations, Article 128 in fact allowed for. For example, in its 1994 
Communication on ‘Community action in support of culture’ (Commission 
1994a; also 1992b), the Commission demanded, among other things, powers 
to organise ‘large-scale emblematic activities’ with a ‘European dimension’, 
including Europe Day festivities across the Union. Yet many member states
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opposed such requests just as they had done before the Maastricht Treaty. 
The traditional hard-core sceptics (Denmark and the UK) were increasingly 
joined by Germany and the Netherlands as well as by Sweden which was 
about to join the Union. These governments were driven by a mix of 
concerns. The German government pleaded mainly Länder fears while others 
claimed that the Commission’s cultural proposals were unnecessary, too 
expensive or in violation of the subsidiarity principle and the anti-harmoni- 
sation provision in the Maastricht Treaty (interviews European Commission, 
June 2000; Council 1994).
Nonetheless, after much debate the national culture ministers (who, after 
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, could dispense with the ‘mixed’ 
formula and meet as a fully-fledged Council of Ministers) finalised three 
cultural programmes, after these had undergone the complicated co-decision 
procedure demanded by Paragraph 128.
The first was a programme in the field of heritage protection. Titled 
‘Raphael’ it received thirty million ECU over a period of four years 
(Commission 1995a, 1995b, 1996a). The second programme, termed 
‘Kaleidoscope 2000’, sponsored various transnational cultural events and 
exchanges -  festivals, exhibitions, meetings and a host of ‘partnership proj­
ects’ involving participants from at least three different member states. Its 
total funding was 36.7 million ECU over a period of five years. After ferocious 
lobbying by the EP and the Commission and against initial resistance in the 
Council, Europe Day was declared a ‘cultural event’ eligible to receive Union 
funding (Commission 1995c). The third programme was named ‘Ariane’ and 
based on the Union’s literature promotion programme in force since the early 
1990s. Most of its combined funding of 11.1 million ECU over four years 
went into translation grants, with preference given to works in lesser-used 
languages, published after 1945 and/or ‘representative of the culture of their 
country*.
In 1999, all three programmes were consolidated into a new programme 
called ‘Culture 2000’, with a total budget of 167 million euro for a period of 
five years, extended by a further two years in 2003 (EP and Council 2000a). 
As before, most funding went into transnational cultural cooperation, 
exchange, partnership and network programmes. The type of projects eligible 
for sponsorship and their objectives became defined more broadly, often to 
the point of becoming virtually meaningless (‘facilitating access to culture’, 
‘intercultural dialogue’, ‘spread of new forms of expression’, release of ‘syner­
gies’, etc.). Only ten per cent of Culture 2000 funding became eligible to go to 
‘special cultural events with a European or international dimension’, such as 
‘European capital of culture’ and ‘European cultural month’ festivities. This 
represented a clear defeat for the Commission and the EP which had consis­
tently lobbied for giving such projects a larger share of funding.
Although the Commission kept a brave face in public, its culture officials 
were disappointed by the post-Maastricht cultural programmes. A series of
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consultation exercises, internal reviews and external evaluations all echoed 
this: while the Union supported hundreds of cultural projects, these suffered 
from high administrative overheads and low public visibility. In fact, one 
external evaluation found that even many recipients of Union sponsorship ‘do 
not remember the results of thefir] projects’ once funding had run out 
(Commission 2004a: 10; see also Commission 2003a; EP 2001). Likewise, as is 
discussed below and further in Chapter 5, most ‘emblematic events’ 
supported by Kaleidoscope 2000 and later the ‘special cultural events’ provi­
sion in Culture 2000 (such as Europe Day) never managed to acquire much 
momentum in most member states.
This lack of visibility and popular resonance had several reasons: rela­
tively low levels of overall funding (amounting to a few cents per Union 
citizen per year), the short duration of most projects (generally limited to one 
year), a focus on relatively uncontroversial but also unspectacular ‘high 
culture’ areas (such as literature and architecture) as well as the 
Commission’s failure to use its (at any rate very small) budget allocated to 
‘emblematic public events’ in a way that would have maximised publicity and 
media attention. In part this was due to fears of ‘overexposure’ and backlashes 
that had haunted the Commission’s information strategists ever since the 
Olympics campaign in 1992. But most importantly, the low visibility of the 
Union’s post-Maastricht cultural initiatives was an inevitable result of their 
preoccupation with ‘networks’.
Cultural networks
Cultural networks were indeed the cornerstone of almost all the Union’s post- 
Maastricht cultural programmes. By the Commission’s own estimate, they 
received twenty per cent of the Union’s cultural budget in the period between 
1993 and 1998 (Commission 1999a) whereas eighty per cent of Culture 2000 
funding goes to networks and other multinational cooperation programmes.
While spending more and more money on them the Commission has 
remained surprisingly vague on how, precisely, a ‘cultural network’ should be 
defined. Judging by the (itself often very vague) wording of the Culture 2000 
programme and the projects the Commission has subsidised, the central idea 
seems to be that cultural networks represent some form of association 
between cultural groupings and organisations from different member states 
that collaborate in joint cultural projects. In line with stated priorities, most 
of these projects have fallen into the areas of performance art, visual and 
multimedia productions, literature, cultural heritage protection, conserva­
tion and museums, as well as cultural administration and management (see 
Commission 2001a).15
At the same time, many of the cultural networks supported by the Union 
have remained downright obscure (‘European Network of Cultural Man­
'POLITICAL SYMBOLISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
agers’, ‘EU NET ART’, ‘European Network of Art Organisations for Children 
and Young People’ ‘Women’s Art Library-International Network’ to name a 
few). Also, it is fair to suspect that many of the participating cultural bodies 
(sometimes quite ‘virtual’ entities in their own right) were driven to form 
transnational networks above all by the desire to become eligible for Union 
funding -  something that many Commission officials privately accept while 
being more or less resigned to it.
From the Commission’s perspective, however, the focus on cultural net­
works is in many ways attractive nonetheless. In the first place, funding them 
satisfies two key requirements of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties: it 
respects the subsidiarity principle in that it offers a ‘value added’ to what 
national cultural policies typically seek to do, and it is not aimed at policy 
harmonisation. Second, the very term ‘network’ is evocative. Discursively it 
connects to notions of things modern, sophisticated, decentralised and flexi­
ble with a grass roots feel (not least of course the Internet) -  a linkage the 
Commission does not tire of drawing time and again. Such notions, more­
over, contrast favourably with criticisms of the Union’s earlier cultural 
initiatives as rigid, dirigiste, bureaucratic, centralising and somewhat 
pompous. Add to this that the very ambiguity of what is (and is not) a cultural 
network, in conjunction with the relatively small amounts of money at stake 
for each individual sponsorship project, gives the Commission a fair amount 
of leeway in distributing its funds. It enables it to quickly adapt its sponsor­
ship policy to changes in its own rhetoric (actual or perceived), changes in 
public or member state preferences, as well as to changing expectations as to 
where sponsorship would most enhance the Union’s visibility and pinpoint 
particular target groups. The Commission clearly values this flexibility, even 
though it has provoked long-lasting complaints that it handles its cultural 
budget in an arbitrary, erratic and less-than-transparent manner (to which 
the Commission has responded by delegating more responsibility to formally 
independent selection panels).
Lastly, the Commission focused on transnational cultural groupings for 
yet another reason. Some officials hoped that strengthening transnational 
bodies with a direct stake in the continuation of existing cultural programmes 
would help the Union consolidate its cultural position. If not leading to 
outright interest group pressure for further integration as with political 
spillover, it might at least help entrench existing cultural programmes and 
prevent rollbacks. As one Commission official put it, if painters had as much 
a stake in European integration and as much political influence as farmers, 
the Commission would have been more successful in promoting its cultural 
agenda all along (interview European Commission, June 2000).
Nonetheless, by the turn of the century many Commission officials had 
come to a sobering assessment regarding the Union’s cultural programmes in 
general and their network fixation in particular.16 On the one hand, they 
accept that sponsoring cultural networks and similar ‘horizontal’ measures
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are among the few cultural activities the member states are willing to tolerate 
to any significant extent. But on the other hand, they have also come to accept 
the inherent limitations of such measures in fostering popular support for 
European integration. Too low is their visibility, and too ephemeral whatever 
‘European dimension’-flavoured output they are liable to generate. Even their 
ability to strengthen the Union’s political position in culture has proved 
modest at best. As suggested, the transnational groupings that have emerged 
are often little more than ad hoc formations, created primarily for the 
purpose of attracting EU funding. To the extent that they developed a politi­
cal agenda it typically serves to obtain still more EU subsidies for themselves. 
There is no evidence that transnational cultural networks have evolved into 
genuine interest groups championing a greater Union involvement in culture, 
much less European integration at large.
Public relations after Maastricht
As was shown earlier, ‘information and communication’ had already become 
a major area of Commission activity by the early 1990s, and after the 
Maastricht Treaty it became more important still. Of all the areas under in­
vestigation, ‘information and communication’ is the one in which the 
Commission made its greatest policy advances -  to the point where by 1998 
the annual budget allocated to it had risen to 107 million ECU17 and has 
remained relatively stable since, with additional funding for some initiatives 
provided by member state governments.
As the Commission’s ‘information and communication’ budget 
increased so did its attempts to establish a coherent framework for spending 
it. In early 1993, at the height of the Maastricht controversy in many member 
states and against the backdrop of a severe downturn in public support for the 
Union, the Commission received a report by an expert working group it had 
appointed to work out a blueprint for the Union’s future information policy 
(see de Selys 1996). The group’s key suggestion was that the Commission 
should try harder to target particular ‘messages’ at particular sections of the 
population. The ‘groups’ it singled out for special consideration were young 
people and women (the latter because they ‘are more liable than men to 
recognise quickly and intuitively the advantages of a better future’). The 
Commission itself, according to the report, ‘must be presented with a human 
face: likeable, warm and conscious of the well-being of others’, while the 
Union at large should be proffered ‘like a good product’. A similar internal 
Commission document in 1994 advocated among other things that the Union 
should improve its media presence (Commission 1994b).
Advised by a plethora of advertising, polling and PR consultants and 
under strong pressure from the European Parliament, the Commission 
launched in 1995 what it called an ‘integrated awareness campaign covering
7 6 'POLITICAL SYMBOLISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
the fundamental basis of the European Union and the place of the citizen 
within it’. Its key ingredients were a ‘targeted and decentralised information 
policy’ and ‘information and communication activities adapted to the culture 
and language of the different countries, or even regions, as well as to specific 
groups, in particular women’ (Commission 2001b; Commission 1999b). At 
their heart was PRINCE (Programa de informaciön para el ciudadano 
europeo), the successor of the ‘priority information programmes’ launched in 
the 19 80s.
PRINCE
Established in its present form in 1995, PRINCE is to provide a ‘global 
approach [to information] with clear and precise objectives and messages 
targeting specific audiences’ (Commission 2001b: 21). To do so, it is divided 
into several ‘priority information actions’. Initially, these were the ‘Citizen’s 
Europe’ (defined largely in terms of practical EU-related issues such as con­
sumer protection and freedom of movement rights), ‘The euro, a currency for 
Europe’ and ‘Promoting the Union’ (an umbrella heading for more general 
information campaigns about Union policies and institutions). Subsequent 
themes included the debate on a future EU constitution, enlargement, and the 
common ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ (the official euphemism for 
EU powers in policing, criminal justice and immigration).
Under each PRINCE heading the Commission publishes numerous 
brochures, leaflets, posters and fact sheets which it distributes through 
libraries, universities, citizens advice centres, European Documentation 
Centres, ‘educational relay centres’ (further discussed in Chapter 5), pro- 
Union organisations and other outlets. In addition, it maintains sites on the 
Internet, telephone advice services and sponsors or co-sponsors a vast range 
of events in the member states, often in cooperation with business organisa­
tions, trade unions and various pro-European associations. More recently, 
the Commission helped establish ‘national-level information relay centres’ in 
several member states, which it manages jointly with the respective host 
governments (such as the Jacques Delors Information Centre in Lisbon and 
Sources d’Europe in Paris).
Of all programmes under PRINCE, the campaign to promote the single 
currency has remained the most ambitious and expensive by far. It sponsored 
euro information tents, euro festivals, a euro newsletter (‘Infeuro’) euro ad­
vice meetings for business people, euro promotion packs for school children, 
euro advertising campaigns, euro exhibitions (‘a time journey through mone­
tary Europe’), the distribution of euro play money in order to familiarise 
citizens with the new currency, a euro calendar and ‘Team Europe’ speakers 
sent out by the Commission’s regional representations to schools, youth 
groups, businesses, trade union gatherings and the like (see Gaserow 1997).
One notable aspect of the single currency promotion campaign was its 
implementation modus. Committees inside the different member states coor-
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dinated the campaign. These comprised one representative from the local 
Commission and EP representations each and one member appointed by the 
host government. While somewhat sceptical initially, Commission officials 
soon came to appreciate the decentralised and mixed implementation modus 
of the euro campaign. It fits in well with its targeted nature and ensures 
cooperation by national governments, which is especially important with 
regard to those measures that benefit from mixed funding. As a result, the 
Commission has sought to apply the decentralised information model to its 
other public relations campaigns under PRINCE and beyond, allocating 
greater responsibility to its representations inside the various member states 
(Commission 2001b).
Officials in the Commission’s ‘information and communication’ de­
partment hail the single currency campaign a success. At the same time they 
stress its uniqueness. National governments and the Commission alike were 
eager to ensure the success of the currency, which created a convergence of 
interest between the various actors. The Commission found it comparatively 
easy to ‘sell’ its euro-promotion campaign to the member states and to obtain 
funding for it (interview European Commission, June 2000). A further factor 
was that Denmark and the UK remain outside the euro zone, were thus not 
targeted by the Union’s euro campaign and thus did little to oppose it.
What stands out about the Commission’s post-Maastricht information 
strategy in general and PRINCE in particular is the systematic targeting of 
information, i.e. the dissemination of different ‘messages’ to distinct audi­
ences that are deemed to have particular ‘information needs’ and to be 
receptive to particular themes and approaches (Commission 2001b). In 
defining target groups, the Commission adheres to several concurrent and 
often crosscutting principles of differentiation. They include socio-economic 
status, presumed level of knowledge and cognitive ability, specific interests 
(e.g. employers, employees, small business owners), gender and age. 
However, the most frequent differentiation criterion is according to member 
state. A large proportion of the Commission’s information output now seeks 
to appeal to specific national audiences by addressing issues deemed to be 
particularly relevant to the country in question. Following the pattern of the 
euro campaign, much of this material is produced and distributed by the 
Commission’s representations inside the member states, which feed intelli­
gence about their impact back to Commission headquarters where it is 
collated and used to plan future information campaigns.
In the UK, the best-known example of such a campaign, and one of the 
few that has attracted a fair amount of general media attention, has been the 
Commission’s ‘Euromyths and misunderstandings’ brochure, first issued in 
1992 and regularly updated since. It informed its British audience that, 
contrary to what it said were frequently levelled claims, the Union did not 
plan to outlaw mushy peas and double-decker busses and that it had not 
issued a directive to make fishing vessels carry condoms in order to prevent
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sexually transmitted diseases from spreading on board (Commission 2003b; 
Commission 1998a).
Age is the Commission’s second most important criterion for targeting 
information, and the one age group that the Commission seeks to target more 
than any other is young people, defined as those aged 25 years and under. This 
concern with youth information goes back to the Adonnino Report, driving a 
‘Youth information action plan’ by the Commission in the early 1990s 
(Commission 1992d; also Bulletin 1991 [No. 6], point 1.2.107). It saw the 
Commission using part of its discretionary budget to produce promotional 
videos and leaflets for schools and youth centres. Moreover, it sponsored the 
‘European Youth Olympics’ and the ‘Youth Forum of the European 
Communities’, a confederation of national youth councils and non-govern­
mental youth groups (Commission 1990a, Annex). It was only in the late 1990s, 
however, that such initiatives gained momentum, accompanied by ever direr 
warnings by the Commission that an ‘information deficit’ among the young 
could do irreparable harm to the Union’s long-term development. In 1997, the 
Commission launched a programme to subsidise youth-targeted ‘initiatives and 
projects in the field of information and communication with a European di­
mension’ (Commission 1997a). Public and private organisations alike can apply 
for funding, provided they ‘develop young people’s awareness of the creation of 
a People’s Europe and European citizenship’, further their knowledge of the 
European Union in general or of particular institutions and policies, or dissem­
inate information about more specific themes such as the Maastricht Treaty or 
the single currency. As is shown in Chapter 5, this focus on youth information 
also shone through in the Commission’s growing efforts at the time to produce 
information literature for children and in its creation of various Internet portals 
especially aimed at the young.
All the same, among officials in DG X the singling out of young people as 
a target group has remained controversial. In the first place, as Chapter 5 
shows in greater detail, PR aimed at teenagers and children soon proved to 
have substantial backlash potential in the national media, forcing the 
Commission to downgrade or even withdraw some of its initiatives in this 
area. Moreover, some Commission officials object that the category ‘young 
people’ is too broad and call for a further fine-tuning of the Commission’s 
‘information and communication’ campaigns by taking into account more 
strongly criteria such as gender, education and social class (interview 
European Commission, June 2000). Nonetheless, even though other cate­
gories have gained some ground in the meantime, ‘young people’ have 
remained one of the Commission’s main ‘information and communication’ 
targets ever since.
Multiplier measures
While seeking to better target its ‘information and communication’ 
campaigns the Commission also has increasingly come to focus on measures
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with a presumed ‘multiplier effect’, i.e. measures that affect not only those 
whom they reach directly but, through them will, it is hoped, trickle down to 
broader sections of the public. Heading the Commission’s list of ‘opinion 
multipliers’ are journalists through whom it hopes to gain more and more 
favourable coverage in the national media. For instance, in 1995, the 
Commission started its own satellite information service. It provides televi­
sion stations across the Union and beyond with newsfeed about the EU and 
offers video footage with background information. To those radio and televi­
sion journalists who visit its headquarters in Brussels the Commission offers 
a reception service, on-site editing facilities and a video library. Print journal­
ists have access to a photo library (Commission 2003c). At the same time, in 
some respects the Commission’s handling of the national media remains 
surprisingly amateurish. For instance, its ability to rebut EU-critical stories in 
the (especially British) weekend papers in a rapid fashion suffers from the fact 
that the Commission shuts down almost completely on weekends. 
Suggestions by some officials that the Commission should establish an all­
weekend ‘emergency rebuttal unit’ have not so far yielded any results 
(interview European Commission, June 2000).
Also in the hope of attaining a multiplier effect the Commission has ex­
panded its visitor service. Commission hosts and hostesses guide visiting 
groups through the Commission’s Brussels headquarters. Those classified as 
‘high priority groups’ (‘made up of ‘‘opinion multipliers” likely to dissemi­
nate the information received within their social and professional circles’) 
receive the most, ‘general-public groups’ the least attention. Visitors are 
invited to attend the Commission’s ‘Visit Point Europe’ exhibition 
(Commission 2004b). It features the ‘Panorama of Europe’ which illustrates 
the history of European integration. Computer and video screens show clips 
about different EU policies, while a live satellite relay broadcasts debates in 
the European Parliament and press briefings by Commission officials.
Even though some of the Commission’s PR measures seem tedious, 
‘information and communication’ is the one area under investigation in 
which the Commission has continued to make the greatest inroads. This 
applies in a quantitative as well as in a qualitative sense. While the Union has 
spent more money on more ‘information and communication’ initiatives 
these have also become better targeted and more professionally designed and 
executed.
But just how effective are such PR measures in improving the Union’s 
popular standing? At least in public the Commission itself is keen to claim 
that they work and seeks to expand them still further. At the same time, some­
what surprisingly it has abandoned many of its earlier attempts to evaluate 
their impact through surveys, focus group research and other means. What 
has taken their place are (far less illuminating) efforts to assess the reach of 
those programmes, for example by compiling statistics about visits to its 
Internet site. Different Commission officials give different explanations for
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this: some plead a lack of resources; others fear that overly zealous impact 
assessment exercises would make the Commission look too manipulative. 
Still others fear that if the impact of Commission PR were found to be low 
some member state governments might insist on cutbacks (interviews 
European Commission, June 2000).
With impact studies scarce the effectiveness of the Commission’s various 
‘information and communication’ campaigns is hard to gauge. One difficulty 
flows from trying to isolate their effect from that of a number of other vari­
ables that could have influenced public opinion towards the Union (and/or 
particular EU policies). For instance, while support for the Union stabilised 
somewhat after the Maastricht Treaty had been ratified (see the bi-annual 
Eurobarometer surveys), this might be due to a host of factors other than the 
‘information and communication’ activities of DG X (e.g. changing economic 
conditions or a temporary decline in media coverage of the Union).
In any event, several factors are likely to mitigate the impact of the 
Commission’s post-Maastricht public relations offensive. In the first place, 
while an average annual ‘information and communication’ budget of around 
100 million euro seems impressive at first glance, it is below the annual adver­
tising budgets of some larger multinational corporations. It becomes even less 
impressive if divided by the over 400 million Union citizens with whom the 
Commission seeks to ‘communicate’. What is more, the Commission’s infor­
mation campaigns face an ever-present danger of triggering backlashes in 
popular opinion. For as these campaigns became more visible, aggressive and 
expensive, criticism that the Commission was wasting taxpayers’ money for 
political propaganda also grew. Increasingly, such complaints emanated from 
beyond the traditionally most Eurosceptic parts of the national press and 
public opinion, and from beyond the traditionally most Eurosceptic member 
states. Indeed, it is now hard to find any recent press item on the Commis­
sion’s Information and communication’ activities that does not adopt, at the 
very least, a decidedly cynical and derisory stance.
As a result, countering such criticisms has itself become an important 
objective for the Commission’s public relations strategists. Paradoxically, 
some of their campaigns now seek to convince citizens that the Union is not 
in fact wasting taxpayers’ money on costly public relations campaigns! For 
example, as part of its ‘Euromyths and misunderstandings’ and ‘press watch’ 
campaigns the Commission sought to assure the British public that contrary 
to what it claimed were frequent accusations to this effect it was not spending 
money on hot air balloons featuring the European logo, had no plans to 
sponsor a ‘Euro-soap opera’, did not insist that ‘obscure European literature 
is being translated at a cost of £20m to Europe’s taxpayers’ and did not 
sponsor a ‘Captain Euro’ comic strip to ‘brainwash children and students’ 
(for recent examples see Commission 2003b).
Overall, while Commission officials are adamant that the euro-promo- 
tion campaign helped shore up support for the single currency, they are less
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upbeat about the other initiatives under PRINCE and related programmes. 
These have enjoyed much less support by the member states, have produced 
frequent backlashes in the national media, and are deemed even by the offi­
cials who run them to have ‘gone stale’ (interview European Commission, 
June 2000). Some fear that with the euro promotion campaign drawing to a 
close the ‘information and communication’ department in DG X will suffer 
cuts in staff and funding, despite the Commission’s frequent attempts to 
depict enlargement and the proposed EU constitution as urgent ‘communi­
cation areas’ (e.g. Commission 2001b).
What is more, some other more emblematic measures at the interface of 
traditional cultural policy and public relations -  such as Europe Day -  are 
now widely perceived to have been a failure, due in part to a lack of coopera­
tion from inside the member states and a dearth of funding (interview 
European Commission, June 2000; see also the discussion in Chapter 5). For 
its part, the European logo has become the most recognisable EU signifier by 
far, but its use is uneven. While the Commission has integrated it throughout 
its own campaigns and prescribes its display in certain contexts (e.g. to 
acknowledge EU funding on public works projects), its use often depends on 
national and local authorities. Generally, in countries where support for the 
EU is highest (such as Italy) it appears to be displayed most frequently and 
vice versa. Especially galling to Commission officials is the continued refusal 
by the British government to print the European logo on car licence plates. 
Over the years, successive UK governments have tried to justify this on 
various grounds, including the claim that the presence of the European logo 
would make licence plates hard for police officers to read and thereby encour­
age traffic offences.
The low turnout for the 1999 elections to the European Parliament was a 
further setback for the Commission’s ‘information and communication’ 
strategists. It sparked accusations of incompetence and ineffectiveness from 
within other parts of the Commission and the European Parliament, no 
doubt further boosted by the still lower popular turnout for the EP elections 
in 2004. Yet here the Commission’s underlying dilemma becomes once more 
apparent. Anxious to avoid accusations of interfering in domestic politics and 
fearful of potential backlashes, the Commission refrained from launching a 
special ‘information’ campaign related to the 1999 EP elections and even 
temporarily downscaled some of its other campaigns (interview European 
Commission, June 2000). Yet while this saved the Commission from accusa­
tions of being overly pushy and prone to ‘overexposure’, it also sparked 
complaints that officials had missed an opportunity to raise the Union’s 
profile while allowing voter apathy to flourish. Caught between the need not 
to appear overly manipulative and constant pressure to ‘sell’ the Union and 
its policies to sceptical post-Maastricht national publics, the Commission’s 
‘information and communication’ officials face a dilemma from which they 
find it increasingly difficult to escape.
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By the turn of the century the Union’s accomplishments in culture and public 
relations had remained ambiguous. On the one hand, it had put in place a 
significant number of cultural and public relations measures. These ranged 
from Culture 2000 and a limited assortment of symbols (above all the 
European logo) to the many ‘information and communication’ measures 
launched in the post-Adonnino period. What is more, although the cultural 
clause in the Maastricht (and subsequent Amsterdam) Treaty was restrictive, 
it placed the Union’s cultural involvement on a clear legal basis for the first 
time. If in the 1950s the Union was founded as an a-cultural entity, half a 
century later this was no longer completely so.
One factor that promoted the Union’s cultural standing was the resilience 
and political skill of the Commission. After tactical mistakes in the 1970s 
when its proposals were overly sweeping and ambitious, the Commission 
switched to a more effective strategy, in some ways reminiscent o f ‘cultivated 
spillover’ expectations discussed in the last chapter. First, it ‘economised’ 
much of its cultural agenda, calling for a borderless ‘cultural space’ in which 
‘cultural goods and services’ could be exchanged freely. This fitted in well 
with the Union’s economic mission and to some extent pre-empted legal 
objections. Second, often with respect to the same initiatives, the 
Commission (increasingly joined by the EP) relied on the Union’s broader 
development to bolster its demands for a greater involvement in culture and 
public relations. When integration was stagnating, it argued that cultural 
policies could help reinvigorate it; when integration was making progress, it 
argued that cultural policies were needed to sustain it. Finally, on top of all 
this the Commission frequently relied on vague rhetorical commitments by 
the member states to foster a European identity, European values and so on. 
Though by the end of the 1990s these themes had faded into the background, 
they allowed the Commission to portray many of its earlier cultural propos­
als as merely giving substance to an objective to which the member states had 
already committed themselves in principle.
On the other hand, however, the nature, scope and funding of the 
Union’s various cultural and PR initiatives remained very limited. Spending 
on all programmes combined amounted to no more than a few cents per EU 
citizen per year. Moreover, throughout the 1990s EU cultural policy became 
increasingly ‘horizontalised’ -  to the point where Culture 2000 centres almost 
exclusively on subsidising cultural exchanges and networks of all kinds. 
Attempts to increase the Union’s symbolic penetration into the everyday lives 
of its citizens -  along the lines of what was suggested in the Tindemans and 
Adonnino Reports -  yielded few tangible results. As for those measures that 
were not purely exchange-oriented, these became more and more punctual 
and PR-centred. They were aimed at generating support for narrowly defined 
Union policies (e.g. enlargement and the single currency), not at the more
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far-reaching objective of fostering a European identity or European values 
that so characterised official Community rhetoric in the 1970s and early 
1980s.
The Maastricht experience further steered EU cultural policy in this 
direction. On the one hand, the sharp rise in public hostility towards the 
Union during the ratification debate seemed to lend a renewed sense of 
urgency to pleas by the Commission and the EP for measures to promote the 
Union’s popular standing. On the other hand, however, the fact that this 
hostility often thrived on fears that the Union was braced to become more 
intrusive and erode national identities made an aggressive cultural offensive 
by the Union even less feasible than before. In fact, throughout the 1990s 
popular support for involving the Union in culture and the audiovisual sector 
(as well as education) was consistently much lower than for most other policy 
areas, including such contentious fields as foreign policy, monetary policy 
and defence (see the bi-annual Eurobarometer surveys; also Theiler 1999a for 
an analysis).
The Union’s growing role in ‘information and communication’ reflected 
an attempt to overcome this dilemma. Many national governments found 
PR-type measures more acceptable than cultural policies of the traditional 
kind. They broke no new legal ground and violated no political taboos. 
Moreover, most PR measures were not geared towards the more grandilo­
quent and increasingly divisive objective of European identity promotion. 
Instead, their aim was more narrow, i.e. to strengthen public support for 
particular EU projects and policies for which national governments them­
selves wanted to secure public acceptance, above all the single currency. The 
logic at work here broadly seems to conform to that outlined in Chapter 2: 
European integration is among other things a policy of national governments 
which therefore, in principle, want to secure public support for it.
By the turn of the century the Commission and the member states had 
settled into a modus vivendi of sorts. National governments backed the 
Commission’s public relations initiatives with relatively high levels of funding 
and gave the Commission a fair amount of leeway in designing and imple­
menting them. At the same time, they denied the Union a more far-reaching 
cultural involvement along the lines of what had been suggested in the 
Tindemans and Adonnino Reports and many initiatives by the Commission 
and EP. For their part, the Commission and to a lesser extent also the EP 
appeared to have internalised these constraints, all but abandoning earlier 
attempts to broaden the Union’s cultural role beyond cultural exchanges and 
narrowly targeted PR-type actions. As one culture official put it, these days 
such grander cultural policies are simply no longer on anyone’s agenda 
(interview European Commission, June 2000).
Another way of conceptualising this shift is against the backdrop of the 
three levels of legitimisation discussed in the last two chapters. The 
Commission’s early cultural ambitions had a strong ‘third level’ flavour; they
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sought to cultivate shared overarching communal identifications among 
Europeans, believing this to be the basis on which support for more specific 
EU institutions and policies could grow. By contrast, the PR-style measures 
which materialised instead had the much more modest ahn of highlighting 
the Union’s supposed economic utility to its citizens. What was to be legit­
imised were specific EU polities rather than the EU itself as corporate actor 
and identity category.
Yet what impact did all this have on public attitudes towards European 
integration? The concluding chapter explores this at greater length. Two 
preliminary observations, however, are in order. First, as was argued, ‘top- 
down’ political symbolism is most effective if it generates ‘bottom-up’ 
responses. The EU’s own rhetoric has increasingly come to reflect this, depict­
ing the encouragement of broad-based ‘dialogue’, ‘debate’ and ‘deliberation’ 
as central aims of its cultural and PR initiatives. Yet in reality very little of this 
has materialised. As suggested, most Union-sponsored cultural ‘networks’ 
have remained obscure to a wider public, much less actually involving it. For 
their part, most PR measures conceptualise EU citizens as little more than 
passive ‘information targets’, despite the loftier rhetoric that often accompa­
nies them.
Likewise, the (at the time of writing still ongoing) debate on a future EU 
constitution has spurred little in the way of a genuinely broad-based popular 
involvement, even though the Commission has made this a ‘priority objec­
tive’ of PRINCE and devised a raft of public information and consultation 
initiatives to this end. Many factors may well have contributed to this, not 
least the lack of a shared language and pan-European media outlets and the 
barriers this poses to transnational communicative processes (see Chapter 4 
below). But in part it also suggests that for most of its citizens the Union has 
not evolved into a salient identity category able to elicit much participatory 
effort. It reflects a ‘third level’ legitimacy deficit which most EU cultural and 
PR initiatives could not and, increasingly, were not designed to fill.
Yet contrary to what many Commission officials feared after the 
Maastricht ratification crisis, neither the introduction of the single currency 
nor the Union’s impending enlargement triggered strong backlashes in public 
opinion. In fact, while public interest and participation in EU affairs has 
remained low (the lowest-ever turnout for the 2004 EP elections was yet 
another sign of this), the proportion of citizens who profess a diffuse sense of 
‘feeling European’ has actually grown in recent years in most member states 
(see the biannual Eurobarometer surveys; also Risse in press). Overall (though 
with the UK being an important exception) public attitudes seem to have 
settled once more into the ‘permissive consensus’ of the pre-Maastricht era: 
marked by relative apathy, low mobilisation and few participatory ambitions 
but, at the same time, by a belief that on balance integration produces practi­
cal benefits. How much the Commission’s many public relations campaigns 
contributed to this is, of course, hard to assess. As suggested, this is due to the
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dearth of reliable impact studies, their increasingly narrow focus on specific 
policies and the challenge of isolating their effect from that of other variables. 
Nonetheless, in so far as these campaigns had an impact at all, it was proba­
bly in promoting a belief that integration offers practical benefits. 
Increasingly this became their predominant aim, pushing aside the more far- 
reaching objectives that marked many earlier, ill-fated cultural initiatives.
The next chapter turns to audiovisual policy, the one part of the broadly 
defined cultural sector that has been left out of the discussion so far. It shows 
that even though the Commission and the EP’s audiovisual ambitions 
enjoyed greater backing from the member states, their fate ultimately resem­
bled that of the other cultural initiatives.
Notes
1 This was evident, for example, in the final declaration of the Congress of Europe in 
1948. On the origins of the European Community between the end of the Second 
World War and the Rome Treaties see Loth (1991).
2 Most clearly the Janne Report o f 1973, which is further discussed in Chapter 5. A 
further factor was the accession of the UK and Denmark in 1973. In both countries, 
public support for integration was much lower than in the original six, which moved 
the issue of public opinion further up on the Community’s political agenda (also see 
Benzoni andDumoulin 1999).
3 From the 1960s onwards, the French government had regularly proposed measures of 
this type (see Perriaux 1990; Bulletin 1987 [No. 3], point 3.4.1. et seq.). On the 
German situation (with reference to education but equally applicable to culture since 
the federal government-Länder division of powers is similar in both areas) see 
Rübsamen (1978).
4 Both the Genscher-Colombo Proposals (formally titled ‘Draft European Act’ [1981]) 
and the subsequent ‘Solemn Declaration on European Union’ issued at the Stuttgart 
Summit (1983) had called vaguely for greater ‘cultural cooperation’ between the 
member states, but not for new Community powers in the field (Perriaux 1990; 
Neville-Jones 1983).
5 Addressing the opening of the intergovernmental conference on constitutional 
reform in September 1985, Jacques Delors was quick to defend this decision on essen­
tially pragmatic grounds. Culture and education, he contended, were more tricky 
areas in which to establish new Community powers than for example environmental 
policy (in which the Commission did demand, and obtain, new competences). There 
was, said Delors, ‘no point in cluttering the Conference table with proposals on this, 
that and the other and plunging into . ..  interminable wrangling’ (Delors 1985).
6 The original reads ‘sind ohne weiteres als dysfiinktional einzuschätzen’.
7 This was so in part because culture and education were emerging areas for the 
Community and as such still had relatively low staffing levels. Furthermore, many 
national and Community officials saw these policy areas as more suitable ‘training 
grounds’ for newly arrived officials than the Commission’s established core depart­
ments (interviews European Commission, September 2000).
8 I am grateful to William Wallace for this information.
9 The account in this section draws on the extensive and detailed report by the
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Commission (1992c) in which it reviews and seeks to evaluate its Olympic campaign. 
All quotes are from the same document. See also Bulletin 1992 (No. 1-2), point 
1.3.263.
10 His account pertains in the first instance to the position of the member states on 
education policy as it is discussed in Chapter 5. For the most part, however, culture 
and (the non-vocational parts of) education were treated in tandem, and a given 
member state’s stance with respect to one area tended to reflect its view on the other. 
See also Bekemans and Balodimos (1992).
11 The politics of translation make Article 3p harder to interpret still, given that some 
non-English versions of the Maastricht Treaty feature a rather different wording. In 
the German language version, for example, this article calls upon the Community to 
contribute ‘zur Entfaltung des Kulturlebens in den Mitgliedsstaaten’ [i.e. ‘to the 
enhancement of cultural life in the member states’] while leaving it open whether this 
‘cultural life’ might contain shared European elements.
12 This: provision has been criticised for, among other things, its ambiguity (see Faroux 
1993).
13 At the same time, there is some debate in the legal literature on whether ‘incentive 
measures’ and even ‘recommendations’ can evolve into ‘soft law’ and, if so, what 
precise legal implications this might entail (see Wellens and Borchardt 1989).
14 Furthermore, as are all areas of concurrent competences between the Union and the 
member states, cultural policy is in principle subjected to the subsidiarity clause as en­
shrined in the Maastricht Treaty under Article 3d. Yet, as has often been pointed out, 
the precise implications of the subsidiarity provision are unclear. Suffice to note that 
at least potentially it represents yet another obstacle that might be thrown in the way 
of concrete measures being adopted under Article 128. For a view that attributes a 
high significance to the subsidiarity clause in the context of Article 128 see Bekemans 
and Balodimos (1992).
15 For instance, in the field of performance art alone the ‘networks’ that benefited from 
Community aid have included: L’ Union des Theatres de l’Europe, la Convention 
Theätrale Europeenne, IETM, the European Network of Information Centres for 
Performing Arts, the Intercultural Production House for the Performing Artists, the 
European Music Office, the Europe Jazz Network, the Baltic Music Network, la Fete 
Europeenne de la Musique, le Reseau Printemps, le Reseau europeen des services 
educatifs des maisons d’opera, Dance Network Europe, Network Dance Web, 
P.A-R.T.S. -  Performing Arts Research Training Studios, Euro Festival Junger 
Artisten.
16 By contrast, a faith in cultural policy as a motor of integration still reverberates 
through some EP reports (e.g. EP 2001).
17 See the Commission’s annual General Report on the Activities of the European 
Union.
4
Audiovisual policy
From their very outset most of the Union’s actual and attempted cultural 
policies as discussed in the last chapter were shrouded in relative obscurity; by 
and large they attracted little public and scholarly attention. An exception was 
audiovisual policy, the one part of the broadly defined ‘cultural sector’ that 
has been left out of the discussion so far. Once the Union had become active 
in this field this attracted a large amount of public scrutiny and sparked reac­
tions that ranged from relentless hostility and ridicule to vigorous 
encouragement and praise. By the mid-1980s, audiovisual policy had become 
one of the EU’s central cultural battlegrounds and has remained so ever since.
This attention has been due in part to the high economic stakes involved 
in the film and television sector. In part, it has also been spurred by the fact 
that its audiovisual ambitions often pitted the Union against the outside 
world, above all the United States. Yet perhaps the most important factor has 
been the role of television in the lives of most Europeans. Of all the ‘cultural 
goods and services’ available to them, television is by far the most widely 
‘consumed’ (see Eurobarometer 2002) -  a fact the Commission itself has not 
tired to stress time and again. This in turn has led many on either side of the 
audiovisual debate in the EU to credit television with an almost magical 
ability to mould popular attitudes -  a view, incidentally, they were reluctant 
to shed even after most theorists of mass communication had abandoned or 
at least heavily qualified it (see Chapter 2 above).
Nonetheless, to date most studies o f  EU audiovisual policy have had a 
limited focus. They have concentrated on those audiovisual initiatives with 
the most direct bearing on the Union’s core mandate of forging a single 
market at the inside and a unified commercial policy towards the rest of the 
world. The most prominent and most written-about of those is the Television 
Without Frontiers (TWF) Directive, first adopted in 1989 and slightly 
amended in 1997. The directive applied single market principles to the audio-
visual sector by abolishing most legal barriers to the transmission and re- - 
ception of television signals between the member states. Moreover, it 
imposed an (albeit non-binding and highly controversial) quota regime, 
intended to aid European producers by curtailing the inflow of audiovisual ? 
material from overseas, above all from the United States?
In the context of this study the TWF Directive is relevant in as far as it 
reflected not only economic but also identity-related considerations. This was 
implicit in frequent claims by the Commission and the EP that making 
Europeans watch television programmes from European countries other than 
their own could make them discover shared cultural roots. Similarly, the 
TWF debate often revolved around assertions that an ‘overexposure’ to US ; 
audiovisual imports could inflict cultural damage on European audiences.
This in turn helped build up the United States as Europe’s privileged ‘cultural 
other’ and thereby established a discursive frame for many other audiovisual 
initiatives as they are discussed below.
However, the present chapter leaves aside the TWF Directive and the ; 
related quota row in order to concentrate on a second category of audiovisual 
initiatives by the Union. Even though these have had a more proactive and 
interventionist flavour they have attracted much less public and scholarly 
attention. The first part of the chapter looks at Commission and EP-driven 
attempts to promote a pan-European television channel, intended to 
confront its audience with non-national (and thus presumably European and 
‘Europeanising’) content. The second part turns to efforts by the EP and the 
Commission to foster the Europeanisation of the audiovisual productions 
sector by, in the first instance, subsidising multinational coproductions. Both 
bodies hoped that a ‘mixing and mingling’ of national audiovisual formats 
would over time lead to their partial cultural ‘denationalisation’, widening the 
market for European audiovisual producers and nurturing a European iden­
tity in viewers.
Yet some two decades later the Union had achieved relatively little in 
both fields. The pan-European television channel established with Com­
mission support in 1985 faltered the following year over a widespread 
audience aversion to its attempted non-national programming format and 
the refusal by many national governments to adequately fund it and to secure 
the Community-wide distribution of its signals. Similarly, many member 
state governments blocked initial proposals for the Union to subsidise multi­
national coproductions. What audiovisual measures they did adopt in the end 
amounted to little more than attempts to boost the production of domestic 
output and its circulation throughout the Union. But these did little to over­
come the cultural and linguistic obstacles that continue to tie many producers 
to their national markets. As the 1990s drew to a close, the Commission 
started to modify its audiovisual ambitions as well as the tactics it used to 
promote them. It toned down its cultural anti-Americanisation rhetoric and 
its audiovisual initiatives started to have a stronger economic and technolog­
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ical focus, gradually abandoning hopes of using films and television 
programmes as vehicles to nurture a European identity in viewers.
The origins of Community audiovisual policy
Until the early 1980s, neither the European Commission nor the European 
Parliament attempted to involve the Community in audiovisual policy. This 
was for political as well as technical reasons. On the political side, until the 
1980s most member states had maintained either strict public service televi­
sion monopolies that excluded all commercial competition (as in West 
Germany), or regulatory frameworks that severely restricted the number and 
type of commercial broadcasters allowed to compete with their licence fee 
and/or taxpayer funded public service counterparts (as in the UK). As a 
consequence, television broadcasting was neither widely pursued nor widely 
conceived of as a commercial activity, which in turn denied the Commission 
an economic rationale under which it could have sought to enter the field 
under its existing legal mandate at the time (Noam 1991).
On the technical side, terrestrial television had little in the way of a self- 
evident transnational dimension to it. Broadcasting across national borders 
required expensive retransmitters and was not widely practised, apart from 
the inevitable ‘spillover’ of television signals in frontier regions. What is 
more, spectrum shortage restricted the number of television channels that 
could be carried terrestrially in any given area. The lack of a standardised 
European television norm further impeded broadcasting across frontiers, 
with some member states using the PAL standard and others the (without 
converter incompatible) SECAM system.
By the late 1970s, however, all this started to change. First, most member 
states weakened their public service monopolies by allowing commercial 
broadcasters to enter the market. In 1980, the European Court of Justice 
acknowledged the growing commercial dimension of broadcasting by declar­
ing it to meet the EEC Treaty’s definition of a ‘service’. In principle, this 
obliged the member states to allow the unhindered distribution of television 
signals originating from anywhere within the Community on their territory 
(Wedell 1986: 288). Technical transformations were expected to push in the 
same direction. The evolution of low, medium and high powered broad­
casting satellites facilitated the diffusion of television signals over large 
geographical areas, either for reception by private satellite dishes (whose size 
and price was steadily diminishing), or as feeders of local cable systems. 
Cable, too, was expanding rapidly in many member states (Negrine and 
Papathanassopoulous 1990). Taken together these political and technical 
developments appeared to usher in a growing transnationalisation of televi­
sion in Western Europe. First, the ease with which television signals could 
now be transmitted via cable and satellite beyond their country of origin
meant that Europeans could receive an increasing number of each other’s 
domestic channels. Second, many observers also expected the emergence of 
truly pan-European television channels, as broadcasters would seek to target 
an international audience so as to maximise their viewing figures and thereby 
their advertising income.
It was against this broader political, economic and technological back­
drop that the European Parliament and the Commission developed a sudden 
interest in the audiovisual sector. In part this was guided by economic objec­
tives, but in part it was also motivated by a faith in television as a vehicle to 
affect loyalties and identifications in mass publics and strengthen support for 
European integration. And of all the initiatives to which this gave rise, the 
Community’s attempts to set up a pan-European television channel stands 
out as the boldest by far. It led to what became the most fascinating -  and ulti­
mately also the most sobering -  cultural experiment in the history of 
European integration to date, even though it has received surprisingly little 
scholarly attention.
The European television channel
The idea for a publicly funded pan-European television channel was first 
advanced by the European Parliament in 1980, in the form of a motion for a 
resolution on ‘Radio and television broadcasting in the European Commu­
nity  (EP 1980). Claiming that ‘reporting of European Community problems 
by national radio and television companies and the press [... has] been inade­
quate, in particular as regards integration’, it called for the ‘establishment of 
a European radio and television company with its own channel’. It would 
cater to a general public and feature programmes in ‘politics, education, 
cultural information, entertainment and also advertising’. It was to broadcast 
multilingually so as to appeal to the widest possible audience across Europe. 
The European Parliament adopted the motion in 1982, giving rise to an EP 
resolution similar in content and wording (1982b).
Earlier that same year, moreover, the EP Committee on Youth, Culture, 
Education and Sport had presented a unanimously adopted report ‘on Radio 
and Television Broadcasting in the European Community’ (EP 1982a). It 
argued that a ‘new dimension must be added to European unification to en­
able Europeans to identify with European union’ and that ‘the instruments 
which serve to shape public opinion today are the media [... of which] tele­
vision .. .  is the most important’ and it, too, proposed the setting up of a 
pan-European, multilingual television channel. The latter would air 
programmes that would be ‘European in origin, transmission range, target 
audience and subject matter’, and thereby enhance popular understanding of 
and support for European integration. According to the report
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European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want it. Europeans will 
only want it if there is such a thing as a European identity. A European identity 
will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed. At present, inform ation 
via the mass media is controlled at national level. The vast m ajority of journalists 
do no t ‘think European’ because their reporting role is defined in national or re­
gional terms. Hence the predom inance o f negative reporting. Therefore, if 
European unification is to be encouraged, Europe m ust penetrate the media.
These repeated pleas by the European Parliament (which, as shown below, 
soon were seconded by the Commission) gave rise to two concrete projects in 
the 1980s. The first was the Eurikon experiment in 1982; the second was 
Europa TV some three years later.
Eurikon
The Eurikon experiment took place under the auspices of the European 
Broadcasting Union, a federation of national public service broadcasters 
which had hitherto been dedicated primarily to the exchange of news footage, 
sports transmissions and, most prominently, to staging the annual Eurovision 
song contest. Eurikon received financial support from fifteen European 
broadcasting organisations and the European Community. Five broadcasters 
(from Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK) contributed pro­
grammes (Negrine and Papathanassopoulus 1990: 174; also Theiler 2001, 
1999b; Collins 1993b: 162-175; Zimmer 1989).
Eurikon was never intended to be a permanent European television 
channel. Instead, it was designed as an experiment to provide its initiators 
with first-hand experience in pan-European broadcasting and help them 
evaluate the feasibility of a ‘real’ and permanent pan-European television 
channel in the future. To this end, Eurikon produced an experimental televi­
sion programme for distribution in closed circuit format to ‘invited guests of 
the participating broadcasters and to panels recruited for the purpose of audi­
ence research’ over a period of five weeks (Collins 1993b: 165-166). It 
featured news, documentaries, sports, ‘light’ entertainment, ‘serious’ music, 
feature films and religious as well as children’s programmes. About one third 
of all programmes were especially produced for Eurikon and each of the five 
contributing broadcasters assumed overall responsibility for one week of 
transmissions. They tried to fill programming slots in their respective week 
with their own productions in the first instance and the remaining slots with 
material solicited from the other four broadcasters (Collins 1993b: 167).
Yet the Eurikon experiment proved disappointing. National audiences 
found its programmes hard to comprehend and they were put off by its 
reliance on dubbing and subtitles. What is more, reactions of this type were 
registered throughout the duration of the Eurikon experiment, even though 
each of the five weeks featured different programming and scheduling formu­
las. Also, while viewers from different countries shared a dislike for Eurikon’s
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output, the precise reasons for their misgivings varied from one national 
audience to the next (Collins 1993b). Overall, if the Eurikon experiment 
offered any clear lesson it was just how potent a set of cultural and linguistic 
obstacles any future pan-European broadcaster would have to grapple with.
Nonetheless, the Eurikon experience did not dampen the EP’s enthusi­
asm for pan-European television broadcasting, in which it was soon joined by 
the Commission. In 1983, the Commission released an interim report to the 
European Parliament titled ‘Realities and tendencies in European television: 
Perspectives and options* (Commission 1983). While the report also dealt 
with issues relating to the free ‘flow’ of television signals across the 
Community and support mechanisms for European audiovisual producers, it 
gave ‘first consideration to the practical possibilities of getting a European 
television programme onto the screen . . . ’. Echoing EP demands, the 
Commission called for a programming mix of ‘news, politics, education, 
culture, entertainment and sport, in which the European viewpoint would be 
based on the ideals and realities of the cultural unity of Europe*. Moreover, 
like the European Parliament before it the Commission argued that the 
Community should help fund such a channel in recognition of what it saw as 
the vital contribution this could make to European integration.
Europa TV
After Eurikon it took another two years for the first publicly funded and truly 
pan-European television channel to take to the air. Europa TV started trans­
missions in October 1985, after protracted negotiations between the 
governments of the member states and their respective national broadcasting 
organisations. In the process, some major European public service broadcast­
ers, such as the BBC and France’s Antenne 2, decided (or were instructed by 
their respective national authorities) not to participate in the project, despite 
intense lobbying by the European Commission to ensure a large number of 
participants (interview European Commission, September 2000).
The intricacies of this preparatory phase need not further concern us 
here. In the end, Europa TV came into being as a consortium of five European 
public service broadcasters from Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Portugal (Maggiore 1990: 71). Its operational headquarters were in the 
Netherlands and its legal headquarters in Geneva, which also hosted the EBU. 
Initially, the channel was to be financed mainly through contributions from 
the Dutch government and the participating broadcast organisations, with 
advertising expected to generate substantial additional revenues over time. Its 
initial three-year budget was 35 million Swiss Francs (Dill 1989: 135-141; 
European Cultural Foundation etal. 1988: 98).2
In many respects Europa TV lived up to the Commission and the EP’s 
expectations for a pan-European television channel. Most importantly, it 
aspired to be pan-European not only with respect to its geographical reach 
but also its programming content. The latter consisted of news, drama,
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sports, music and children’s programming and ‘was intended to meet the fol­
lowing criteria: it had to be European, complementary, independent, 
universal and original [ ... and it was to reflect] European culture a n d ...  con­
tribute] to it’ (European Cultural Foundation e ta l  1988:99). Though Europa 
TV also featured domestic programmes produced by the participating 
national broadcasters as well as other national productions bought on the 
open market, its main mission was to produce and transmit programmes in a 
‘denationalised’ format. For example, in order to cover news and current 
affairs from a ‘European point of view’ its news team ‘was carefully structured 
to avoid the dominance of any single national group’ and a ‘non-national 
perspective was encouraged by all available means’ (Maggiore 1990: 71). As 
a general rule, news events were covered by nationals of countries other 
than the one in which they took place (European Cultural Foundation et al 
1988: 99).
To overcome language barriers, Europa TV’s visual image was transmit­
ted alongside several sound channels. Facilities for simultaneous translation 
(in English, Dutch, German and Portuguese) enabled audiences to receive the 
channel in their native tongue. In addition, Europa TV provided subtitling in 
different languages through teletext.
After an initial phase during which Europa TV had only been available in 
the Netherlands, it expanded its reach to 4.5 million homes across Europe. 
This included access to 1.5 million households in Portugal where it was 
transmitted terrestrially (Negrine and Papathanassopoulus 1990: 176). 
Europa TV’s initiators predicted that this expansion would continue at rapid 
pace and soon allow the channel to reach over thirty million homes and con­
quer a sizeable audience share in the process (European Cultural Foundation 
et al 1988: 99). Moreover, the European Parliament and the Commission 
both hoped that by demonstrating the viability of pan-European broadcast­
ing Europa TV would induce commercially operated broadcasters to follow 
into its pan-European footsteps and thereby become a catalyst for ‘denation­
alised’ broadcasting in Western Europe.
Yet things turned out very differently for Europa TV. Barely over one year 
after its founding it was forced to cease operations in November 1986. The 
causes of this failure merit some closer attention.
W7iy Europa TV failed
The most immediate reasons for Europa TV’s demise were financial. After its 
first year of operations the channel had already exhausted its initial three-year 
budget (Zimmer 1989: 124). In the end, even the equivalent of a 720,000 
pounds sterling emergency grant by the Commission could not save Europa 
TV, and at the time of its closure its debts had accumulated to 3.7 million 
pounds sterling (Negrine and Papathanassopoulus 1990: 176-177).
These financial difficulties stemmed in part from the failure of the 
participating broadcasters (and often indirectly of their respective national
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governments) to ensure that Europa TV could operate on more than a frac­
tion of the annual budget available to most domestic public service 
broadcasters. What is more, during its preparatory phase and throughout its 
short life Europa TV’s participants engaged in frequent rows and issued 
demands that further reduced its economic viability. A good example was 
Portugal’s insistence that Europa TV broadcast not only in English, German 
and Dutch but also in Portuguese. Given that the channel’s signal was distrib­
uted widely in Portugal this seemed fair enough; but at the same time it so 
increased the cost of translation facilities and multiple soundtracks that it ate 
up half of Europa TV’s budget (Negrine and Papathanassopoulus 1990: 176). 
A further blow came when Belgium refused to carry Europa TV on its cable 
system. This prevented it from reaching Belgium’s sizeable Dutch-speaking 
market and thereby reduced its potential to attract advertising revenues 
(Lange and Renaud 1989:236). Furthermore, even though Europa TV had its 
operational headquarters in the Netherlands and received subsidies from the 
Dutch government, the latter refused to exempt it from a rule prohibiting 
foreign channels distributed in the Netherlands from carrying subtitles, 
aimed at protecting Dutch broadcasters from foreign competition (Zimmer 
1989: 130). This reduced Europa TV’s appeal to those Dutch viewers who 
would have preferred subtitles to dubbing and reduced its economic viability 
even more.
On top of all this Europa TV was plagued by administrative problems and 
by a general lack of direction and leadership. At the root of this were rivalries 
between the participating national broadcasters and their refusal to allow the 
EBU to effectively take charge of the channel. All the while their willingness 
to do so themselves often remained wanting, as was borne out by their 
frequent failure to fill the programming slots allocated to them. Even though 
they themselves had brought Europa TV into being, it soon became clear that 
the participating national broadcasters refused ‘to regard Europa as their own 
offspring’ (European Cultural Foundation et al. 1988: 99; interview European 
Commission, September 2000).
Yet what most sealed Europa TV’s fate was its lack of audience appeal. It 
was responsible for its failure to attract advertisers and thereby to become 
economically viable. Indeed, so low was Europa TV’s attractiveness to view­
ers that even after it had begun to offer commercial slots free of charge in an 
effort to bring itself to the attention of potential advertisers these largely failed 
to take up the offer (Negrine and Papathanassopoulus 1990: 177).
How to account for Europa TV’s low popularity? As suggested, in part it 
was due to its lack of resources and the Dutch refusal to let it carry subtitles, 
while its ‘high brow’ cultural and educational aspirations clearly did not help 
either- But more than any other factor it was Europa TV’s attempt to appeal 
to an audience as culturally and linguistically fragmented as the West 
European one that posed a major stumbling block. A good way to illustrate 
this is through the concept o f ‘cultural discount’. It denotes why ‘a particular
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programme rooted in one culture, and thus attractive in that environment, 
will have a diminished appeal elsewhere as viewers find it difficult to identify 
with the style, values, beliefs, institutions and behavioural patterns of the 
material in question’ (Hoskins and Mirus 1988: 500). The concept o f‘cultural 
discount’ is applied most commonly to cross-national situations (e.g. Finnish 
films shown to Greek audiences). Yet it also captures viewers’ resistance to 
programmes in a ‘denationalised’ format which Eurikon and Europa TV 
sought to develop. In proportion to how much this format clashes with the 
cultural habitus of viewers, its attractiveness; to them diminishes.
A pan-European channel with an overwhelming financial and political 
backing, populist programming content and Europe-wide terrestrial distribu­
tion might have made up for some of these disadvantages. At the very least, a 
wider distribution would have helped compensate for a relatively low audi­
ence share by maximising audience reach5 In any case, Europa TV fell short 
on all these counts: it had weak financial and political backing, unrealistically 
strong ‘high cultural’ and didactic ambitions and only a very limited reach 
due to the refusal of all but one participating member state to distribute it 
terrestrially. By associating itself with Europa TV, the Commission thus bet 
on a project whose failure was almost a foregone conclusion.
With hindsight many Commission officials believe that the Commission 
should have distanced itself from Europa TV -  or indeed even discouraged it 
-  once it had become clear that a fully-fledged pan-European channel with 
adequate funding and operational autonomy was not attainable, and that 
some of the most important national broadcasters would not participate 
(interview European Commission, June 2000). Beyond this, the very notion 
of a publicly run pan-European television channel with a mission of fostering 
a European identity in viewers was by its nature destined to run into strong 
scepticism. Not least, it clashed with the prevailing ethos in all West European 
democracies that public service broadcasting should not be used for political 
purposes, at least not in such an explicit manner. Moreover, even within the 
Commission many officials simply could not imagine what a truly ‘denation­
alised’ television channel would look like, or indeed that such a thing could 
even be possible in the first place (interview European Commission, June 
2000).
Interestingly, Europa TV was not the only channel to experience the diffi­
culties linked to pan-European broadcasting. Its fate was shared by 
commercially operated pan-European satellite broadcasters in the 1980s. 
These channels, too, had started out with the aim of offering at least partially 
‘denationalised’ programmes to a pan-European audience. Instead of adopt­
ing Europa TV’s failed strategy of providing multiple sound tracks they 
broadcast in English exclusively, but sought to specialise in programmes for 
which linguistic elements are less significant. UK-based Super Channel, for 
example, promised in its press information package to ‘[take] into account 
that most viewers are not native English speakers. Presenters speak clearly,
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comedies and documentaries are selected for their visual content while music 
and sports programmes have a universal appeal’ (quoted in Collins 1989: 
365). However, echoing the fate of Europa TV these channels either perished 
or refocused on a predominantly mono-national audience. British-based 
Super Channel was one example. In 1989, it lost an average of one million 
pounds sterling per month (Collins 1989: 364). Its major pan-European com­
petitor at the time fared little better: Sky Television had lost, by varying 
accounts, between 10.2 and 14.6 million pounds sterling in the year up to 
June 1987 (Collins 1989: 365). It, too, had little prospect of acquiring a suffi­
ciently large audience share to survive as a pan-European channel in the 
long-run. Both broadcasters subsequently relinquished their pan-European 
aspirations and concentrated on the UK market, after which their financial lot 
improved. The Swiss-based European Business Channel encountered an even 
harsher fate. Founded in 1988 it beamed financial news across Europe, but in 
1990 large financial losses forced it to close down permanently (Noam 
1991: 193).
In 1988, after Europa TV’s demise and the poor showing of commercially 
operated pan-European channels, the European Commission openly pondered 
whether it should support a renewed attempt at pan-European broadcasting. 
This ‘provided it combines the following characteristics: a broadcasting organi­
sation which is multinational within Europe, multilingual broadcasts; a 
multinational audience within a wide European area; European programme 
content’ (Commission 1988b: 4). Until the launching of Euronews in January 
1993, however, Europa TV’s fiasco spelled an end to further projects of this kind. 
And in any event, Euronews was only a very diluted version of what Europa TV 
had once aspired to be, as is shown below.
Attempts to Europeanise the audiovisual productions sector
For the European Commission and the European Parliament, support for 
pan-European broadcasting was an important but not the only way in which 
they hoped to instrumentalise television to strengthen popular support for 
European integration. Especially once it had become clear that pan-European 
television channels were not viable, they turned their energies to the more 
modest project of encouraging a partial Europeanisation of the audiovisual 
productions sector. This would lead to what in Community jargon was often 
referred to as a ‘European audiovisual space’ or a ‘Europe of viewers’.
Europeanisation versus Americanisation in EU audiovisual rhetoric 
There was another, more subtle shift in emphasis. While the aim of promot­
ing a European identity in mass audiences continued to resonate throughout 
the various audiovisual production initiatives by the Commission and the EP, 
it became complemented by increasingly vociferous calls to reduce the
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Community’s audiovisual trade deficit with the United States. With a growing 
sense of urgency, both bodies depicted Europe’s reliance on US films and tele­
vision programmes as costly not only in economic terms but also as a source 
of serious cultural damage to European audiences and as a threat to the 
survival of European culture -  so much so that by the late 1980s the anti- 
Americanisation theme had become the predominant discursive frame for 
their various audiovisual initiatives.
Underpinning this focus on American audiovisual imports was hard 
statistical evidence. It showed that while enjoying a globally dominant posi­
tion, the United States had also conquered a relatively large audiovisual 
market share in Western Europe, especially in fictional content. In fact, 
among European audiences US audiovisual imports carried a much lower 
‘cultural discount’ than those from other European countries -  signalling 
that, paradoxically, the United States had come closer to developing a ‘pan- 
European’ audiovisual format than any country in Europe (see Collins 1990). 
And by most accounts the US’s audiovisual share in Europe was set to grow 
further, as new commercial television channels would turn to the United 
States as a source of relatively cheap, plentiful and popular programming 
input.
There are different ways to account for the popularity of US-made films 
and television programmes in Europe. One explanation focuses on the fact 
that Hollywood imports have had much longer exposure among most 
European audiences than those from other European countries. A further 
reason might well be the size and internal heterogeneity of the US domestic 
market. The former ensures sufficiently high economies of scale to allow for 
the production of more attractive output; the latter forces US producers to 
make films and television programmes which already carry some measure of 
cross-cultural mass appeal (Hoskins and Minis 1988). Still other explanations 
emphasise the attractiveness of American cultural imports to European audi­
ences as an alternative to the more ‘elitist’ and ‘educational’ fare traditionally 
offered by many European domestic producers, especially in the earlier days 
of rigid public service monopolies (see Morley and Robins 1989).
Whatever the explanation, it was against the backdrop of growing audio­
visual imports from the United States that the Commission and the EP 
painted their ‘cultural defence’ scenario in ever starker colours. In their 
rendering, American and European audiovisual producers were pitted against 
each other in a relentless struggle for market share, audiences and cultural 
influence, with the former fighting for total hegemony and the latter for 
survival. And the success of US films and television programmes in Europe 
was portrayed not only as costly in economic terms but also as a threat to 
what was referred to more or less interchangeably, and with more regard for 
subtle ambiguity than conceptual consistency, as national cultures, European 
culture and European cultural diversity.
In 1986, for example, in defending the proposed MEDIA programme dis­
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cussed below, the Commission warned that ‘[the] economic and cultural 
dimensions of communications cannot be separated. The gap between the 
proliferation of equipment and media and the stagnation of creative content 
production capacities is a major problem for the societies of Europe; it lays 
them open to domination by other powers with a better performance in the 
programming content industry’ (Commission 1986: 4). Similarly, in 1988 it 
cautioned that ‘while satellites are getting ready to overwhelm us with hun­
dreds of new television channels, Europe runs the risk of seeing its own 
industry squeezed out and its market taken over by American and Japanese 
industrialists and producers [... A] European response is required 
(Commission 1988a: 5-6). But perhaps it was Jacques Delors himself who 
offered the most perfect synthesis of economic and cultural strands in his 
warnings against audiovisual domination by foreigners. In his first speech to 
the European Parliament after taking office as Commission President in 1985, 
he proclaimed that
the culture industry will tom orrow  be one o f the biggest industries, a creator of 
wealth and jobs. U nder the terms o f the Treaty [of Rome] we do not have the 
resources to im plem ent a cultural policy, but we are trying to tackle it along 
economic lines. It is no t simply a question o f television programmes. We have to 
build a powerful European culture industry that will enable us to be in control of 
both the m edium  and its content, maintaining our standards o f civilisation, and 
encouraging the creative people amongst us. (Quoted in Collins 1994b: 90)
Whatever its factual merits, the Commission and the EP’s use of the ‘cultural 
defence’ argument as a rhetorical pillar of their successive audiovisual policy 
proposals was tactically astute -  and not just in the general sense that, as 
shown in Chapters 1 and 2, political identity-building benefits from accentu­
ating perceived differences between in- and outsiders. First, as was argued, to 
some extent such anti-Americanisation warnings were rooted in hard 
economic facts which gave them a degree of underlying plausibility. There 
was an audiovisual trade deficit with the US, this deficit was likely to widen, 
and Europeans did spend a lot of time watching American films and television 
programmes. Certainly, claims that all this had a disastrous cultural impact 
were by their very nature impossible to arbitrate, appearing to some as far­
fetched, hysterical or even absurd. Yet the Commission and the EP could not 
have made such claims in the first place had it not been for the underlying 
economic and statistical realities on which they were predicated. Warnings of 
an impending cultural takeover by the United States were discursive 
constructs, but they were not simply taken out of thin air.
Second, such warnings seemed all the more plausible since cultural. 
resentments against the United States had a long history in many European 
countries. They reached back at least as far as the rise of Hollywood as a domi­
nant cultural producer and exporter. In particular, they thrived on the appeal 
of American cultural imports to European working class audiences. Long
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before the Second World War, critics all over Europe bemoaned the alleged 
vulgarity, brashness and (bizarrely enough) effeminate and ‘feminising’ 
effects of American cultural imports, above all Hollywood-produced films. In 
Britain, for instance, cultural elites from all parts of the political spectrum
were united by a fascinated loathing for m odern architecture, holiday camps, 
advertising, fast food, plastics and, o f course, chewing gum. . . .  These were the 
images of the soft and enervating ‘easy life’ which threatened to sm other British 
cultural identity [and of] the process through which authentic working-class life 
was being destroyed by the ‘hollow brightness’, the ‘shiny barbarism ’ and ‘spiri­
tual decay’ of im ported American culture. (Morley and Robins 1989: 19; also 
Delanty 1995)
It is hard to pin down the precise origins of these cultural resentments against 
the United States. More sociologically oriented accounts would focus on fears 
by national cultural elites of losing their own symbolic power to aesthetic 
influences beyond their control. Especially in Britain and France more 
general misgivings about a declining global influence in relation to the United 
States may also have fuelled cultural grudges after 1945.
In any event, frequently such elite concerns for the survival o f ‘authentic’ 
national culture sparked policies that served as a precedent for what the 
Commission and the EP sought to implement at the EU level from the 1980s 
onwards. For instance, the early BBC had as one of its core missions the 
upholding o f‘national standards’ (Morley and Robins 1989:19). Other public 
service broadcasters maintained official or unofficial restrictions on foreign 
content, directed mainly against imports from the US. Sometimes such 
quotas even applied to music played on the radio. In addition, almost all 
European countries instituted various schemes to subsidise their national film  
industries.
A further factor that encouraged the Commission and the EP’s resort to 
the anti-Americanisation theme was the coming to power of the Socialist 
government in France in the early 1980s. For their warnings against ‘cultural 
domination’ by the United States coincided with that very theme evolving 
into a central plank of French cultural policy under the new government. 
Moreover, it started to resonate with some southern member states that had 
sided with French calls for protectionist quotas in the context of the 
Television Without Frontiers directive. Their commitment to the cause was 
epitomised by French culture minister Jack Lang’s often-cited call for a cru­
sade ‘against financial and intellectual imperialism that no longer grabs 
territory, or rarely, but grabs consciousness, ways of thinking, ways of living’ 
(quoted in Tracey 1988: 16-17). It was also evident in the denouncing by his 
ministerial colleague of American ‘Coca Cola satellites’ undermining ‘our lin­
guistic and cultural identity’ (quoted in Noam 1991: 302). By making the 
anti-Americanisation cause a rhetorical pillar of its own audiovisual propos­
als, the Commission and the EP could, at the very least, hope to enhance their
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appeal to the French government. And as is shown below, it was indeed 
France which of all the member states became the staunchest and most 
consistent backer of an EU audiovisual involvement.
Lastly, the move of focusing on Europe’s audiovisual standing in relation 
to ‘other cultures’ helped shift the terms of the audiovisual debate away from 
the question of European identity construction at the inside to that of 
Europe’s position in relation to the outside world. As the Community’s expe­
rience in other parts of the cultural sector had already shown, too outspoken 
a commitment to the former left it vulnerable to accusations of wanting to 
disseminate ‘cultural propaganda’, ‘flatten national identities’ and overstep 
legal constraints. The latter, by contrast, was less sensitive an area for the 
Community to be seen to concern itself with, giving its audiovisual initiatives 
seemingly greater normative validity and fewer manipulative connotations. 
Moreover, this external focus enabled the Commission and the EP to link the 
audiovisual sector to trade policy (where the Community enjoyed clear legal 
competences) as well as to issues of economic and technological competitive­
ness.
For all these reasons, the cultural anti-Americanisation theme had the 
makings of a potentially effective rhetorical pillar upon which the EP and the 
Commission could predicate their various proposals to Europeanise the 
audiovisual productions sector. Nonetheless, as is shown next, these propos­
als encountered significant resistance from the member states. And the 
policies that the Community eventually put into practice were a far cry from 
what the Commission and the EP had originally advocated.
The MEDIA programme
As far as its ‘software’ aspects were concerned, the audiovisual sector gener­
ally came within the competences of the national ministers of culture. As 
shown in the last chapter, these had started to meet more or less regularly in 
the early 1980s. Yet, when it came to audiovisual policy this initially produced 
little more than vague declarations of intent. Whenever the Commission 
managed to put more concrete proposals on the ministers’ table agreement 
remained wanting, despite the ‘metaphor of cultural war’ (Schlesinger 1996: 
10) against the United States which typically accompanied them and despite 
strong backing by France and the European Parliament (e.g. EP 1983, 1985).
For example, this became evident in April 1985 when the Commission 
proposed a Council regulation on a ‘Community aid scheme for non-docu­
mentary cinema and television co-productions’ (Commission 1985a). Its 
declared aim was to ‘increase the number of mass-audience cinema and tele­
vision co-productions involving nationals of more than one Member State’. 
To this end, it would have created a system to aid such coproductions through 
grants and loans, covering production as well as distribution costs.
But the Commission’s proposal to aid coproductions ran into staunch 
opposition from several member states. Germany objected that it was too
A u d io v isu a l  p o l ic y 101
expensive, yet was also driven by the habitual Länder anxieties about protect­
ing their constitutional powers, which include cultural policy in general and 
broadcasting in particular. Not surprisingly, the Danish government rejected 
it on the grounds that the Treaties of Rome did not allow the Community to 
pursue cultural policies even if these were adopted under a partly .economic 
guise. Similarly, the Thatcher government in Britain rejected any Community 
intervention in the field and instead ‘argued in favour of letting market forces 
have their way and of encouraging the television organisations [of the 
member states] to work together5 (Wedell 1986: 284).
In late 1985, the Commission resubmitted its earlier proposal for an 
audiovisual support scheme (Commission 1985b; Bulletin 1985 [No. 12], 
point 2.1.125). In line with suggestions by the European Parliament it now 
listed support for coproductions involving partners from countries whose 
languages were not widely spoken as one of the ‘objectives’ that were to guide 
the distribution of aid. This, however, did little to appease those member 
states that had opposed the Commission’s audiovisual plans from the outset 
(see Collins 1993b). As a result, the Commission’s proposed Community-aid 
scheme for non-documentary cinema and television coproductions received 
its definitive burial.
This renewed setback prompted the Commission to revise its audiovisual 
wish list more thoroughly and to come up with proposals that would stand a 
greater chance of being accepted by the member states. This it did in 1986, 
when it presented a communication to the Council for an ‘Action programme 
for the European audio-visual media products industry5 (Commission 1986). 
It laid the foundation for the MEDIA programme which was passed later that 
same year.
The MEDIA (Mesures pour encourager le developpement de l’industrie 
audiovisuelle) programme started at the end of 1986, initially comprising a 
range of pilot projects. Since then, MEDIA has been renewed several times, 
most recently in 2000 where its annual funding was increased to atotal of 400 
million euros for a period of five years (EP and Council 2001; Council 2000).
In contrast to the unsuccessful Commission and EP proposals that 
preceded it, MEDIA’S main aim is to enhance the circulation of nationally 
produced audiovisual output inside the Community and beyond, not to 
promote transnational coproductions. From the very outset, MEDIA’S ‘top 
priority [...was] the creation of a European film distribution system, which 
will make it easier for national productions to move more freely throughout 
the Community5 (Commission 1987b: 14).
The Commission distributes some MEDIA funding in the form of auto­
matic subsidies to European film distributors. Beyond this, it supports 
selected projects on a competitive basis, similar to the Culture 2000 model 
discussed in the last chapter. An expert committee helps the Commission 
select projects and monitor their implementation, with projects generally 
receiving up to fifty per cent of their budget from the MEDIA fund.
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In its two decades or so of existence MEDIA has supported a wide range 
of initiatives to encourage domestic audiovisual productions and their circu­
lation throughout the Union and beyond. They have included a European 
Film Distribution Office to give loans to low-cost European feature films 
distributed in at least three different member states and a scheme called 
BABEL (Broadcasting Across the Barriers of European Languages) to refine 
dubbing and translation techniques. MEDIA has also supported various 
initiatives to help market independent productions as well as projects to 
promote cartoon films, audiovisual output in minority languages, the 
restoration and digitisation of the ‘European audiovisual heritage’, various 
training schemes for script writing, subtitling and the use of new technolo­
gies, and a European Film Academy which hands out the annual European 
film awards. Moreover, especially towards the end of the 1990s, MEDIA 
supported a myriad o f‘networks’ in charge of almost every imaginable part of 
the audiovisual sector.
The audiovisual output supported by MEDIA in recent years still gravi­
tates towards the ‘high brow’ end of the spectrum, though there have been 
attempts to aid productions that stand a realistic chance of attaining some 
mass appeal. However, even those MEDIA-supported productions that do 
attract relatively large audiences have their appeal primarily confined to their 
country (or linguistic region) of origin. Very few enjoy the pan-European 
popularity enjoyed by Hollywood blockbusters.
Most importantly, despite substantial increases in funding over the years, 
MEDIA’S main objective is still to increase the output of nationally produced 
material and its circulation throughout the Union and beyond, not the 
Europeanisation of audiovisual content by subsidising multinational copro­
ductions. Demands by the European Parliament in a proposed amendment to 
the draft for a new version of the MEDIA programme in 1995 that MEDIA 
should incorporate measures to ‘develop the ability of professionals to under­
stand the European cultural dimension to audiovisual works in order to 
develop their ability to address a European, rather than simply a national 
audience’ (‘MEDIA II: Development and training’ 1995: 198) failed to make 
their way into the programme.
In other words, with the advent of the MEDIA programme the Union’s 
very Europeanisation objective had undergone a profound redefinition. 
According to the definition which had dominated the Commission and the 
EP’s earlier audiovisual proposals that were rejected by the member states, 
Europeanisation was seen to entail, in the first instance, a measure of cultural 
harmonisation or ‘denationalisation’ -  or at least a ‘compatiblisation’ of sorts 
-  of different national audiovisual formats, and a corresponding harmonisa­
tion or ‘compatibilisation’ of viewing preferences (though the Commission 
and the EP were careful not to use such terms in public). To bring this about, 
these earlier proposals were aimed at fostering audiovisual coproductions 
involving as many member states as possible. Coproductions were expected
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to have a harmonising effect because they entail a ‘mixing and mingling’ of 
national audiovisual formats and because they must seek to minimise the 
‘cultural discount’ attached to them since they are produced from the outset 
for consumption in several national markets and cultural regions. According 
to this logic, once a ‘denationalised’ audiovisual format has started to emerge 
and audiences grow amenable to it, producers will be able to market their 
output Community-wide, and pan-European channels will benefit from a 
suitably Europeanised supply of programming input. Moreover, even purely 
national television channels will acquire a greater ‘European dimension’ by 
airing more non-national programmes. And underlying all this was the hope 
that ‘denationalised’ audiovisual content would become a carrier of European 
values, fostering in audiences a European identity and, ultimately, greater 
support for European integration.
By contrast, in the second definition as it informed notably the MEDIA 
programme, Europeanisation constitutes above all a process of making 
audiovisual productions from one member state more attractive to audiences 
in other member states without, at the same time, inducing a partial cultural 
levelling of national audiovisual formats. To be Europeanised, in other words, 
is the market available to audiovisual producers rather than the style and 
content of their productions. To this end MEDIA subsidises dubbing and 
subtitling techniques, transnational distribution networks and the like. The 
hope is that by making productions from other member states more accessi­
ble to viewers they 'will spend more time watching and thereby become more 
‘acclimatised’ to them, which in turn would lower the ‘cultural discount’ 
attached to these productions and promote their circulation still further. By 
way of such a virtuous cycle, then, European audiovisual producers would 
benefit from a larger market even without a cultural harmonisation or 
‘compatibilisation’ of audiovisual formats. In this sense, even though MEDIA 
is still wedded to the Europeanisation cause, it in fact signifies a radical shift 
in EU audiovisual policy away from ‘emphasising unity to emphasising diver­
sity1 (Collins 1994b: 96).
Conscious of this departure from its original audiovisual aspirations, the 
Commission’s stance towards the MEDIA programme has remained 
ambiguous. On the one hand, many officials see it as a basic policy framework 
on which they hope to graft more ambitious and content-centred audiovisual 
measures at some later stage. On the other hand, echoing the general move 
away from interventionist and ‘Europeanising’ cultural initiatives discussed 
in the last chapter, the prospects of this happening anytime soon have wors­
ened in recent years. On top of this, concurring with many other observers 
Commission officials doubt whether MEDIA in its present form will actually 
succeed in ‘defragmenting’ the European audiovisual market. Poor transna­
tional marketing and distribution facilities are at least as much a symptom of 
a low demand for national audiovisual productions beyond their country of 
origin as they are its cause. In this sense, many officials suspect that MEDIA
simply has its priorities the wrong way round (interview European 
Commission, June 2000).
Audiovisual Eureka and Eurimages
If MEDIA thus focuses mainly on mono-national audiovisual productions, 
this does not apply to the same extent to two other audiovisual support 
programmes that came into operation in the late 1980s. These were launched 
outside the Community framework yet provided for its participation in one 
form or another. The first was the Audiovisual Eureka programme, founded 
in 1989 on the initiative of the French government. Twenty-six countries 
signed its original charter, including some from Central and Eastern Europe 
(Sandell 1996: 274). By the end of the 1980s its membership had grown to 
thirty-five countries, with the Council of Europe and the European 
Commission as associate members. During its lifetime Audiovisual Eureka 
received some Community funding and the Commission supported its small 
secretariat (‘Audiovisual Eureka’ 1999; Collins 1994a: 136; Commission 
1994c; ‘Joint declaration’ 1990).
Audiovisual Eureka’s clout remained severely limited by the fact that it 
had no significant funds of its own to hand out. Instead, its role was that of a 
‘marriage bureau’ of sorts. It brought together companies in the audiovisual 
sector to collaborate on specific projects, including coproductions and dis­
tribution arrangements. One of its priorities was to involve the new 
democracies from Central and Eastern Europe in such projects. Audiovisual 
Eureka also promoted the use and development of new production tech­
niques, and in 1992 it gave birth to the European Audiovisual Observatory 
which compiles statistics about the audiovisual sector. In 2003 the participat­
ing governments decided to dissolve Audiovisual Eureka (though not the 
European Audiovisual Observatory). This was due in part to policy disagree­
ments, and in part to the fact that some of its activities had been incorporated 
into the new MEDIA programme which had also been extended to the 
Central and East European accession countries in the meantime 
(Communication on Audiovisual Eureka 2003).
Equally launched on the behest of the French government and also 
outside a formal Community context was the Eurimages programme. It was 
initiated in 1988 based on the Council of Europe’s Cultural Convention. Most 
Community member states (with the notable exception of the UK) partici­
pate, joined by a range of Council of Europe members that do not (or at the 
time did not) belong to the Community. Eurimages’ declared aim is to 
support ‘the co-production, distribution, broadcasting and exploitation of 
creative cinematographic and audiovisual works’ through a range of financial 
incentives (Council of Europe 1988). Thus far, Eurimages has come to the aid 
of around 900 full-length feature films and documentaries, ranging from 
Asterix.et Obelix contre Cesar to a documentary about the conflict in Northern 
Ireland (Council of Europe 2004).
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In so far as Eurimages fosters transnational coproductions it clearly goes 
farther than most aspects of the MEDIA programme and indeed resembles 
the Commission’s unsuccessful coproduction proposals in the 1980s. At the 
same time its funding has remained tiny and its overall impact on the 
European audiovisual sector negligible. At present, it expends around nine­
teen million euro per year on average, far below the production costs of many 
single Hollywood films.
Officially, the Commission has been an enthusiastic supporter of both 
Audiovisual Eureka and Eurimages. In private, Commission officials are 
more ambivalent. On the one hand, they fear that programmes of this kind 
could herald a gradual ‘de-Communitarisation’ of audiovisual policy alto­
gether. On the other hand, so far these programmes have proven the only way 
‘to “end-run” the veto over cultural initiatives enjoyed by single Member 
States within the Community and to establish outside the Community pro­
grammes and policies impossible to achieve within it’ (Collins 1994b: 97). 
What is more, there is at least a theoretical possibility that over time 
Eurimages could be incorporated into the EU proper, or at least inspire future 
additions to the MEDIA programme. However, as is shown next, as the 1990s 
drew to a close the prospects for this became ever more remote.
Maastricht and beyond
As discussed in the last chapter, the Maastricht Treaty gave the Union a 
formal mandate in cultural policy for the first time. Article 128 (changed to 
Article 151 in the subsequent Amsterdam Treaty) mentions the audiovisual 
sector as an area of potential Union intervention. Yet as in other parts of 
culture it may only take ‘incentive measures’ and issue ‘recommendations’. 
These must be legally non-binding, ‘non-harmonising’, respect the subsidiar­
ity principle and must be adopted unanimously. Many of these terms are 
unclear, and after the Maastricht Treaty had come into force in late 1993 
Commission officials in charge of audiovisual policy disagreed on how best to 
proceed. Some wanted to submit at least one major new audiovisual initiative 
to the member states with a minimum of delay -  mostly advocating a new 
coproduction-oriented initiative modelled after Eurimages and its own 
defeated proposals from the first half of the 1980s (interview European 
Commission, June 2000). This, they hoped, would sustain the momentum 
created by the Maastricht Treaty and push for a liberal interpretation of 
Article 128. Yet other Commission officials were more cautious, wanting to 
focus at least initially on the gradual expansion of the MEDIA programme. As 
did their colleagues responsible for other areas of cultural policy, they feared 
that too ambitious and pushy an offensive by the Commission might create a 
backlash in some member states and cause them to retreat into a restrictive 
interpretation of Article 128 from the outset.
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As is shown below, the Commission did indeed start to work on a new 
coproduction initiative which it formally submitted to the member states in 
1995. Parallel to this, it invested a large portion of its post-Maastricht audio­
visual energies in a stream of reports, memorandums, position, strategy and 
green papers as well as impact and feasibility studies, hoping to turn the 
Union’s limited audiovisual mandate in the Maastricht Treaty into tangible 
policies that would eventually take it beyond the confines of the MEDIA 
programme. Many of these pronouncements came to centre on the objective 
of creating a ‘European information area’ -  a term that, by the mid-1990s, 
had replaced the earlier concept of the ‘European audiovisual space’. 
Moreover, they contained very similar findings, all suggesting that the meas­
ures hitherto taken (mainly under the MEDIA umbrella) had done little to 
‘defragment’ the European audiovisual sector. Cultural and linguistic barriers 
between the member states had remained strong and most audiovisual 
producers continued to be tied to their national markets, depriving them of 
sufficient economies of scale to successfully compete against their US 
counterparts.
Figures on television consumption were one indication of this. By the 
mid-1990s, viewers watching their respective domestic channels still 
accounted for ninety-four per cent of television consumption in Europe 
(Stewart and Laird 1994: 5). The remaining six per cent consisted mainly of 
viewers watching domestic channels from neighbouring countries in their 
own language (e.g. Austrians watching German channels), or diaspora 
communities tuned to television stations from their home countries (e.g. 
Italian immigrants in France watching channels from Italy). Furthermore, in 
as far as domestic channels featured non-domestic programmes, these mostly 
came from the United States rather than from elsewhere in Europe.
Cinema statistics pointed in the same direction. A Commission study in 
1997 found that the year before some sixteen per cent of cinema tickets sold 
in the EU were for national films in their respective home markets. A mere six 
per cent of cinema admissions were for films produced elsewhere in the EU 
(Commission 1997b). The remaining seventy-eight per cent of cinema admis­
sions were for films originating from overseas, overwhelmingly of course 
from the United Sates. A study by the European Audiovisual Observatory in 
1996 showed very similar results (Commission 1997b). Of the forty commer­
cially most successful films in the EU, only ten were European. In fact, apart 
from Trainspotting (which ranked thirteenth) the first twenty were all from 
the US. The comparatively most successful European films were ‘on a par 
with comedies like Werner -  Das Muß Kesseln!, Il Ciclone and Les Trois Freres, 
having only a limited geographical distribution, which demonstrates the 
limited market potential for this genre outside national frontiers’ 
(Commission 1997b). Six years later the situation had barely improved, 
despite significant increases in MEDIA funding. The EU-wide market share of 
European films shown beyond their home markets in 2002 was a mere 7.9
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per cent. The US scored 71.2 per cent, whereas 19.2 per cent of cinema admis­
sions were for domestic productions shown in their home markets (European 
Audiovisual Observatory 2003). Likewise, a mere eight per cent of European- 
made films were seen by more than one million EU-Europeans while 
sixty-one per cent of US films shown in Europe attracted an EU audience of 
one million or more (Commission 2003d: 40). The Union’s combined audio­
visual trade deficit with the US in 2002 was estimated at around 8.2 billion 
dollars (European Audiovisual Observatory 2002).
Yet despite the starkness of these figures and the intensity of its pleas, the 
Commission’s audiovisual policy achievements after the Maastricht Treaty 
have remained modest. On the audiovisual productions front there were no 
qualitative leaps but merely a continuation and expansion of existing initia­
tives. This is borne out by the new MEDIA programme which, as was shown, 
is still aimed largely at boosting the circulation of domestic audiovisual 
output throughout the Union?
Throughout the second part of the 1990s, repeated attempts by the 
European Parliament and the Commission to overcome these constraints ran 
into opposition from some member states, which had remained as strong as 
throughout the decade before. For example, in 1995 the Commission issued a 
proposal for a ‘European guarantee fund’ (Commission 1995d). It was to run 
parallel to the MEDIA programme and foster the development of fictional 
works -  mainly coproductions -  ‘with considerable European and interna­
tional market potential’ by providing credit guarantees. The proposal was 
approved unanimously by the European Parliament and (not surprisingly) 
welcomed by the audiovisual industry yet the Council refused to adopt it. The 
most vociferous objections came from the usual suspects, above all the UK, 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands (and, after it had joined the Union, also 
Sweden), but even many other governments were lukewarm at best. Then as 
now, a role for the EU in shaping audiovisual content -  however indirectly -  
has remained unacceptable to many national governments.
Similarly, the Union has not attempted to set up another multilingual 
pan-European television broadcaster along the lines of Europa TV. One 
partial exception is Euronews. It was established in January 1993 as a consor­
tium of (mostly public) broadcasters from several European countries and 
Egypt. Subsequently, the British ITN acquired a forty-nine per cent stake in 
its operating society, which was bought back in 2003 by the public consor­
tium that runs Euronews (see European Broadcasting Union 2003). Yet other 
than being multilingual with a pan-European reach, Euronews bears little 
resemblance to the failed pan-European broadcasters of the 1980s. In the first 
place, its programmes are limited to news and current affairs. Second, it does 
not, for the most part, attempt to repeat Europa TV’s failed strategy of seeking 
to cover national events from an elusive ‘European point of view’. Instead, the 
bulk of its news footage comes from the participating national broadcasters 
and Euronews then produces multilingual soundtracks to accompany it. In
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this sense, Euronews is a plurinationai rather than a non-national broad­
caster. The European Commission subsidises Euronews by running frequent 
‘infomercial’ type programmes that straddle the boundary between ‘citizen’s 
advice’ and blatant pro-Union PR, but otherwise does not use the channel to 
promote a ‘denationalised’ programming format. As have other parts of 
cultural policy, pan-European broadcasting, too, has become ‘PR-ised’ to an 
extent.
With initiatives to promote ‘denationalised’ pan-European television 
channels and audiovisual coproductions seemingly ruled out for the foresee­
able future, the latest innovations in EU audiovisual policy have largely been 
confined to a discursive level. There the Commission has come to treat audio­
visual policy -  in its technical as well as content-related aspects -  as a 
sub-sector of what it refers to as the ‘multimedia’ field, depicted to involve 
everything from the Internet to mobile phones and digital broadcasting. 
What is more, in the Commission’s rendering ‘multimedia’ in turn is but one 
dimension of the broader group of issues it bunches together under the 
heading of ‘information society1, which is defined so vaguely as to apply to 
almost every imaginable sphere of social, cultural and economic activity. By 
the late 1990s, ‘multimedia’, ‘information society’, ‘digitisation’ and ‘techno­
logical convergence’, along with ubiquitously invoked ‘networks’ and 
‘information gateways’ had all become buzzwords in official Commission 
rhetoric, liberally strewn across numerous reports, position, discussion and 
strategy papers.
Still on the level of Commission rhetoric, moreover, audiovisual policy 
has become largely ‘deculturalised’. On occasion the Commission still claims 
that the Union should devise audiovisual policies to foster ‘enhanced social 
solidarity’, promote the ‘dissemination of European cultural values’ and the 
like. But as these themes failed to make its audiovisual Europeanisation 
agenda more palatable to many member states, the Commission (and to a 
lesser diegree also the European Parliament) gradually abandoned them. 
Instead, the Commission has come to treat audiovisual policy primarily 
under economic and technological rather than cultural guises. Time and 
again, it stresses the economic stakes involved in the audiovisual sector and 
the supposed link between its ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ aspects, the latter 
encompassing areas such as new distribution techniques (mainly the 
Internet), digital broadcasting and high definition television (Commission 
1997c, 1994d; more recently Reading 2004; Commission 2001c, 1999c).
As for the cultural anti-Americanisation theme it, too, has lost its former 
place in Commission rhetoric. The Commission still makes frequent refer­
ence to the United States. However, rather than depicting the US as a cultural 
menace it now portrays it mainly as a technological competitor, together with 
Japan and other countries in Asia. For the Commission, the audiovisual 
‘struggle’ is now mainly about money rather than identity.
Yet just as the embrace of the ‘European culture’ and cultural anti-
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Americanisation themes in the early 1980s did not spawn effective measures 
to Europeanise the audiovisual sector, so the gradual abandonment of these 
themes a decade later had little impact either. In fact, the Commission may 
well have started to bow to the limits of the politically possible: it has not, as 
of late, tried to submit a new and farther-reaching audiovisual initiative to the 
member states, along the lines of its ill-fated proposals to support transna­
tional coproductions in the 1980s.
In sum, judged by the Union’s policy record to date, the Europeanisation 
and ‘defragmentation’ of the audiovisual productions sector is not a project 
that is in the process of building up momentum. On the contrary: efforts to 
implement such policies may well turn out to have been no more than a 
sustained but largely inconsequential episode that began in the early 1980s 
but started to run out of steam some two decades later. So, too, did pleas for 
the protection of ‘European culture’ against the United States.
Conclusion
The Union’s audiovisual record thus broadly mirrors that in other parts of 
culture. The Commission and the EP started out with ambitious proposals 
aimed at ‘denationalising’ audiovisual content and viewing habits through 
pan-European television channels and transnational coproductions. In part 
they were driven by the hope that this would foster a European identity in 
viewers and foster support for European integration. Yet these proposals 
either failed to materialise or, as with the European television channel, proved 
unsustainable. What followed in their wake were much more modest meas­
ures aimed at enhancing national audiovisual output and its circulation 
throughout the Union, mainly through the MEDIA programme. Measures of 
this type were relatively easy to swallow for even the most culturally protec­
tive member state governments: they did not interfere with national 
audiovisual content or with national audiovisual policies, and in fact comple­
mented what the latter had already been trying to achieve for many decades. 
By the end of 1990s the Commission (and to some extent also the EP) seemed 
to have bowed to the limits of the politically possible and abandoned their 
earlier aspirations to use audiovisual policy as tool to Europeanise mass audi­
ences.
How to explain the Union’s meagre audiovisual record? As in other parts 
of culture, national governments were clearly the main obstacles, and 
frequently their opposition extended beyond the usual suspects such as 
Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the UK. As was discussed in the last chapter, 
the Union’s weak legal mandate in culture (which did only marginally 
improve in the Maastricht Treaty) made it easy for national governments to 
block the Commission and the EP’s audiovisual proposals, allowing them to 
simply invoke the Union’s lack of legal competences rather than having to
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make their case on more substantive grounds.
All the while, the Commission and the EP once more employed a great 
deal of ingenuity and tactical skill in promoting their audiovisual agenda, 
above all by using an eclectic variety of discursive frames. Some sought to 
highlight the economic significance of the audiovisual sector and its link to 
issues such as technological competitiveness and the development of the 
‘information society’. Others stressed the fragile nature of public support for 
the EU and the potential of audiovisual measures to improve it. A third type 
centred on the cultural anti-Americanisation theme. The latter in particular 
seemed promising, and not just in the broader sense that, as argued in 
Chapters 1 and 2, the construction of political communities benefits from 
emphasising boundaries. In fact, it was uniquely suited to the audiovisual 
sector, given that Europe’s audiovisual trade deficit with the US was real and 
that cultural resentments against the United States were firmly entrenched 
among elites in many member states.
Yet while warnings against a ‘cultural colonialisation’ by the United 
States found some resonance in France and some southern member states, 
many others remained thoroughly unconvinced. In countries ranging from 
Denmark and Ireland to the Netherlands and the UK, such fears appeared 
grossly exaggerated if not downright weird. And for wider publics across the 
Union the anti-Americanisation argument was bound to be even less 
convincing, given that these very publics were avid consumers of American 
films and television programmes. In the end, even in France this theme could 
only get the EP and the Commission so far. While broad sections of the 
French elite (far beyond Jack Lang and the various Socialist governments 
during the period) were receptive to the ‘resistance to American cultural 
imperialism’ theme, their primary concern was for French culture and the 
French language, not for a concept of European culture, however defined. 
French cultural and language policy at the time clearly bore this out. In sum, 
the anti-Americanisation theme enjoyed some plausibility in some member 
states, but to serve as a viable rhetorical underpinning for ambitious and 
culturally intrusive audiovisual policy initiatives by the EU it was simply not 
plausible enough.
Much the same applied to the ‘European culture’ theme. It was the 
discursive flipside of the anti-Americanisation coin, and its use by the 
Commission and the EP represented in many ways a throwback to their early 
cultural initiatives of the 1970s and to the Tindemans and Adonnino reports. 
But this theme, too, enjoyed only limited appeal. In many member states, 
‘Brussels” insistence on defending ‘European culture’ could only be grist on 
the rhetorical mill of EU opponents who depicted the Union as an intrusive 
and manipulative entity determined to erode national identities and 
homogenise national cultures. Against this backdrop, the Commission was 
well advised to gradually drop the ‘European culture’ theme in the 1990s, 
especially after the Maastricht debate had revealed widespread anxieties
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regarding the effects of European integration on national cultures. In fact, 
along with other parts of culture and education, audiovisual policy is among 
the areas in which national publics are least willing to accept a Union involve­
ment (see the bi-annual Eurobarometer surveys; Theiler 1999a).
This chapter raises many more questions which go to the heart of the 
issues discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Most importantly, even if the Union had 
launched major initiatives to support transnational coproductions their likely 
impact is far from clear. Claims by the Commission and the EP that multina­
tional coproductions would cultivate ‘denationalised’ audiovisual formats are 
problematic, not least because they risk glossing over prevailing linguistic 
differences which are not liable to be easily ‘denationalised’. Perhaps, even a 
large-scale, sustained and aggressive sponsorship of multinational coproduc­
tions would not have caused a significant ‘denationalisation’ of audiovisual 
formats and viewing habits. But even if this had occurred, it would not neces­
sarily have led to a Europeanisation of political allegiances. As was suggested 
in Chapter 1, simply watching the same films and television programmes does 
not inevitably create overarching identifications or communal sentiments, 
just as using similar airports and shopping malls does not necessarily have 
such an effect either. The Commission and the EP’s confidence in the ability 
of television to shape political allegiances often smacked of the ‘hypodermic 
needle’ and ‘remote control’ conceptions of media impact to which few 
contemporary students of mass communication subscribe (see Chapter 2). 
More broadly, it reflected too uncritical a faith in the ability of technology to 
act as a European identity forger.
As for the pan-European television channel, had it survived it might 
conceivably have provided a state-transcending communicative forum for 
Europeans, facilitating the kind o f ‘bottom-up’ deliberative and interactional 
processes without which third-level legitimisation cannot materialise. But 
here, too, the mere ability to communicate does not ensure that communica­
tion actually takes place, much less its actual content and effect on those 
involved. At this point, then, one of the basic dilemmas that looms over the 
entire political symbolism project in the EU once more comes into view: as 
suggested in Chapters 1 and 2, effective political symbolism requires a 
conscious ‘top-down’ shaping of cultural content, at least during its initial 
stages. But the early twenty-first century liberal pluralist context within which 
the Union operates and which informs its own ethos makes interventionist 
policies of this kind very difficult to implement in the first place. The back­
lashes against the Commission’s ‘information and communication’ 
campaigns discussed in the last chapter (which, though arguably both manip­
ulative and ‘interventionist’ were hardly culturally homogenising) are a good 
example. Aggressive attempts to instrumentalise a pan-European television 
channel for political ends might well have elicited similar responses and 
thereby become self-defeating.
The concluding chapter explores these issues at greater length. In any
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case, because most audiovisual ‘denationalisation1 proposals were never 
implemented we cannot be sure what their impact would have been. If this 
chapter supports one clear conclusion, it is thus above all how strongly many 
member states and national publics alike continue to resist an EU involve­
ment in audiovisual policy, and how difficult it is for the Commission and the 
EP to overcome this resistance. As is shown in the next chapter, the Union’s 
experience in educational policy leads to very similar conclusions.
Notes
1 The most recent version of the TWF Directive is EP and Council (1997). Also see 
Collins (2002, 1995, 1994a, 1993a). On the world trade issue see Schlesinger (1997, 
1996).
2 The Swiss franc was used as Europa TV’s accounting unit because of its legal base in 
Geneva.
3 Audience reach refers to the number of viewers who can receive a given television 
channel; audience share pertains to the proportion of viewers that actually choose to 
watch it. Therefore, even if a channel’s audience share remains stable, its actual net 
audience grows as its reach increases.
4 Also, in 1997 the Union adopted a slightly amended version of the Television Without 
Frontiers Directive (Collins 2002; EP and Council 1997). It contained additional 
provisions on issues such as teleshopping, the protection of children and the right of 
reply. The famous ‘where practicable’ provision attached to TWF’s European content 
provision, however, was left intact. While the French government had lobbied hard to 
erase the escape clause from the directive, this stumbled over resistance led by the UK.
5
The ‘European dimension’ in schools
Unlike cultural policy where the Community had no powers under its found­
ing treaties, the situation in education was less clear-cut. Potentially, the 
Community could become implicated in those aspects of educational policy 
that touched on its broadly defined economic mandate. These included vo­
cational training (Article 128 EEC), the Community-wide recognition of 
educational and professional qualifications (Article 57 EEC) and, on a more 
limited scale, the promotion of some types of scientific research (Articles 7 
and 9 EURATOM). In addition, according to some interpretations there was 
again the potential for involving the Community in educational domains 
beyond those mentioned in the founding treaties by resorting to Article 235 
of the EEC Treaty. As discussed in Chapter 3, however, the extent to which 
Article 235 lent itself as an alternative legal foundation was disputed.
During the Community’s first decade and a half of existence, neither the 
European Commission, the European Parliament nor any of the member 
states challenged its legal limitations in education. The few educational initia­
tives launched in this period were strictly confined to vocational training and 
the mutual recognition of educational qualifications and they were justified 
with economic arguments rather than with the desire to use education as a 
tool to strengthen popular support for European integration (e.g. Council 
1963; also Hölzle 1994; Müller-Solger, Czysz, Leonhard and Pfaff 1993; Peege 
1973).
It was not until the early 1970s that the Commission made its first 
cautious forays into ‘general’ (as opposed to vocational) education. Like 
parallel attempts to implicate the Community in culture as discussed in 
Chapter 3, this occurred against the backdrop of what many inside the 
Commission and beyond held to be a growing public alienation from the 
integrative process. And driving it was a belief that mass education in general 
and school curricula in particular could be instrumentalised to cultivate a
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European identity in national publics and shore up support for integration. 
However, reflecting the expected sensitivity of the issue and the
Community’s lack of legal competences in ‘general’ education, the 
Commission proceeded very cautiously. In July 1972, it appointed an advi­
sory panel chaired by the former Belgian educational minister Henri Janne 
and composed of eminent academics including Carl Friedrich von 
Weizsäcker, Hendrik Brugmans, Jan Tinbergen and Alfred Grosser. The panel 
received the task of defining a set of fundamental objectives that were to guide 
the Community’s educational activities in the future. It released its report in 
February 1973 (Field 1998: 29-31; Commission 1973).
From the Janne Report to the action programme
The official title of what is commonly referred to as the Janne Report is For a 
Community Policy on Education, and the report’s title encapsulates its 
content much of it centres on the attempt to devise potential rationales for 
why the Community’s educational involvement should be extended beyond 
vocational education and diploma recognition. The report put forward two 
main arguments. First, it claimed that ‘the economic (and therefore “profes­
sional” [i.e. vocational]) needs for training are not separable from the 
education system in general’. As the Community was tackling the former 
already, the latter allegedly could (and thus, according to the somewhat 
eccentric logic that marked the Janne Report’s chain of reasoning, should} no 
longer be kept completely beyond its reach. Second, however, for the Janne 
committee a Community involvement in ‘general’ education was not just 
logical-cum-inevitable but it was also necessary. It was required to, among 
other things, add a ‘European dimension’ to the educational experience of 
young Europeans and thereby help them develop ‘positive attitudes with 
regard to Europe’:
The Europeans’ feeling o f political, social and cultural belonging can no longer 
be exclusively national if a part of the attributes o f the nation-state has been 
tested in the Community: the territory in as far as the frontiers disappear, the 
transfers of powers of decision to supranational bodies, the supranational juris­
dictions, the right o f establishment of foreigners, etc. This being so, is it possible 
to escape from  the idea that education should comprise a European dimension 
wherever this is possible?
The Janne R eport then  identified a range o f elem ents th a t should constitute 
this ‘E uropean d im ension’. They included:
(i) insertion into teaching practices o f a suitable proportion of examples and 
illustrations as well as reading texts . . .  tending to increase knowledge of Europe 
and the other peoples which are members of the Community, (ii) Continuation 
o f the ‘correction’ of history textbooks with a view to expurging or amending na­
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tionalistic, biased passages o r those o f a kind which would create hostile or erro­
neous judgem ents;. . .  (iv) Use of geography to transcend national frontiers and 
to m ark the relative nature o f the differences and similarities o f hum an groups; 
positive influences o f the frontier regions; (v) Creation of linguistics teaching, 
throwing light in particular on the com m on structures of the European lan­
guages; (vi) Prudent and gradual teaching o f European ‘civics’ to be based mainly 
on Com m unity practices and institutions, on pluralism and on democracy; (vii) 
Examination o f the opportuneness o f creating an ‘agency1 at [the] Com m unity 
level to produce (or to  prom ote the production of) didactic equ ipm ent. . .  with a 
view to supplying teaching establishments . . .  with instrum ents o f study o f high 
pedagogic quality and creating or strengthening positive and well-informed atti­
tudes with regard to Europe.
The Janne Report further recommended the promotion of foreign language 
learning and measures to enhance student and teacher mobility. Finally, it 
advocated the creation of a Community ‘cultural and educational commit­
tee’, and the drafting of a European charter of education as a ‘framework for 
the whole of educational thought in our region of the world ..
Although the Janne Report was advisory only it represented an important 
initial step in what became the Commission’s protracted fight on behalf of the 
‘European dimension’ in schools. The most important factor was its timing, 
as its release virtually coincided with the ‘Declaration on European identity1 
at the Copenhagen Summit as discussed in Chapter 3. This meant that those 
who championed a greater educational role for the Community -  above all 
the Commission itself -  could construe the Janne Report as merely one step 
towards translating existing verbal commitments by the member states into 
concrete policies. For much the same reason, even those national govern­
ments that had gone along with the Copenhagen Declaration in the 
expectation that no concrete actions would ensue were now in a poor posi­
tion to reject the Janne Report out of hand.
Furthermore, the release of the Janne Report roughly coincided with a 
redistribution of responsibility for the educational portfolio within the 
Commission, which boosted its determination and -  on the face of it -  its 
ability to advance the educational agenda outlined in the report. In 1973, the 
Commission created a new Directorate for Education and Training integrated 
within the equally new Directorate-General for Research, Science and Edu­
cation (DG XII) (General Report 1973: 320-321). The new
Directorate-General became headed by the (then) German Commissioner 
Ralf Dahrendorf, who is widely noted for his enthusiasm in translating the 
Janne Report’s educational wishlist into concrete policy initiatives with which 
to confront the Council and the individual member states. According to one 
former high-ranking Commission official, had it not been for Dahrendorfs 
arrival the Janne Report might well have faded into obscurity, and the 
Commission might well have failed to develop an agenda in ‘general’ educa­
tion until well into the 1980s (interview, February 2001).
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A few months after Dahrendorfs taking charge of the education portfo­
lio, the Commission issued an initial draft for a Community action 
programme in education, titled ‘Education in the European Community 
(Commission 1974a) which largely repeated the ‘European dimension’- 
related recommendations in the Janne Report. These were affirmed once 
more in a draft resolution for ‘Cooperation in the field of education* which 
the Commission submitted to the Council shortly thereafter (Commission 
1974b). Yet despite the Commission’s cautious way of proceeding it soon ran 
up against strong resistance from some member states. In fact, when the 
national educational ministers met under their habitual ‘mixed’ formula of 
the ‘Council and the ministers of education meeting within the Council’ (the 
same formula later used in culture)1 to debate the draft resolution, they failed 
to adopt it. Instead, they referred the issue to a newly created ‘education 
committee’. It was composed of representatives from the Commission and 
national education ministries and was to draw up a blueprint for a compre­
hensive Community action programme in education (Neave 1984: 13-15). 
The committee reported to the education ministers in 1975, and an ‘action 
programme’ in education was passed in February 1976 (Council 1976; also 
Field 1998: 31-33; Maaß 1978).
The action programme contained a wide range of provisions, touching 
on areas such as the schooling of immigrant and ‘guest worker’ children, 
equal opportunities in higher education, language teaching, exchange visits 
for educational administrators, networking between educational institutions 
and, once more, the mutual recognition of educational qualifications. Yet as 
far as the ‘European dimension’ in school curricula was concerned it was a 
major disappointment for the Commission. Almost all of its initial proposals 
on the subject (and by extension those in the Janne Report) had vanished 
from the action programme -  so much so that the ‘European dimension’ in 
school curricula did not even receive its own heading. Instead, it was sub­
sumed under the title ‘promotion of closer relations between educational 
systems in Europe’. There the action programme stipulated that ‘in order to 
give a European dimension to the experience of teachers and pupils in 
primary and secondary schools in the Community’, the member states (and 
not the Community itself) should
prom ote and organise short study visits and exchanges for teachers, with special 
emphasis on student language teachers; development o f the national information 
and advisory services necessary to prom ote the mobility and interchange of 
pupils and teachers w ithin the Community; contacts between the authorities of 
establishments concerned with teacher training; educational activities with a 
European content.
There were no further guidelines on what these ‘educational activities with a 
European content’ (or, for that matter, the ‘European content’ itself) should 
consist of.
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For the Commission this was all the more painful as the overall impor­
tance of the action programme was considerable. Never before had the 
education ministers been able to agree on a similarly comprehensive and far- 
reaching declaration of intent regarding the Community’s educational role, 
and its approval by the ministers ‘brought to a close the protracted and often 
difficult quest to find a basis for cooperation in education. It se t.. .  down the 
areas in which such cooperation should concentrate and develop’ (Neave 
1984: 11; also Field 1998: 32-33; Winter 1980). For many years to come, 
almost every educational initiative by the Community relied heavily on the 
action programme, both in rhetoric and substance. Yet it was precisely the 
role of the action programme in defining those areas of educational policy in 
which some Community involvement would be broadly acceptable to the 
member states which renders the almost complete absence of the ‘European 
dimension’ in school curricula among these areas so significant. It turned the 
action programme into a clear setback for the Commission in its efforts to 
make the introduction of ‘European content’ into national school curricula a 
pillar of its educational involvement.
After the action programme had been passed, the Commission and the 
EP both continued to lobby on behalf of the ‘European dimension’ in school 
curricula but the earlier momentum had been lost. A Commission initiative 
in 1978 entitled ‘Educational Activities with a European Content: The Study 
of the European Community in Schools’ (Commission 1978) largely reiter­
ated the recommendations in the Janne Report. It was accompanied by a 
country-by-country survey which highlighted the large-scale absence of 
‘European content’ from national school curricula and the alleged danger this 
posed to the Community’s long-term development. But this initiative, too, 
elicited strong resistance from some member states, which became so strong 
that the ‘Council and the ministers of education meeting within the Council’ 
did not meet for the next three years. The most vociferous opponents were 
Denmark and France. As in cultural policy, they invoked the Community’s 
lack of legal powers in ‘general’ education and now even argued that the 
‘mixed’ formula ‘Council and the ministers of education meeting within the 
Council’ carried too strong an allusion to Community competences where 
none in fact existed. At the same time, such objections enjoyed the more or 
less tacit support of other member states. These included the UK (especially 
after the Thatcher government had come to power) and Germany which was 
driven by the habitual Länder fears of a Community encroachment into their 
constitutional prerogatives which include education (Janssen 1981: 213; 
Schmitz-Wenzel 1980; Rübsamen 1978).
If anything the cause of the ‘European dimension’ in schools lost further 
momentum by a partial reversal of the administrative reforms of 1973 inside 
the Commission. Effective from January 1981, the education portfolio moved 
from the Directorate-General XII into DG V (Employment and Social Af­
fairs). This represented a setback to attempts spearheaded by Commissioner
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Dahrendorf in the 1970s to develop education into a field of Community 
activity in its own right instead of treating it as a mere auxiliary instrument to 
help the Community achieve its economic objectives (Janssen 1982:267)* The 
broader implications of this were clear: while a Community involvement in 
education for economic ends was now broadly acceptable, attempts to in­
strumentalise education for symbolic and identity-related purposes were not. 
It was only with the Adonnino Report in the mid-1980s that the ‘European 
dimension’ in school curricula received a new impetus.
From the Adonnino Report to the Maastricht Treaty
As was shown in Chapter 3, the Adonnino Committee (formally named 
‘Committee on a People’s Europe’) was appointed at the Fontainebleau Summit 
and instructed to work out a strategy by which the Community could enhance 
its symbolic presence in the lives of its citizens and attract greater popular 
support (Bulletin 1984 [No. 6]: point 1.1.9 [subheading 6]). To some extent the 
Adonnino Report was a consolation prize for the European Parliament, the 
Commission and the more culture and education-ambitious member states, 
compensating them for the likely absence of those two policy areas from the 
upcoming Single European Act. To some extent it also reflected a desire on the 
part of many member state governments to ensure popular acceptance of the 
Single Market programme, not least under the impression of a disappointingly 
low turnout for the European Parliament elections in June 1984.
The first of the two Adonnino reports did not touch on education other 
than to demand the better mutual recognition of educational and profes­
sional qualifications under the rubric entitled ‘Community citizen’s rights’. 
The second report, by contrast, dealt much more extensively with education, 
under the title ‘Youth, education, exchanges and sport’ (both reports in ‘A 
People’s Europe’ 1985). As in culture, Adonnino’s educational proposals fell 
into two broad categories. The majority covered the already familiar terrain 
ranging from the promotion of language learning to school and youth 
exchanges and pan-European youth camps. A second category of proposals, 
by contrast, fell under the heading of the ‘European image in education’. It 
included
(i) the creation by each M ember State, wherever this has not yet been done, of 
centres whose task . . .  it would be to facilitate the work of schools and teachers 
and inform and help them  from  an educational viewpoint; (ii) the preparation 
and availability of appropriate school books and teaching materials; (iii) 
confirming 9 M ay of each year Europe Day with a view to creating awareness and 
giving inform ation in schools in particular as well as on  television and in the 
other media. . . . ;  (iv) the setting-up of a Centre displaying European achieve­
ments, and the com m on heritage, backed up by a collection of docum ents and 
works relating thereto.
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It is difficult to establish a direct link between the Adonnino Report and the 
launch of concrete educational initiatives shortly thereafter. After all, 
Adonnino’s recommendations were not binding and, as shown in Chapter 3, 
their wider reception was far from unanimously enthusiastic. Even so, just as 
in cultural policy several factors strengthened the Commission and the EP’s 
educational clout in the immediate post-Adonnino period. This included the 
accession in the early- to-mid-1980s of Greece, Spain and Portugal whose 
governments were generally more open to involving the Community in 
cultural and educational policy, and whose nationals helped boost staffing 
levels in the Commission’s culture and education departments. Moreover, 
Adonnino’s central claim that cultural and educational measures could help 
the upcoming Single Market programme succeed was bound to resonate 
favourably in some national capitals. In the 1970s, the Commission’s argu­
ment that European identity-enhancing measures were needed to lift the 
Community out of its stagnation could do little to convince national govern­
ments which were ultimately responsible for this stagnation; in the 1980s, by 
contrast, such measures could be depicted as part of an effort to ensure the 
success of a wider economic and political agenda to which the member states 
had already committed themselves in principle. At the very least, by formally 
accepting the educational recommendations in the Adonnino Report 
national governments increased the accumulated weight of their commit­
ments for a ‘European dimension’ in education. This in turn could only 
encourage the Commission and the EP to step up their push for tangible poli­
cies in this field and made it more difficult for sceptical member states to 
reject them out of hand.
And it was indeed in the immediate post-Adonnino era that the 
Community made its most significant forays into ‘general’ education to date, 
launching three initiatives which -  albeit under changing titles and formats -  
have formed the backbone of its educational agenda until the present day: 
Erasmus, Lingua, and Youth for Europe.
The chronologically first and most expensive of these was the Erasmus 
programme (Council 1987c). First adopted in 1987, Erasmus’ core objective 
is to enable university students to pursue part of their studies in another 
member state through mobility grants and exchange agreements between 
universities. As is shown below, in 1995 Erasmus became part of the new 
Socrates programme and experienced significant increases in funding.
The Lingua programme was initiated in 1989 and sought to promote the 
learning and teaching of Community languages (Council 1989). It supported 
students and pupils wishing to learn the language of another member state on 
location, as well as language teaching in the context of vocational and techni­
cal education. Lingua, too, was later subsumed into the Socrates programme 
and its funding rose significantly.
Youth for Europe (Council 1988a), finally, also had as its core objective 
to foster the movement of people across borders through youth exchanges of
n y
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various kinds and periods of duration. Exchanges deemed to ‘make young 
people aware of the European dimension’ (for example by being multi- rather 
than merely bilateral), and those involving participants from underprivileged 
backgrounds received priority. In subsequent years, Youth for Europe, too, 
was renewed and its funding increased significantly.
All three initiatives were controversial and their drafting was mired in 
numerous quarrels and legal challenges pertaining to their funding, legal 
foundations and implementation rules. In particular, given the Community1 s 
continued lack of legal powers in ‘general’ education at the time they had to 
be based in part on Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, subjecting them to the 
unanimity requirement in the Council (Blanke 1994: 57). In addition, apart 
from accepting much lower funding levels than it had originally demanded 
for all three programmes, the Commission made several substantive conces­
sions- First, national authorities received a key role in implementing the three 
programmes. Second, with the very limited exception of Lingua they did not 
seek to affect curricular content, much less infuse European symbolism into 
school curricula. Instead, their key objective echoed that of the various 
cultural programmes passed almost simultaneously: to promote transna­
tional mobility and communication and therefore to make Europeans from 
different member states more visible to and more knowledgeable of each 
other. Though the Community had managed to involve itself in ‘general’ 
education at last, this involvement, too, had become thoroughly ‘horizon- 
talised’. Finally none of the three initiatives had a direct bearing on 
elementary schooling. In devising Lingua, the Commission had originally 
planned a comprehensive Community language programme that would have 
covered elementary and secondary schools, vocational training and adult 
education. Yet upon the insistence of notably Germany and the UK, all refer­
ences to elementary schooling were dropped. And it was left to each member 
state to decide whether it wanted to extend Lingua into secondary education 
(Janssen 1989: 195).
Erasmus and Lingua both benefited from a measure of interest group 
pressure on their behalf. One Commission official singles out the role of the 
Confederation of British Industry, which had good links to some high- 
ranking members of the Commission as well as to ministers in the Thatcher 
government and which championed the two programmes as a cost-effective 
way of addressing a dearth of foreign language skills among the British work­
force. The official insists that the CBI’s stance was decisive in preventing a 
British veto (interview European Commission, September 2000).
In addition, at a European level Erasmus was supported notably by the 
European Round Table of Industrialists as well as by the European Council of 
Rectors, although they supported it for different reasons. Employers were 
after a net increase in student mobility in order to improve language skills and 
‘cross cultural competences’, whereas higher education institutions saw in 
Erasmus a way of managing intra-Community student flows. This became a
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more pressing issue after some of the traditional obstacles to transnational 
student mobility (such as differential student fees, difficulties in obtaining 
residence permits and the imperfect transnational recognition of educational 
qualifications) had been reduced through a mixture of ECJ rulings and Single 
Market-related decisions in the 1980s. The desire to curtail student inflows 
from other parts of the Community was especially strong among British 
universities. Largely due to the language factor these were attractive to 
Continental students but generally preferred fee-paying students from coun­
tries outside the Community (Hackl 2001; Shaw 1999; Field 1998: 36)?
Youth for Europe, for its part, also benefited from the Commission’s skill 
in political framing. When drawing up the programme the Commission 
shrewdly avoided any allusions to formal education. Instead, it advanced it as 
a ‘youth measure’, thereby locating it in a policy domain that was less 
contested than education (Janssen 1987: 218-219). Most importantly, the 
policy area which in some Continental member states is referred to as ‘youth 
policy’ (sometimes looked after by ‘youth ministries’) has no real formal 
equivalent in the UK. This made it harder for the Thatcher government to 
argue that Youth for Europe encroached upon a national policy domain and 
thereby preempted a great deal of potential resistance to the programme 
(interview European Commission, September 2000).
Yet when it came to the Adonnino Report’s push for a ‘European dimen­
sion’ in school curricula these factors did not apply and, accordingly, progress 
was much slower. After ferocious lobbying by the Commission and the EP 
and various drafting stages, (e.g. Social Europe 1988 [Supplement No. 5]: 
23-24; Council 1987b [1985]), the education ministers adopted a new reso­
lution on the issue in 1988 (Council 1988b) whose content largely reflected 
the Adonnino Report. Its declared objective was to ‘strengthen in young 
people a sense of European identity and make clear to them the value of 
European civilisation and of the foundations on which the European peoples 
intend to base their development today . . . ’ through a series of ‘concerted 
measures’. The member states pledged, ‘within the limits of their own specific 
educational policies and structures’ to, among other things, ‘include the 
European dimension explicitly in their school curricula in all appropriate 
disciplines, for example literature, languages, history, geography, social sci­
ences, economics and the arts’. They also promised to organise seminars on 
the subject and encourage ‘school twinnings’, the formation of ‘European 
clubs’ in schools, educational activities as part of Europe Day (9 May) and 
transnational cooperation in school sports. For its part, the Commission was 
to ‘examine the possibilities’ of using ‘European dimension’-related audiovi­
sual material in schools, promote the exchange of information between 
educational authorities and carry out ‘comparative analysis’.
Overall the 1988 resolution had little impact (see the survey below). What 
tangible measures it produced at the time revolved around the odd pilot 
programme in teacher training and curricular development, as well as numer­
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ous conferences, colloquia and seminars that attracted little public attention 
beyond the narrow ranks of educationalists, academics, and education 
ministry officials who frequented the Community-sponsored conference cir­
cuit? Moreover, by the early 1990s even the Commission itself had become 
more muted on the ‘European dimension’ in school curricula, with most of 
its educational reports, memoranda and discussion papers released in antici­
pation of the Single Market deadline at the end of 1992 preoccupied with 
social and economic rather than political and identity-related issues (e.g. 
Commission 1991a, 1991b). All the same, there was one notable exception to 
the Commission’s general restraint at the time, which was its attempt to 
sponsor a pan-European history textbook. Together with Europa TV, the 
history textbook was one of its boldest political symbolism initiatives to date, 
but in the end turned out to be one of its most spectacular failures.
The European history textbook
The European history textbook originated with an umbrella project launched 
by the Franco-British-Norwegian industrialist Frederic Delouche, which the 
Commission began to support in the late 1980s. The first stage of the project 
was to entail the production of a 500-page survey of European history written 
for a general audience; the second the book’s adoption into a television series; 
and the third the production of a European history survey for use as a 
prescribed text in schools throughout the Community (see Davies 1996: 
43-44).
The European history book for a general audience had as its chief author 
the historian Jean Baptiste Duroselle who was assisted by a multinational 
panel of advisors. It was published in 1990 under the title Europe: A History of 
its Peoples (Duroselle 1990). The volume’s objective as spelled out in its intro­
duction was to compile ‘for the general reader a one-volume history of 
Europe, set in overall European as opposed to national perspective’. Such an 
account would overcome the lingering national biases which according to the 
authors overshadowed traditional national historiography. By extension, it 
would bring home to its readers Europe’s presumed underlying social and 
cultural unity and the necessity to speed up political unification. And indeed, 
in every regard the narrative that unfolded on the subsequent 500 pages or so 
sought to live up to these aims:
Chapter One opens with the rape of the Greek Goddess ‘Europa’, and proceeds 
to discuss the geographical complexity and uniqueness of the continent ... 
Chapter Three describes the Celts and Teutons as the first Indo-Europeans. 
Chapter Four proceeds under the heading ‘Classical A ntiquity  Greek Wisdom, 
Roman G randeur’. Chapter Five (‘the First Four Centuries AD in the West’) is 
devoted exclusively to the expansion o f Christianity. Chapter Seven is a lengthy 
discussion of whether Charlemagne’s empire marks the ‘beginnings of Europe’. 
Chapter Eight (‘Europe under Siege’) opens with a vivid image o f banner-waving 
Saracens on horseback -  ‘European civilisation’ thus being equated unequivo-
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cally as Christendom defending itself against the resurgent forces o f Islam. The 
book continues in a similar vein until Chapter Seventeen (‘The Road to European 
Disaster’) which deals with nationalism, Chapter Eighteen (‘Europe Destroys 
itself) and finally Chapter Nineteen, ‘Europe’s Recovery and Resurgent 
Hopes’, which focuses on the ‘makers o f Europe’ and the ‘building of Europe in 
the face of Gaullism’. [Overall) European history is presented as a gradual 
coming together: a moral success story o f reason and unity trium phing over 
disunity and nationalism. (Shore 1996: 485—486)
Most reviews of the European history book were scathing. One critic de­
nounced it as ‘history in the service of an idea’ and likened it to Soviet-bloc 
historiography (Zamoyski 1988: 13). Another, alluding to the book’s defini­
tion of Europe as limited to the then-EC-Twelve plus Scandinavia, Austria 
and Switzerland, accused it of peddling ‘half-truths about half of Europe’ 
(Nicholas 1991: 22). The strongest protests, however, came from Greece. 
Many critics there took exception to Duroselle’s alleged lack of regard for the 
contributions of ancient Greece and Byzantium to European history, and for 
Greek and Slavic cultures in his discussion o f ‘the ancient peoples of Europe’. 
Several Greek MEPs lodged stern protests with the Commission, as did the 
Archbishop of Athens. Some Greek commentators likened the Euro-history 
book to the Satanic Verses (Davies 1996: 43).
Taken aback by such criticism and by a barrage of media ridicule, the 
Commission distanced itself from the European history enterprise and 
stopped funding it? Nonetheless, the schoolbook project survived, thanks to 
the continued support by Delouche, the French Hachette publishing house as 
well as translation grants from a private German foundation and the French 
ministry of culture.
The didactic volume, co-produced by twelve authors from eleven 
member states plus Czechoslovakia (Delouche 1993), was completed in 1992 
and eventually published in sixteen languages, after it had struggled to find a 
publisher in Britain (Nundy 1992: 15). Prior to this, various drafts had 
provoked extended quarrelling between the different co-authors and under­
gone various ‘corrections’. For example, a ‘French account of “the Barbarian 
Invasions” was changed to “the Germanic Invasions”. A Spanish description 
of Sir Francis Drake as a “pirate” was overruled. A picture of General de 
Gaulle among the portraits on the cover was replaced by one of Queen 
Victoria’ (Davies 1996: 44; also Nundy 1992).
In any event, in the end the book’s initiators had to compromise on their 
two most central objectives. First, they did not achieve a completely 
homogenised European format: the different language versions of the text 
display substantial differences in content and interpretation (Hörner 1996: 
28). Second, in light of the looming refusal by most national education 
authorities to approve the European history book for school use (which 
seemed almost a foregone conclusion, especially after the adverse publicity it 
had generated), its authors were forced to compromise even on that issue.
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In the introduction to the German language edition they concede that their 
work does not satisfy ‘the narrow criteria for authorisation’ as a school text­
book and should thus be seen as a ‘prototype’ of sorts which would hopefully 
appeal to a more general public.5 The foreword to the English language 
edition does not even mention the authors’ initial intention of producing a 
textbook. Thus re-targeted at a general audience, the would-be textbook 
could at the most hope to duplicate the Duroselle volume published two years 
earlier to which at any rate it bears strong resemblance.
Not surprisingly, the European history textbook saga has not left 
Commission officials with fond memories. Comparing it to Europa TV, they 
view it as an embarrassment they are determined not to repeat. All the while, 
it remains unclear who exactly decided to associate the Commission with the 
project in the first place. The sponsorship decision was made without formal 
involvement by national education ministries. Some suggest that a link 
between Delouche and an extremely high-ranking Commission official at the 
time might have played a role, while others speculate that the Commission 
might have given in to informal pressure by the French government whose 
own culture ministry helped sponsor the project (interviews European 
Commission, September 2000),
Whatever the case, there are strong parallels between the attempted 
European history textbook and Europa TV -  parallels that go beyond the fact 
that both projects ultimately floundered and earned the Commission wide­
spread criticism and embarrassment. In the first place, both Europa TV and 
the textbook saga bear out the risks to which the Commission exposes itself 
by leaping ahead with a ‘European dimension’-related project that many 
consider overly ambitious at best and blatantly propagandist and manipula­
tive at worst. Whatever the intrinsic merits of these projects, the adverse 
coverage they attracted sealed their fate. Moreover, both projects highlight 
the dangers the Commission faces by associating itself with cultural and 
educational projects over whose implementation it has only limited control. 
The lack of formal Council involvement in the Commission’s decision to 
support the European history project proved a mixed blessing. While it prob­
ably enabled the Commission to go ahead with it in the first place it also 
meant that its officials had to weather the ensuing barrage of criticism all by 
themselves. Its hasty withdrawal from the project was justified on pragmatic 
grounds but it was also a sign of its vulnerability and lack of support over the 
issue.
Beyond this, the failures of Europa TV and the would-be European 
history textbook both point to a deeper problem that lingers over the entire 
gamut of European identity and ‘European dimension’ projects in culture, 
audiovisual policy and education. As was suggested, even if projects with a 
consciously designed ‘European dimension’ manage to be produced in defi­
ance of the many legal and political obstacles that usually stand in their way, 
it is far from self-evident what this ‘European dimension’ should consist of,
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let alone that it will actually be ‘absorbed’ by its intended recipients. 
Ultimately, covering European history from a ‘non-national’ point of view 
proved as elusive as Europa TV’s ‘non-national’ programming format. As the 
concluding chapter argues, constructing the ‘European dimension’ in a way 
that -  inevitably -  national publics can relate to might well pose the greatest 
challenge to the EU’s political symbolism project in culture, education and 
beyond.
Education in the Maastricht Treaty
As was the case with cultural policy and for similar reasons, the period leading 
up to the Maastricht Treaty saw a relatively widespread expectation that 
‘general’ education would be included in the range of new Community 
competences (e.g. Witte 1991:196). Yet the member states were again divided 
on the issue. Some, not surprisingly coalescing around Denmark and the UK, 
opposed giving the Community even a very limited mandate in the field. 
Other (mainly southern) member states were willing to accept a relatively 
broad Community mandate in ‘general’ education, akin to what it already 
enjoyed in vocational education. The German government, finally, again had 
two main objectives. On the one hand, it wanted to place those educational 
programmes that were already in force on a more solid legal foundation. On 
the other hand, driven in part by the habitual Länder fears, it wanted to limit 
the kinds of programmes which the Union could launch in ‘general’ educa­
tion, and especially those that would extend beyond mere educational 
exchanges (Blanke 1994). As in cultural policy it was again the German posi­
tion which broadly won out.
Three separate passages in the Maastricht Treaty (which were left 
unchanged in the subsequent Amsterdam Treaty) allude to education. Part 
One of the treaty, titled ‘Principles’, features the aforementioned Article 3p 
(3q Amsterdam). It stipulates that the Community should make ‘a contri­
bution to education and training of quality and to the flowering of the 
cultures of the Member States’. As was argued, the legal standing of Article 3p 
is ambiguous, but it has potential significance as an ‘interpretative clause’ for 
the more specific cultural and educational articles in the treaty.
Article 127 of the Maastricht Treaty (Article 150 Amsterdam) pertains to 
vocational education. As was shown, in this field the Community had already 
enjoyed some powers under the Rome Treaties and the Maastricht Treaty 
further expanded them. It authorises the Community to ‘implement a vo­
cational training policy which shall support and supplement the action of the 
Member States’ in areas such as vocational training and the reintegration of 
unemployed people into the labour market. Decisions under Article 127 are 
subjected to the co-decision procedure as spelled out in Article 189b of the 
Maastricht Treaty (Article 251 Amsterdam), and again exclude ‘any harmon­
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isation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’. At the same time, 
Article 127 is relatively far-reaching. It authorises the Community to ‘imple­
ment a policy’ rather than merely to enact ‘incentive measures’ and issue 
recommendations. Moreover, once adopted policies in vocational education 
are legally binding (Blanke 1994: 66-67).
Yet it is the Maastricht T reat/s  implications for non-vocational -  i.e. 
‘general’ -  education that are of primary interest in the present context. Here 
the treaty contains a new Article 126 (Article 149 Amsterdam) which gives the 
Union a limited legal standing in ‘general’ education (as well as in the adja­
cent area o f ‘youth policy1) for the first time.
The Com m unity shall contribute to the development o f quality education by en­
couraging cooperation between M ember States and, if necessary, by supporting 
and supplem enting their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the 
M ember States for the content o f teaching and the organisation o f education sys­
tems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.
Such Community action, according to the treaty, should be aimed at
developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the 
teaching and dissemination of the languages of the M ember States; encouraging 
mobility o f students and teachers, inter alia by encouraging the academic 
recognition o f diplomas and periods of study; prom oting cooperation between 
educational establishments; developing exchanges o f inform ation and experience 
on issues com m on to  the education systems o f the M ember States; encouraging 
the development o f youth exchanges and o f exchanges o f socio-educational 
instructors; encouraging the development of distance education.
In addition, the Community may foster educational cooperation with third 
countries and international organisations, especially the Council of Europe. 
As in culture, decisions under Article 126 are subject to the co-decision proce­
dure as outlined under Article 189b as well as to the subsidiarity principle.
As far as the ‘European dimension’ in school curricula is concerned 
Article 126 has only modest implications at best. First, the possible areas of 
Community action it enumerates are almost exclusively concerned with 
fostering the mobility of students and teachers but do not include educational 
content of any kind. In this sense, Article 126 stays well behind even the edu­
cational action programme of 1976 (Janssen 1992: 202). As with cultural 
policy, legal experts disagree on whether the list of educational measures 
contained in Article 126 is exemplary or exhaustive (Blanke 1994:69-70). But 
even if it were deemed to be merely exemplary, any curriculum-related initia­
tive in the Community could at the most be of a ‘soft’ and non-binding type, 
rather like the many resolutions and declarations drafted in the past. And this 
is not only due to the ‘while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member 
States for the content of teaching’ clause, but above all because the same 
article does not give the Union any competences in ‘general’ education of a 
kind that would enable it to define and enforce binding standards. Instead, it
uiiwxjzvoi urv irv olhuulo x-ä/
stipulates that the Council 'shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’ (emphasis 
added). In addition, the Council may issue recommendations. As was argued, 
these terms are ambiguous. Nonetheless, just as in culture the setting of 
legally enforceable standards is not permitted under Article 126 of the Maas­
tricht Treaty, even if they were deemed to be of a ‘non-harmonising’ kind.
In sum, under the Maastricht Treaty the Community’s role in ‘general’ 
education is one of encouraging educational cooperation between the 
member states. Depending on which legal interpretation one follows, this 
could potentially include the promotion of legally non-binding agreements 
on curriculum design. But these areas remain under the exclusive control of 
the member states and, as in culture, the Community lacks legal powers of 
enforcement (Blanke 1994; Bekemans and Balodimos 1992).
By designing the educational provisions of the Maastricht Treaty in the 
way they did the member states managed once more to reconcile a host of 
different and at first glance contradictory objectives. On the one hand, they 
gave the Community a legal mandate in ‘general’ education for the first time. 
This went some ways towards accommodating demands by the EP and the 
Commission and conformed to the Maastricht Treaty’s declared purpose of 
taking the Community beyond the status of a purely economic entity. It also 
helped place those educational policies already in force on a more solid legal 
basis. Yet on the other hand, the Maastricht Treaty contains powerful safe­
guards to ensure that any amendment to or extension of these existing 
initiatives must stay within very narrow parameters. In particular, it excludes 
any supranational challenge to the member states’ monopoly over educa­
tional content.
One of the earliest repercussions of the Maastricht Treaty for educational 
policy was at an administrative level. In 1995, education once again received 
a fully-fledged Directorate-General for ‘Education, Training and Youth’6 (DG 
XXII) placed under the auspices of Commissioner Edith Cresson, the former 
French Socialist prime minister. This administrative upgrading reflected the 
Union’s expanded competences in vocational and first-time formal mandate 
in ‘general’ education. It also anticipated an increase in funding and organi­
sational complexity of some educational programmes in preparation at the 
time.
Cresson’s arrival provoked mixed feelings among her new subordinates. 
Some saw her as poorly briefed, heavily dependent on her advisers and 
lacking the necessary skills to compile and push through new policy initia­
tives. Yet at the same time Cresson was energetic and well connected and 
seemed more strongly committed to expanding the Community’s educational 
role than her immediate predecessor, the Irish Social Affairs Commissioner 
Pradaig Flynn. In fact, not since Dahrendorfs reign in the 1970s did an 
Education Commissioner appear to harbour such a strong commitment to 
education as a political and cultural rather than merely an economic tool
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(interviews European Commission, September 2000; Field 1998: 63-64).
Even before Cresson took charge, and even before the Maastricht Treaty 
had entered into force, the Commission’s education officials had started to 
work on a strategy for the immediate post-Maastricht period. The Union’s 
three existing flagship programmes in ‘general’ education and youth policy -  
Erasmus, Lingua and Youth for Europe -  were scheduled to run out by the 
middle of the decade, and the Commission was set on trying to renew and if 
possible expand them into compulsory education. Yet as in cultural policy it 
had to proceed with caution. The Union’s new mandate in ‘general’ education 
was legally ambiguous, and some Commission officials feared that too aggres­
sive a move by the Commission could provoke the member states into a 
restrictive interpretation of Article 126, just as the overly enthusiastic 
approach by the Dahrendorf Commission in the 1970s had provoked some 
member states into complete intransigence that lasted for several years (inter­
view European Commission, September 2000).
Such fears were aggravated by the behaviour of the UK government. Soon 
after winning the 1992 election, the Major administration started to show 
itself no less hostile to many of the Community’s educational activities than 
its predecessors under Margaret Thatcher. This was borne out by the British 
reaction to a Commission Green Paper on the ‘European dimension’ in 
education (Commission 1993a). The contents of the Green Paper were 
modest and vague, essentially reiterating what the education ministers them­
selves had already agreed to in the 1988 ‘European dimension’ resolution. But 
the British reaction was furious all the same. One British minister denounced 
what he claimed were the Commission’s schemes for a ‘statutory curriculum, 
modules or themes which would be commonly used throughout Europe’ and 
pledged to ensure that ‘common-sense not common education’ would prevail 
(quoted in Field 1998: 65). Faced with such hostility the Commission 
refrained from submitting further proposals of the kind until the latter part 
of the decade.
In addition, Commission officials were at odds over how the upcoming 
educational initiatives should be ‘packaged’. Some wanted to combine all 
‘general’ and most vocational education programmes into a single overarch­
ing initiative for ‘lifelong learning’. They hoped that this would eliminate the 
‘Berlin Wall’ which according to one official had been erected between voca­
tional and ‘general’ education and stifled Community progress in the latter. 
This position also had some support in the European Parliament. By contrast, 
a second group of Commission officials insisted that the basic division 
between ‘general’ and vocational education needed to be maintained, fearing 
that the Union’s vocational initiatives could be dragged down by becoming 
too closely associated with ‘general’ education where its legal basis was much 
more fragile and the member states more reluctant to grant the Union a 
significant role (interviews European Commission, September 2000).
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Socrates
Emerging out of this were two new umbrella programmes in education which 
both had a long and arduous journey through the co-decision procedure 
demanded by the Maastricht Treaty. The first is called ‘Leonardo da Vinci’ 
and combines expanded versions of most of the Union’s vocational 
programmes from the preceding decade. The second programme is in 
‘general’ education. Named ‘Socrates’, it was passed in March 1995 with a 
funding of 850 million ECU for a five-year period and based on both Articles 
127 and 126 of the Maastricht Treaty. In 2000 it was renewed for a seven-year 
period with its contents amended and its funding raised to 1,850 m illion euro 
(EP and Council 2000d; Fritsch 1998).
Socrates incorporates expanded and amended versions of the old 
Erasmus and Lingua programmes as well as a range of measures in areas such 
as adult education, distance learning and educational technologies -  areas in 
which by the mid-1990s a coalition of interest groups and some national 
governments were pushing for a Union involvement.7 But most importantly 
in the present context, Socrates includes the Union’s first-ever programme in 
primary and secondary education, called Comenius, which must receive at 
least 27 per cent of its overall budget.
Comenius offers financial and logistical support for transnational school 
partnerships. Each partnership revolves around a particular project (loosely 
defined as having to be ‘of common interest to the participating schools’) and 
leads to school-based activities ranging from exchange visits to the produc­
tion of videos, exhibitions and Internet websites (see below). In addition, 
Comenius sponsors a variety of teacher mobility programmes, transnational 
‘networks’ pertaining to almost every conceivable aspect of school education 
as well as multilateral cooperation projects in  areas such as didactic methods 
and curriculum development.
In its initial Socrates proposals, the Commission had sought to give itself 
the bulk of responsibility for implementing the programme. Yet during the 
subsequent negotiation process it was forced to surrender important powers 
to national Socrates agencies (interview European Commission, September 
2000). These are designated by national governments and are interposed 
between the Commission on the one hand and individuals, groups and 
educational institutions on the other. Depending on the member state in 
question, they are more or less tightly subjected to national educational 
ministries. As regards those Socrates programme items that are officially des­
ignated as ‘decentralised’ (which, crucially, includes the entire school 
partnership section of Comenius), applicants for funding have their ap­
plication evaluated directly by their respective national agencies. The 
Commission is shut out from the decision-making process altogether and has 
no possibility of recourse. Many member states depicted this as a decentralis­
ing measure justified by the subsidiary principle. However, seen from a
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different angle it subjects Socrates to a curious form of ‘multiple centralism’, 
in many ways resembling a conventional international cooperation 
programme (Janssen 1994: 211).
How, then, has Socrates been implemented thus far? Its Erasmus part, for 
a start, has helped stimulate a growing transnational mobility of students and 
university teachers. For instance, in the 2003/2004 academic year Erasmus 
funded transnational mobility arrangements involving almost two thousand 
higher education institutions and around 120,000 students (Commission 
2002b).8 Moreover, it has supported a variety of projects to facilitate the 
mutual recognition of university courses (and thereby indirectly encouraged 
the mobility of students still further). Increasingly, moreover, Erasmus has 
been brought into overlap with other Union activities in higher education. 
This includes the Jean Monnet programme. Financed up to now from the 
Commission’s information budget, it promotes the teaching of European 
integration at universities by subsidising Jean Monnet chairs (over 600 since 
1990), as well as teaching projects, centres and course modules (Commission 
2004c)? Finally, some key Erasmus objectives also tie in with the intergov­
ernmental ‘Bologna Declaration’ and the subsequent ‘Bologna process’, 
which seeks to compatibilise national higher education systems through a 
unified European degree structure, degree recognition provisions and the 
full-scale implementation of the European Credit Transfer System (Hackl 
2001).
Yet of primary interest in the present context is of course Comenius, 
given that it pertains to ‘general’ education at the primary and secondary 
levels. In 2003, more than 10,000 schools were involved in Comenius-spon- 
sored partnerships, with some 25,000 pupils and 35,000 teachers visiting 
partner schools in other member states {General Report on the Activities of the 
European Union 2003). These numbers look impressive at first glance but they 
call for two important qualifications.
First, they seem significantly less impressive if one considers that 
Comenius covers an area (the EU and some adjacent candidate countries) 
that comprises around 300,000 schools, four million teachers and seventy 
million primary and secondary school pupils. Second, merely focusing on 
quantitative indicators does little to illuminate what the various school part­
nerships sponsored by Comenius actually consist of, or their impact on 
pupils’ educational experience. For example, how much teaching time is typi­
cally devoted to partnership-related activities? What other parts of the 
curriculum do these activities replace? Does a typical Comenius partnership 
lead to the transmission of knowledge and symbolic representations o f the 
European Union or merely of other countries and cultures?
Surprisingly little comparative work has been carried out on these ques­
tions. The Commission’s own Comenius database pertains mainly to formal 
criteria (such as project titles, age of the participating children and location of 
the partner institutions) and gives few indications as to how Comenius activ­
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ities are actually carried out in practice and perceived by the participants (see 
‘PartBase’ 2004). Similarly, the Commission’s regular assessment exercises 
(usually conducted by external auditors) deal mainly with financial and 
managerial rather than content-related issues (e.g, Commission 2004d; 
Commission 1997d).
In the absence of more systematic, fieldwork-centred studies, the follow­
ing two examples give a fairly good flavour of typical Comenius school 
partnerships. The first partnership linked a village primary school in Kinloch 
Rannoch in the UK to two schools in Sweden and Italy (Haigh 1998). By 1998, 
it had led to teacher visits and pupils’ involvement in two projects. The first 
project was labelled ‘playground games’. Each school contributed a few games 
typical of its respective country or region. From this sprang the production of 
a ‘game pack’ and of a video illustrating the different games. As their second 
project the schools produced a calendar. Pupils from each school contributed 
illustrations and sold copies of the calendar to their parents. They also 
exchanged regular newsletters, and many children found pen friends in 
partner schools. A second example of a typical Comenius school partnership 
links three junior secondary schools in Germany, Sweden and Finland 
(Karolina-Burger-Realschule 2004). In preparatory meetings, teachers agreed 
to start a project labelled ‘Life and work by the river or by the sea -  geograph­
ical, historical and economical aspects’. Pupils prepared posters in German 
and English, a joint exhibition and an Internet site and some pupils visited 
each other’s schools.
By and large, Comenius-sponsored school partnerships resonate well 
with the (in relation to the Union’s population size extremely few) pupils and 
teachers that have participated in them. Moreover, in contrast to some other 
EU-sponsored educational and cultural initiatives -  Europa TV and the 
would-be European history textbook being prime examples -  what media 
coverage it has attracted has been largely favourable. At the same time, except 
for the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe and some candi­
date countries, applications for Comenius funding have started to level off 
somewhat in recent years. In part this may be due to an increase in teacher 
workloads in many member states and, linked to this, to increasingly 
crowded, ‘three-Rs’-dominated and centrally steered national curricula. This 
leaves less room for optional add-ons such as Comenius (Commission 
2004d). In any event, there is little evidence that Comenius has led to a signif­
icant increase in the transmission of positive representations of the European 
Union or of particular EU-related policies or institutions. Indeed, themes 
relating to the EU or even only to European integration broadly defined are 
largely absent from the list of the most popular projects around which 
Comenius school partnerships revolve (see ‘PartBase’ 2004). And given that 
the selection of partnerships (and, by extension, of projects) is in the hands of 
the national Socrates agencies rather than the Commission, the latter has no 
means of changing this.
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Commission officials view this with mixed feelings. On the one hand, 
they would welcome an increase in EU-related Comenius projects. On the 
other hand, still smarting from the debacle of the would-be European history 
textbook and the widespread hostility to its ‘information and communica­
tion’ material for school children (further discussed below), they want to 
avoid Comenius being seen as an outlet for ‘EU propaganda’. The 
Commission’s ability to include Comenius into the Socrates programme was 
due in part to it revolving around exchanges, language learning and the 
promotion of transnational ‘cultural literacy’ rather than the Europeanisation 
of school curricula. Any move away from this might well place the entire 
programme at risk (interview European Commission, September 2000).
Finally, more or less closely tied in with Comenius are a range of educa­
tional initiatives that emerged from within the member states themselves 
from the mid-1990s, often devised and initiated by semi or non-governmen­
tal bodies such as teacher associations, local school boards and even 
individual schools or teachers. Some benefit from material or logistical 
support from non-EU organisations such as the Council of Europe and the 
European Cultural Foundation (Council of Europe 2003; Bell 1995; Brock 
and Tulasiewicz 1994; Hopkins, Howarth and Le Metais 1994) while others 
are spin-offs from various Comenius-sponsored ‘networks’ and collaboration 
programmes involving teachers and educational administrators. Examples 
include the formation of ‘European clubs’ in some schools, their participation 
in the annual ‘European schools day competition’ as well as Council of 
Europe-sponsored brochures and events on subjects such as racism, multi­
culturalism, general democratic values and the environment. Yet the presence 
and visibility of such initiatives varies greatly from one member state to the 
next, with some smaller ones (such as Ireland and Portugal) but also to some 
extent Germany and some new member states from Central Europe in the 
lead. Moreover, like Comenius-sponsored school partnerships many of these 
initiatives do not centre on the European Union, but instead on language 
learning or on broader social issues that are worthy but largely ‘European 
dimension’-free.
Other post-Maastricht initiatives
Negotiated parallel to Socrates was the new version of the Youth for Europe 
programme, aimed at what in Union jargon are now referred to as ‘young 
people in non-formal learning contexts’. It was originally passed in 1995 with 
Article 126 of the Maastricht Treaty as its legal basis, a funding of 126 million 
ECU and implementation provisions similar to those of Socrates (EP and 
Council 1995). In 2000 it received the less ‘propagandist’ title ‘Youth’ and was 
renewed for a period of seven years with a total funding of 520 million euro 
(EP and Council 2000b).
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Youth’s centrepiece has remained the funding of different kinds of 
transnational youth exchanges, similar to those supported by the original 
Youth for Europe programme. In addition, it now includes a ‘European 
voluntary service programme for young people’ (EVS), which supports 
volunteers working in other member states or in selected third countries for 
up to one year.10 A further part of the Youth programme is ‘Eurodesk’, offi­
cially defined as a ‘European network’ that disseminates information about 
the EU notably through a telephone answering service and an extensive 
Internet presence. Eurodesk’s principal task is to provide information ‘rele­
vant to the education, training and youth fields, and the involvement of 
young people in European activities’. In addition, the Commission has sought 
to put Eurodesk at the service of its broader ‘youth information’ and PR 
campaigns. Sometimes in collaboration with pro-EU youth organisations 
inside the member states, it disseminates more general information and PR 
material on Union policies and institutions.
Closer to school teaching is the Union’s involvement with educational 
software and, more generally, with information technology in schools. The 
‘Delors White Paper’ on ‘Competitiveness, growth and employment’ 
(Commission 1993b) already featured stark warnings that Europe had fallen 
behind the United States and Japan in this area, and a specially appointed 
‘task force on educational multi-media software’ reiterated them 
(Commission 1996b). Reminiscent of the Commission’s take on the audiovi­
sual sector, the taskforce blamed US dominance in this field on Europe’s 
linguistic and cultural fragmentation, which results in low economies of scale 
for European producers. To remedy this, it called for EU initiatives to support 
the development and distribution of European educational software, the 
training of teachers and pupils in its use and the universal connection of 
schools to the Internet. Echoing the ‘multiple-use’ character of its audiovisual 
rhetoric, the Commission suggested that involving the EU in educational 
technology would yield economic benefits and defend Europe against tech­
nological domination by outsiders, as well as ‘bring different cultures 
together, strengthen European identity and reinforce European integration’. 
The same theme reverberates throughout the Commission’s various follow­
up reports on the implementation of the ‘Education & Training 2010’ 
strategy. It features a range of (non-binding) educational targets based on the 
pledge by the Lisbon European Council in 2000 to turn Europe into the 
world’s leading ‘knowledge economy5 -  a term, incidentally, that has become 
as ubiquitous in Union rhetoric as it has remained ill-defined (e.g. 
Commission 2002a).
From the second part of the 1990s, the Commission and the EP managed 
to push through a range of concrete initiatives to support information tech­
nology in schools. Some of these were incorporated into the Socrates and 
Leonardo da Vinci programmes, while others formed part of broader tech­
nology initiatives such as ESPRIT and its successors. The most visible
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programme in this domain is the annual ‘Netdays Europe’. Apart from 
general awareness-raising, it seeks to encourage the design of educational 
projects using the Internet. By 2002, 471 projects were awarded the Netdays 
Europe label of which 45 per cent were submitted by schools (see 
Commission 2004e; Netdays 2002: Summary of Results). Related to this, the 
Commission has set up the ‘European schoolnet’, which it uses among other 
things as a vehicle for its school-centred public relations campaigns further 
discussed below. Lastly, it sponsors a growing number of other websites such 
as ‘Myeurope’ and the ‘European youth portal’.
Commission officials depict the Netdays and related initiatives as a 
success. Given the obvious technological, economic, and transnational 
dimension of the Internet, the Union’s involvement in this area was compar­
atively easy to justify and offered a plausible ‘value added’. By the mid-1990s, 
many member state governments -  especially in southern Europe -  had come 
to see information technology as an area in which they were seriously lagging 
behind, and the Commission’s various educational technology initiatives skil­
fully played to such anxieties (interview European Commission, September 
2000).
At the same time, these various educational technology initiatives, too, 
are not likely to have increased pupils’ exposure to EU-related themes and 
symbols in any significant way. The Internet itself is hardly a specifically 
European medium, and the Commission’s numerous reports and policy 
statements do surprisingly little to clarify what, precisely, the ‘high-quality 
digital educational content’ (Commission 2002a) it wants to foster might 
consist of. Accordingly, Netdays’ aims have remained vaguely defined, revolv­
ing around ‘dialogue’, ‘cultural knowledge’, ‘quality educational content’, 
‘appreciation of cultural diversity’ ‘technological competence’ and so on, and 
many Netdays projects focus on themes such as language learning, poetry and 
the performing arts. Such coyness is no accident. As with Comenius, 
Commission officials fear that too aggressive an attempt to graft ‘European 
content’ onto its educational technology initiatives could trigger backlashes 
inside the member states and thereby place these initiatives at risk.
On balance, the EU’s educational technology initiatives are mainly about 
helping to build an educational communications infrastructure as opposed to 
Europeanising educational content. As regards their value as an outlet for 
political symbolism as defined in Chapters 1 and 2 this is obviously a major 
limitation. Moreover, at least as far as the Internet is concerned it might also 
limit their potential for further growth. Some member states have connected 
almost all their schools to the Internet and the latter has become so popular 
that initiatives to train teachers -  let alone students -  in how to use it are 
increasingly redundant.
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Commission PR in schools
Most EU educational initiatives have thus left little room for the ‘European 
dimension’ in school curricula. Moreover, as is shown below, if only for prag­
matic reasons the Commission itself became increasingly reluctant to press 
for it overtly. Even so, as in cultural policy this does not mean that the 
Commission has shed all ambitions to use schools as instruments to 
strengthen popular support for European integration. Instead, in some 
measure educational policy, too, has become ‘PR-ised’, with the Commission 
producing a barrage of promotional material aimed at children and trying to 
convince schools and teachers to integrate such material into the curriculum. 
Many of these initiatives have benefited from close collaboration between the 
Commission’s education officials and its ‘information and communication’ 
department as discussed in Chapter 3.
Like its PR campaigns aimed at a general public, the Commission’s 
promotional drive in schools received a critical boost with the introduction of 
the single currency. In May 1997, the Commission appointed a group of 
external advisors from the education and PR fields to ‘ponder the relevance of 
conducting a campaign [for the euro] via the school system, the organisa­
tional aspects of this, its timing and, lastly, the possible role of the 
Commission in supporting and supplementing action taken by the Member 
States’ (Commission 1998b; also Commission 1998c; Commission 1998d). 
The expert group released its report in January 1998 (Commission 1998b). It 
called for a publicity drive on behalf of the euro among young people, not 
only because they ‘have substantial potential for assimilation’ but also due to 
their ‘obvious capability for conveying information to their parents and 
grand-parents’. Moreover, according to the report ‘school information 
programmes on the euro can provide an excellent opportunity to familiarise 
pupils with the other peoples of Europe and their history. A platform of 
knowledge of this kind is a step in the direction of European citizenship, a 
step school pupils could take in conjunction with the introduction of the 
single currency’. In this sense, the euro should not be handled ‘as simply yet 
another piece of information, but as the core of an important message’.
When it came to concrete policy recommendations the expert group 
report was surprisingly modest, however. It cautioned that too aggressive a 
euro promotion campaign could trigger backlashes inside the member states 
and create an impression that ‘“Brussels” [is] looking out for propagandists 
at school’. To avoid this, a school-centred euro information campaign would 
have to be implemented by national educational authorities in the first 
instance with the Commission limiting itself to some ‘added value’ measures 
such as the exchange of experience and the production information literature.
Accordingly, most of the Commission’s attempts to promote the euro in 
schools have centred on the production of promotional material, often in 
close cooperation with the PRINCE programme discussed in Chapter 3.
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‘Information and communication’ output produced for school children 
included numerous brochures, posters, sketches of euro notes and coins, 
‘umbrella-type display stands’, and a selection of videos. These bore titles 
such as ‘A single currency for Europe’, ‘The European ABC: the single 
currency’, ‘From the electrum to the euro’, The euro -  it’s child’s play5, and 
‘The euro isn’t witchcraft; this way to the currency’ (Commission 1998b). In 
addition, the Commission produced material, both in print and on the 
Internet, to inform teachers whose alleged ignorance on the subject it did not 
cease to bemoan, about the euro.
Parallel to distributing material on the single currency the Commission 
sought to take advantage of the momentum created by the euro promotion 
campaign by intensifying its more general drive to promote the EU in schools. 
This led to numerous ‘overview of the EU and European integration’-type 
booklets such as a ‘passport-sized mini-brochure’ aimed at children between 
five and ten, and, most famously, several hundred thousand copies of a comic 
booklet titled The Raspberry Ice Cream War: A Comic for Young People on a 
Peaceful Europe without Frontiers (Commission 1998e). It
tells the story o f Christine (who has ‘already made friends all over Europe’), Max
(who wears a baseball cap with the EU flag) and Paul (who wants to study 
languages and travel to as many countries as possible -  first o f all, o f course, right 
across Europe). O ur three young heroes are busy surfing the Internet one day 
when they get sucked into the com puter and dum ped in a land of borders, pass­
ports and levies. . . .  Europe in the dark ages. Frontiers and barriers everywhere 
and people fighting wars for the stupidest reasons . . .  The kids are arrested for 
refusing to pay a border levy and are hauled before the king -  who suspects them 
of trying to steal the recipe for raspberry ice cream. O ur enlightened trio explain 
what life is like in the EU paradise they hail from, ‘There are no borders anymore 
and the governments p u t their heads together to decide what’s best for everyone 
. . .  you can go anywhere you want, work, study, buy things, go on holiday’, 
Christine helpfully explains. (Harding 2003: 2)
The Commission also put material of this kind on its ‘European schoolnet’ as 
well as on sister sites such as ‘Myeurope’, a self-styled ‘unique community of 
teachers who work for the development and the enhancement of our 
common European identity’. In addition, the Commission distributes its 
information output through its representations in the member states, 
through ‘European resource centres for schools and colleges’ (which have 
steadily proliferated in recent years), and sometimes through the local 
Socrates implementation agencies. In line with the general tendency discussed 
in Chapter 3, the Commission has increasingly sought to target such promo­
tional output according to age, educational level and, above all, member state.
All this raises the question of whether schools and teachers actually use 
such Union-produced material in their daily teaching, whether this has led to 
an increase in teaching time devoted to the EU, and ultimately of course 
whether it has shaped pupils’ attitudes towards European integration. These
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questions are hard to answer. As discussed, the Commission itself has become 
reluctant to conduct systematic impact studies of its PR initiatives. All the 
same, several factors are bound to mitigate the use and effectiveness of Union 
PR in schools. First, while the Commission’s promotional campaigns aimed 
at a general public as discussed in Chapter 3 allow it to appeal directly to 
national audiences by bypassing national governments, media, political 
parties and other opinion formers, the use of Union-produced material in 
schools inevitably requires the cooperation of the relevant authorities inside 
the member states: national or regional education ministries, local educa­
tional authorities, school boards, head teachers and not least individual 
classroom teachers. Yet especially where school curricula are under relatively 
tight central control, even those schools and teachers that would otherwise be 
willing to do so have little leeway to deviate from the officially prescribed 
curriculum so as to provide their pupils with a greater dose of European 
content.
Add to this that the Commission’s promotional material for children 
faces strong hostility in some member states. Not surprisingly, the UK again 
took the lead in this, causing the Commission to withdraw 75,000 English- 
language copies of its Raspberry Ice Cream War comic (Bamber 1998), 
reputedly moving most of them into the basement of the Commission 
Representation in Dublin.11 This came after a barrage of criticism from the 
conservative press and (mainly) Conservative politicians, some of whom had 
been inspired by the Commission comic to veritable tirades. Conservative MP 
Teresa Gorman, for instance, likened the comic to ‘extreme propaganda 
aimed at children ., .  reminiscent of the one-sided stuff put out by the Third 
Reich’ (quoted in Bamber 1998). Parts of the national press in the UK soon 
joined in such criticism, and the Raspberry Ice Cream War provoked angry 
questions in the House of Commons (UK Parliament Hansard 11 Nov. 1999, 
pt. 6; UK Parliament Hansard 28 Oct. 1998, pt. 4). In the end, even the Labour 
government felt compelled to denounce the comic as ‘undoubtedly an ill- 
judged and, in part, factually inaccurate publication’ (quoted in Harding 
2003: 2).
In other member states such opposition is generally less animated. But 
along with criticism of the Commission’s general PR activities discussed in 
Chapter 3 it has grown in recent years and made the Commission tread more 
carefully: much of its more recent material for schools deals with worthy but 
largely ‘European dimension’-less issues, ranging from drugs and racism to 
environmental protection and gender equality.
In fact, just as in culture and the audiovisual sector the Commission has 
increasingly come to respect the limits imposed on its attempts to use educa­
tion as a European consciousness-raising tool. On the one hand, its education 
officials have continued to release a steady stream of ambitiously titled posi­
tion papers and Green Papers, reports, feasibility studies, working group 
documents, draft ‘action initiatives’ and the like: a communication on
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‘Learning in the information society’ (Commission 1996c); a White Paper 
entitled ‘Teaching and learning, towards the learning society^ (Commission 
1995e); a Green Paper on ‘Education -  training -  research: The obstacles to 
transnational mobility1 (Commission 1996d); a report titled ‘Towards a 
Europe of knowledge’ (Commission 1997e); and numerous documents on 
the implementation of the ‘Education & Training 2010’ strategy, which 
revolves around a range of (aspirational) educational targets intended to turn 
the EU into the ‘most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world’ (Commission 2003e, 2002a).
Yet, on the other hand, most of these reports and initiatives led to little 
tangible action, other than of a kind which itself was largely symbolic and 
centred on awareness raising and the production of still more studies, reports 
and expert meetings. An example was the Union-sponsored ‘European year of 
lifelong learning’ held in 1996. According to one official, it was designed not 
only to popularise the issue of lifelong learning itself but also to create ‘posi­
tive momentum’ for the EU’s educational involvement more generally 
(interview European Commission, September 2000). Apart from sparking a 
further cascade of reports and expert meetings, the ‘year of lifelong learning’ 
included some eye-catching initiatives, such as ‘pub-based learning’ in West 
Yorkshire. Some of these managed to attract a fair amount of media attention 
but had little lasting impact overall. Much the same applied to the Union- 
sponsored ‘European year of languages’ in 2001 (EP and Council 2000c) 
which led to a host of conferences and awareness-raising measures but in the 
end did little to enhance the Union’s clout in ‘general’ education.
In fact, save for a few exceptions (e.g. Commission 1997e) the 
Commission’s educational rhetoric has increasingly abandoned the European 
identity theme altogether. In its place have come frequent allusions to what 
the Commission refers to more or less interchangeably as ‘active citizenship’, 
‘modem citizenship’, or ‘active (or modern) citizenship in the Union’. 
‘Learning for active citizenship’, in the Commission’s rendering, ‘can be 
described as a process of critical accompaniment in which individuals are 
offered structured opportunities -  at cognitive, affective and pragmatic levels 
-  to gain and renew the skills of self-directed participation and to experience 
the negotiation of social purpose and meaning’ (Commission 1998f; also 
Commission 2003e, 2002a). Yet once the Commission’s ‘active citizenship’ 
rhetoric is stripped of its accompanying jargon one is left with a rather more 
prosaic concept. Teaching ‘active citizenship’ then reveals itself as little more 
than a strategy to encourage labour mobility; to, as the Commission puts it in 
the same working document, give pupils ‘access to the skills and compe­
tencies that young people will need for effective economic participation 
under conditions of technological modernisation, economic globalisation, 
and, very concretely, transnational European labour markets’. The engender­
ing of popular identifications with the EU and its policies is not part of the 
Commission’s ‘learning for active citizenship’ definition.
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Different Commission officials account for this shift in different ways. 
Some highlight the need for pragmatism and rhetorical caution -  all the more 
pressing once the Blair government in Britain had turned out to be almost as 
hostile to much of the EU’s involvement in ‘general’ education as its 
Conservative predecessors, and once the member states had implicitly agreed 
not to use qualified majority voting in ‘general’ education even though the 
Maastricht Treaty provides for it. The Commission’s more docile approach in 
recent years was further boosted once Edith Cresson had resigned over 
corruption allegations in 1999 and was replaced by the more consensus- 
oriented Viviane Reding. On a different note, one Commission official points 
to the ‘rationalist wave’ that has swept through the Commission, causing it to 
redirect its policy agenda towards ever more narrowly defined economic 
ends. Yet another colleague points to generational turnover within the 
Commission’s education department. Most officials associated with the Janne 
and Dahrendorf agenda have retired from the Commission and with them 
went out much of the energy and idealism they had brought to the task. Much 
-  though not all -  of the more recent intake of education officials are scepti­
cal of what one of them dismisses as the ‘flag and anthem approach’ to 
European identity promotion in schools (interviews European Commission, 
September 2000).
This group of Commission officials can be subdivided into two camps. 
Some see the Commission above all as a champion of various progressive 
educational causes and their implantation in national educational practice -  
ranging from multiculturalism to non-traditional gender conceptions, gay 
rights and the ‘mainstreaming’ of children with learning difficulties and phys­
ical disabilities. Others, by contrast, argue that attempts to instrumentalise 
education for any kind of broader social, cultural, or identity-related objective 
should best be left to the member states. They believe that the Union should 
limit its educational ambitions to the economic and technology-related areas 
that remain closest to its core mandate and where EU involvement has consis­
tently proven much more acceptable to the member states. In this rendering, 
education may still be instrumentalised to strengthen support for European 
integration, but the responsibility for this should lie with national govern­
ments rather than with the Union itself.
The ‘European dimension’ in educational practice
So far this chapter has focused more on policy formation and formulation 
than on policy implementation; it has traced the fate of the ‘European dimen­
sion’ in schools by, in the first instance, exploring the content of the Union’s 
various educational initiatives. In so far as it has focused on how these initia­
tives relate to actual educational practice, this was mainly with regard to the 
use of Union-produced material in schools and the impact of Comenius
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school partnerships. Yet initiatives of this latter type could of course never 
hope to do more than to provide relatively marginal European ‘add-ons’ to 
regular, nationally defined curricular content. The following question thus 
remains: to what extent have regular national school curricula and teaching 
practices come to include EU-related elements and what do these elements 
consist of? This final section of the chapter seeks to shed some light on this 
and, in particular, on whether the 1988 ‘Resolution of the Council and the 
ministers of education meeting within the Council on the European dimen­
sion in education’ (which has thus far remained the last initiative of its kind) 
has had a tangible impact on educational practice inside the member states.
Clear data is hard to come by. Stimulated by the 1988 resolution (and a 
stream of research funding that followed in its wake) the few existing studies 
on the subject are relatively dated, mostly going back to the early- to mid- 
1990s. Reflecting the fact that the 1988 resolution has thus far remained the 
last of its kind and that in the period since the ‘European dimension’ in school 
curricula has slipped on the Commission’s list of educational priorities, most 
of these studies have not been updated since. Likewise, the Union’s own 
educational statistics are only of limited use in this regard. ‘Eurydice’, the 
EU’s main educational database, contains audited figures on almost every 
conceivable aspect of educational policy but not on ‘European content’ in 
school curricula. Also, the bibliography it compiled on the subject has not 
been updated since 1996 (Eurydice 1996).12
Against this backdrop, two country-by-country surveys are especially 
useful for our purposes because of their comparative and fieldwork-based 
approach and their adherence to a set of relatively coherent and consistent 
criteria of evaluation. The first study was commissioned by the Association 
for Teacher Education in Europe (ATEE) (Ryba 1992) and the second is 
published in a volume edited by Cremer and Schmuck (1991). Even though 
these studies are relatively dated (both were directly stimulated by the 1988 
resolution), they nevertheless give an approximate insight into the status of 
the ‘European dimension’ in the Union’s schools -  a status which, for the 
reasons suggested below, is not likely to have changed significantly in the 
years since. For some countries, moreover, these surveys can be usefully 
complemented with more recent material with conveys a similar overall 
impression.
Turning to the situation in individual countries, the best range of quan­
titative and qualitative data on the ‘European dimension’ has been compiled 
in the Netherlands. A 1990 study of Dutch textbooks and teaching syllabuses 
(which focused on geography, history, economics, social studies and ‘civics’) 
is a good example. It found that in geography 48 per cent of all textbooks and 
83 per cent of syllabuses dealt with questions pertaining in one way or another 
to the European Community. Yet the proportion of time and space devoted 
to the Community was a mere 3.9 per cent in textbooks and 3.3 per cent in 
syllabuses. In social studies, 45 per cent of Dutch textbooks dealt with the EC
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as did 50 per cent of syllabuses, but the proportion of time and space devoted 
to the Community was a tiny 1.9 per cent in both textbooks and syllabuses. 
The picture was similar in the subject of history. While 59 per cent of all text­
books and SO per cent of syllabuses dealt with EC-related issues, the space and 
time devoted to them was only 2.6 per cent in textbooks and 2.5 per cent in 
syllabuses (Plas 1991: 284). The ATEE study came to similar conclusions 
regarding the presence of EU-related material in Dutch textbooks and further 
criticised its poor presentation and substandard didactic quality (p. 21).
The situation was similar in the Irish Republic. The contribution on Ire­
land in the Cremer and Schmuck survey found little evidence of there being 
‘in the curriculum at the primary or secondary levels a particular interest in 
EC-related themes’ (Doran 1991: 227, my translation13). Overall, it concluded 
that Ireland’s membership of the European Community did not significantly 
enhance its treatment in Irish school curricula. The ATEE study came to 
similar findings: It detected elements pertaining to the EC and Europe 
throughout Irish textbooks and syllabuses, yet found that the emphasis was 
typically on ‘“foreign” languages and on “other” countries [.. .i.e. on] “them 
and us rather than us’” (p. 17). Similarly, ‘the history of Europe is not painted 
or portrayed as “our history” but rather as the history of “other countries”’ 
(p. 17).
This ‘us and them’ matrix prevailed in Spanish schools as well. Ninety per 
cent of Spanish history and social science syllabuses mention ‘Europe’. 
‘However, many of the themes that deal with Europe do not really have a 
European orientation. Most are influenced by the involvement of Spain in 
European history, especially from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, and 
often amount to pure descriptions of historical facts. Though these themes 
provide a wealth of information about Europe, much remains to be done to 
get from this nationalistic approach to a European one’ (Palacio-Villa 1991: 
313, my translation14).
In France, too, the status of the ‘European dimension’ in schools is gen­
erally precarious. The contribution in the Cremer and Schmuck survey notes 
the continued strength of specifically national elements in the French ‘educa­
tion civique which is explicitly aimed at engendering ‘republican loyalties’ 
(Hickel 1991). When it comes to ‘European content’ in French curricula, 
however, no comparable ambition exists. What traces there are of it are 
confined to history and geography lessons. The ATEE report confirms this 
impression. It senses in France a ‘brick wall of fundamental scepticism’ 
towards the inclusion of a ‘European dimension’ in school curricula and 
notes that ‘the study of foreign languages, mother tongue and art hardly take 
account of the European dimension’ (p. 18). The same applied to teachers 
training (p. 19).
The picture worsens when one turns to the UK. In the 1970s, an attempt 
to increase the presence of ‘Europe’ in British education led to the in­
troduction of ‘European studies’ as a distinct subject in some schools
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(Blackledge 1991). But ‘European studies’ generally enjoyed a low academic 
status and quickly became seen as an easy alternative to ‘serious’ language 
learning (Goodson 1995, Chapter 4). The ATEE report confirms this as it cites 
‘evidence for the very low status of European studies [... which are] generally 
pursued only by the less able students’ (p. 20). When the first National 
Curriculum came into force in England in 1988 under the Thatcher govern­
ment, the ‘European dimension’ was largely excluded. And the revised 
National Curriculum of 1995 ‘had virtually eliminated the European dimen­
sion’ (Morrell 1996: 12) even in its most prosaic and factual aspects, with the 
term ‘European Union’ excluded from all curricular subjects other than geog­
raphy. Consequently, in history ‘the study unit entitled “The Twentieth 
Century World” does not include the establishment of the European 
Community or Union’ (Morrell 1996: 9). But even in geography ‘the Union 
is not identified in any of the three maps provided -  of the UK, Europe and 
the World’ (Morrell 1996: 13). The ATEE study concurs, noting that in 
Britain “most students . . .  receive no specific teaching about Europe’ (p. 20).
In Danish schools the ‘European dimension’ has remained equally scarce. 
The ATEE study concludes that on the available evidence ‘it will take 
considerable time before the European dimension and European awareness 
. . .  become part of the Danish education system’ (p. 18). The contribution on 
Denmark in the Cremer and Schmuck survey found that what little mention­
ing there is of the Community in Danish schools is often embedded in a 
‘discussion of contemporary problems’ framework. There, the Community 
tends to surface in relation to unflattering topics such as unemployment and 
the fisheries crisis. Meanwhile, ‘civics’ lessons in Denmark deal overwhelm­
ingly with Danish society, institutions and political processes while ‘only a 
very small proportion of teachers is of the opinion that school teaching 
should be used to instill in pupils positive attitudes towards European 
integration’ (Kledal and Lauridsen 1991: 100, my translation15)- Overall, the 
study concludes that in Denmark it is ‘politically still unthinkable to intro­
duce the fostering of a European consciousness as an educational objective’ 
(Kledal and Lauridsen 1991: 98, my translation16).
In Germany, the responsibility for curricular content rests largely with 
the Länder. Even though on average they have gone further than the educa­
tional authorities in most other member states, the presence of the ‘European 
Dimension’ in German school curricula is still very limited. A content analy­
sis of German ‘political studies’ (Politikunterricht) curricula found that while 
all but one Land included in it some elements pertaining to European integra­
tion, the Community received a low priority compared to other topics. ‘The 
survey shows clearly that European themes are emphasised in only a few 
school curricula. In most curricula, European themes are “taken care of” 
under broader subject headings (e.g. “international relations”). Compared to 
other topics dealt with in political studies Europe is clearly given less weight’ 
(Renner and Sander 1991: 129, my translation17). Similarly, ‘Europe’ takes up
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an average of only three percent of German political studies textbooks and 
many treat European integration from a purely economic angle (Renner and 
Sander 1991: 133).
As in many other member states, the Greek education system is heavily 
and explicitly instrumentalised as a national consciousness-raising tool. Ac­
cording to the 1985 education law, pupils are to be turned into ‘free, 
responsible democratic citizens, [willing] to defend national independence, 
the country’s territorial integrity and democracy, imbued with love towards 
human beings, life and nature, and faithfully committed to the fatherland and 
to the true Christian Orthodox tradition’ (quoted in Gikopoulos and 
Kakavoulis 1991: 179-180, my translation38). When it comes to the EU, no 
comparable ambition exists. Accordingly, ‘the examination of the Greek cur­
riculum and [teaching] materials showed that only two subjects in the sixth 
grade of the primary school in Greece have devoted some time for [sic] teach­
ing about the European Community. These subjects are history and social 
and political education. All other textbooks present the concept of Europe via 
war events, conflicts, aggression, as well as by geophysical and geopolitical 
aspects’ (Flouris 1995: 117). Further, ‘[a] more in-depth content analysis of 
both subjects revealed that in history, approximately 12 minutes of instruc­
tional time has been allocated for teaching about the EEC. The situation is 
worse in social and political education, since only four lines constitute the 
total amount of instructional time that has been allocated. No other learning 
activities could be found in the written curriculum and materials that focus 
on the European Community1 (Flouris 1995: 117-118). In sum, ‘the Greek 
elementary school curriculum and materials during all six years of attendance 
do not reflect any of the aspects of the European Dimension as stated in the 
Resolution of the Council and the Ministers of Education of the EU countries 
[of 1988]. The concepts of European identity and citizenship as proposed by 
the Resolution do not exist in Greece’s curriculum and textbooks’ (Flouris 
1995: 118).
These findings echo those for most other member states and they broadly 
converge on three basic observations. First, in all cases the share of curricular 
content devoted in one way or another to ‘Europe’, the European Union or 
even only to other member states is small, if one leaves aside foreign language 
teaching. Second, to the extent that ‘European content’ is detectable in 
national school curricula, it tends to be (a) not primarily concerned with the 
European Union or European integration and; (b), about ‘our country in 
relation to other countries in Europe’ rather than about ‘we together with 
other countries/peoples as part of Europe/as Europeans’. This, finally, places 
the ‘European dimension’ in stark contrast to the continued strong presence 
of specifically national content in the school curricula of most member states, 
which are often explicitly instrumentalised as vehicles for the transmission of 
national myths and symbols.
To such findings one could object that most of the research on which they
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are based is by now somewhat dated, and that in the meantime the 1988 reso­
lution on the ‘European dimension’ together with new programmes such as 
Comenlus and the Commission’s various school-centred PR initiatives might 
have had more impact. Nonetheless, to the extent that such gains occurred 
they are bound to have been relatively marginal. In the first place, the few 
somewhat more recent studies that are available for some countries suggest 
no significant progress.19 Second, as far as Comenius is concerned the number 
of pupils affected by it is tiny in relation to the Union’s size. Third, Comenius 
(as well as the Commission’s PR campaigns) seeks to complement rather than 
replace regular national curricula and thus can hope to account for no more 
than a small share of overall teaching time and curricular content. Finally, as 
shown, most Comenius partnerships do not revolve around EU-related 
themes in the first place, and even Commission-produced literature for 
schools increasingly deals with issues other than EU structures and institu­
tions. Especially if compared to the fervour with which most member states 
continue to design their ‘civics’, history, and geography curricula to advance 
their specifically national socialisation agendas, the ‘European dimension’ is 
still a negligible entity in school curricula throughout the Union.
All this does not exclude the possibility that events could take a sudden turn 
and make the ‘European dimension’ in schools a reality at last. But judged by the 
Union’s educational record in recent years this seems unlikely. The 
Commission’s actions since Maastricht suggest that it has understood the ‘while 
fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teach­
ing’ clause in the Maastricht Treaty as a signal by the member states that 
curricular content is not a part of educational policy in which they want the 
Union to be involved, however indirectly. Increasingly, moreover, the 
Commission appears willing to abide by this wish, not least so as not to risk the 
development of its other educational programmes. In light of this, the 
‘European dimension’ in schools is not a project that is in the process of build­
ing up momentum. On the contrary, like parallel attempts to ‘denationalise’ the 
audiovisual sector, efforts to involve the European Union in the design of 
national school curricula -  or even only to include elements pertaining to the 
EU therein -  may well prove to have been a largely inconsequential episode that 
started in the mid-1970s and came to an end some two decades later.
Notes
1 They had met under this formula since 1971. For a discussion of the extremely 
complex (and never entirely clarified) legal implications of the ‘mixed’ formula in 
education see Rübsamen (1978).
2 Erasmus further benefited from the fact that universities have always had a much 
stronger international outlook than elementary and secondary education and, at any 
rale, more autonomy from direct state control in most member states. This made a 
Community involvement in higher education generally less sensitive (Hack! 2001).
3 Sometimes other bodies such as private foundations or German regional govern­
ments also supported such conferences. For conference reports see Janssen (1993). 
See also Janssen (1990). One more tangible ‘European-dimension’ related measure at 
the time was the European Parliament’s decision to unilaterally fund the distribution 
of Community maps to schools (Social Europe 1989 [Supplement No. 8]: 46; Social 
Europe 1987 [Supplement No. 3]: 16).
4 I was unable to find out at precisely what stage the Commission pulled out of the 
European history project. According to one report, it still subsidised 'first meetings’ 
of the panel of twelve historians that compiled the subsequent textbook version of the 
history project (Nundy 1992:15).
5 Though the German edition is still labelled as a ‘historical work for schools to be used 
in the first and second years of secondary school*.
6 Subsequently, culture was added to DG XXII’s brief.
7 An example was an influential report by the University-Industry Forum, a partner­
ship between the European Round Table of Industrialists and the European Council 
of Rectors. Released in 1992, it warned that the underdevelopment of the adult educa­
tion sector in many member states carried serious economic risks and called for a 
Europe-wide programme for ‘lifelong learning’ to remedy the situation (Otala 1992; 
also Field 1998: 54). In preparing Socrates the Commission went to great lengths to 
consult various NGOs interested in education and it encouraged them to form 
Europe-wide umbrella organisations or ‘networks’. Many have done so in recent 
years, with the larger ones establishing representations in Brussels. One Commission 
official estimates that by the end of the 1990s the Commission’s education depart­
ment was in regular contact with over 300 such groups (interview European 
Commission, September 2000).
8 This second figure pertains to the preceding year.
9 In 2003, the Commission proposed to subsume the Jean Monnet programme into a 
new ‘Community action programme to promote bodies active at European level and 
support specific activities in the field of education and training’, together with exist­
ing subsidies for other higher education bodies such as the European University 
Institute in Florence and the College of Europe in Bruges (Commission 2003f).
10 EVS started in 1998 with a budget of 47.5 million ECU for the first two years. It 
reached back to an EP resolution (EP 1995). A Commission-initiated pilot pro­
gramme began in 1996 with an action programme approved in 1998.
11 Many thanks to Daniel Dunne for this information.
12 What little information it contains on that subject is limited to policy statements or 
declarations of intent provided by the national ministries of education. Yet for the 
most part these lack specificity. For instance, while most national educational author­
ities now indicate that the founding of the EU forms part of the history curriculum, 
they rarely specify the actual share of teaching time and reading material devoted to 
the EU in relation to other items such as national or world history. What is more, as 
the Commission’s own surveys ascertained as far back as the 1970s, such declarations 
are often aspirational in nature and at odds with actual educational practice 
(Commission 1978).
13 ‘Es gibt wenig augenscheinliche Beweise dafür, daß es im Lehrplan sowohl der 
Primär- als auch der Sekundarebene ein besonderes Interesse an EG-Themen g ib t..
14 ‘Allerdings sind viele dieser Themen, die Europa behandeln, nicht wirklich 
europäisch ausgerichtet. Die meisten von ihnen werden berührt von der Verwicklung 
Spaniens in die europäische Geschichte, insbesondere vom 16. bis zum 18. 
Jahrhundert, und sind oft reine Beschreibungen historischer Tatsachen. Diese
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Themen vermitteln zwar eine Fülle von Informationen über Europa, aber es bleibt 
noch viel zu tun, um von diesem nationalistischen Ansatz zu einem europäischen zu 
gelangen.’
15 ‘N ur ein sehr geringer Teil der Lehrer ist der Meinung, daß den Schülern eine posi­
tive Einstellung zur europäischen Integration im Rahmen des Unterrichts vermittelt 
werden sollte.’
16 ‘politisch noch undenkbar, ein europäisches Bewußtsein als Erziehungsziel 
einzuführen’.
17 ‘Die Übersicht macht deutlich, daß europäischen Themen nur in einzelnen 
Lehrplänen eine herausgehobene Bedeutung beigemessen wird. In der Mehrzahl der 
Pläne werden europäische Themen im Rahmen eines übergeordneten Themas (z. B. 
“Internationale Beziehungen”) “mitbehandelt”. Im Vergleich zu anderen Themen 
des Politikunterrichts hat Europa ein deutlich geringeres Gewicht.’
18 ‘freie, verantwortliche, demokratische Bürger zu werden, die nationale Unabhänigkeit, 
die territoriale Integrität des Landes und die Demokratie zu verteidigen, beseelt zu sein 
von der Liebe zum Menschen, zum Leben und zur Natur und in Treue zum Vaterland 
und zur wahren orthodoxen Christlichen Tradition zu stehen’.
19 For instance the updated study by Morrell (1996) on the UK and the one by Flouris 
(1995) on Greece.
Political symbolism and the future of European 
integration
Some fifty years after its founding the Union’s record in culture, the audiovi­
sual sector and education remained mixed. It had become involved in some 
economically oriented areas such as the free movement of cultural ‘goods and 
services’ and vocational training. Moreover, it had initiated some more pro­
active exchange and circulation-enhancing programmes, above all Youth, 
Socrates, MEDIA and Culture 2000, Finally, from the 1990s onwards it 
pursued a myriad of PR-style measures, mostly aimed at shoring up public 
support for particular EU policies such as enlargement and the single 
currency. Yet when it came to instrumentalising culture and education to 
increase the Union’s symbolic presence in the everyday lives of its citizens, far 
less had been achieved. From EU-sponsored Europe Day celebrations to the 
‘European dimension’ in schools, most proposals in this area stumbled over 
resistance mounted by shifting configurations of national governments. 
Others were accepted by the member states in the form of vague declarations 
of intent but never implemented. Indeed, resistance to these proposals 
became so strong that the Commission itself abandoned many of them.
Two major questions arise from this. First, why were the European 
Commission and Parliament so unsuccessful in involving the Union in the 
more symbolically charged parts of culture, audiovisual policy and education 
-  a failure that on the face of it seems all the more paradoxical as it coincided 
with important advances in economic and to some extent also political inte­
gration? Second, what are the potential consequences of this for legitimacy, 
identity, and public consent in the European Union?
Addressing the first question it is useful to return briefly to the ‘spillover 
versus countervailing pressures’ framework outlined in Chapter 2. As was 
suggested, in this rendering three types of policy spillover have the potential 
to further the Union’s position in a given policy area: functional, political and 
cultivated.
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Functional spillover» to begin with, did play some role in advancing the 
Union’s clout in some more economically charged parts of culture, audiovi­
sual policy and education- For instance, many initiatives for language 
learning, mutual diploma recognition and educational mobility were 
launched on the coattails of the Single Market programme in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. Though such policies were hardly indispensable for the 
successful implementation of the Single Market, they nonetheless represented 
a logical complement to and extension of economic integration and could be 
justified in these terms. By contrast, proposals ranging from Union-spon­
sored Europe Day celebrations to the ‘correction’ of history textbooks had 
little direct bearing on economic and Single Market-related issues, and except 
for some initiatives in the audiovisual sector the Commission did not even try 
to justify them on economic grounds.
All the same, as discussed in Chapter 2 ‘functional pressures’ may also 
result from public opinion-related as opposed to just economic develop­
ments. Other things being equal, as the Union’s perceived salience and 
visibility increases so does the need for corresponding ‘legitimacy transfers’ to 
maintain popular support, with cultural, audiovisual and educational policy 
representing a potential tool to help achieve this. The Commission and the 
EP, the Tindemans Report and the Janne and Adonnino committees predi­
cated their proposals on precisely this logic. When integration was stagnating, 
they portrayed cultural and educational measures as necessary to reinvigorate 
it; when integration was progressing, they claimed that such measures would 
help sustain it. Yet in the end these arguments, too, carried little weight. 
Throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s the Union’s popular standing was 
in fact relatively solid, thus depriving the Commission’s ‘crisis talk’ of credi­
bility. Similarly, in the 1970s claims that the Community could be helped out 
of its stagnation by shoring up popular enthusiasm for it did little to sway 
national governments which were chiefly responsible for this stagnation in 
the first place.
In the 1990s all this changed, as the Maastricht ratification crisis brought 
the long-lasting permissive consensus for integration to an (at least tempo­
rary) end. But at this stage the Union faced a new dilemma. For as popular 
scepticism of the Union grew so did fears that it was braced to become cultur­
ally more intrusive and erode national identities. In conjunction with opinion 
surveys which suggested that an EU involvement in culture, audiovisual 
policy and education was extremely unpopular, this meant that the 
Commission found it difficult to justify its ambitions in these areas on the 
grounds that they would improve the EU’s popular standing. At the most, the 
perceived need to shore up popular support for the EU and particular EU 
policies (above all the single currency) fuelled the growth of the 
Commission’s PR budget at the time.
Turning to political spillover, it, too, played only a limited role overall. To 
the extent that interest group pressure did enter the equation it was again
chiefly in the more economically charged parts of culture and education, such 
as language learning, vocational training and some audiovisual support and 
liberalisation initiatives. This is not surprising, given that the most influential 
interest groups at the national and European levels alike pursue broadly 
defined economic agendas. By contrast, using culture and education as 
European identity forgers had few outspoken advocates, save for the relatively 
weak pro-European movements and some related organisations. In the 1990s, 
the Commission attempted to change this by encouraging the formation of 
various ‘cultural networks’ and educational NGOs at the European level. Yet 
the transnational groupings that emerged were often little more than ad hoc 
formations, created primarily for the purpose of obtaining EU funds and 
without a broader policy agenda. Similarly, the Commission’s attempts to 
liaise with governmental and semi-govemmental agencies in culture and 
education (such as curriculum development units within national education 
ministries) and/or to help them form ties with educational NGOs had little 
lasting impact.
Cultivated spillover, finally, seems to have played the greatest role by 
comparison. Commission officials at all levels remained staunchly deter­
mined to strengthen popular support for European integration through 
cultural, audiovisual and educational policies. Only in the late 1990s did this 
commitment fizzle out somewhat as a younger and more pragmatic batch of 
cultural and educational officials rose through the ranks and as resistance 
from some member states had proven impossible to overcome. Also, in trying 
to advance their cultural, audiovisual and educational agenda Commission 
officials often displayed impressive tenacity and tactical skill. They resorted to 
formally independent expert panels to elaborate or reinforce particular policy 
agendas, encouraged a generous interpretation of existing legal constraints, 
interpreted previous Council commitments as constituting more than the 
Council itself had intended and grafted proposals for symbolically charged 
cultural, audiovisual and educational proposals onto more economically 
oriented ones. The Commission also experimented with various rhetorical 
‘frames’, ranging from the ‘rediscovery of European culture’ and ‘public 
apathy threatens the Community’s future’ themes in the 1970s to the anti- 
Americanisation and ‘cultural performance conditions economic 
performance’ headings in subsequent decades. Finally, as noted the 
Commission liaised with and encouraged the formation of pan-European 
interest groups in culture, the audiovisual sector and education from which it 
hoped to obtain rhetorical and political support, above all through its various 
‘network’ initiatives.
However, these cultivation attempts, too, faced important obstacles. 
They ranged from the seeming elusiveness of discursive ‘frames’ that would 
appeal to all member state governments to the difficulty of ensuring that the 
would-be lobbying groups which the Commission sought to create would 
develop into effective champions of its broader cultural, audiovisual and
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educational policy agenda. Yet the central obstacle throughout was resistance 
to this agenda from within the ranks of the member states and, linked to this, 
the very unequal distribution of powers in culture, audiovisual policy and 
education between the Commission and the EP on the one hand and the 
Union’s intergovernmental elements on the other. Due to this resistance 
many of the Commission’s efforts to ‘cultivate’ particular cultural and educa­
tional agendas were choked off from the outset. In other cases the 
Commission’s ‘cultivation’ effect was limited to pruning initial proposals to 
the point where they satisfied the lowest common denominator among the 
member states and where they were only a pale shadow of what the 
Commission itself had originally sought to accomplish.
Certainly, to assert that spillover failed to operate in culture, audiovisual 
policy and education is another way of saying that countervailing pressures 
prevented it from succeeding. As suggested in Chapter 2, such pressures can 
emanate from ‘above’ (i.e. from governments and other elites) as well as from 
‘below’ (i.e. from national mass publics), and this study suggests that both 
were frequently present.
Resistance from national governments, to begin with, remained strong 
throughout. Usually it was spearheaded by Denmark, the UK, Germany and 
Sweden while enjoying more or less explicit support of many other govern­
ments as well. The precise causes of this resistance varied between different 
countries, governments, periods and issue areas and the position of individ­
ual member state governments was often neither clear nor consistent. Even 
so, seen at the broadest level the tenacity and seemingly insurmountable 
nature of this resistance bears out a central claim of consociational and many 
other broadly intergovernmentalist approaches to European integration as 
discussed in Chapter 2: national elites refused to share their monopoly over 
the symbolic tools of political legitimisation and community-building 
because they do not see European integration as a socially, culturally and 
psychologically state-transcending undertaking in the first place. Then as 
now, such a conception is not widely shared beyond the confines of the 
European Parliament and the Commission. Most importantly, it is not shared 
by political elites in many member states which continue to bear the main 
responsibility for policy outcomes in the EU and which have continued to 
refuse the EP and the Commission’s quest for a greater symbolic role.
At the same time, national governments were not the only source of 
opposition. Resistance also came from ‘below’, from within broader sections 
of the various national publics. The low popular appeal of Europa TV, the 
widespread apathy towards Union-invented rituals such as Europe Day, and 
the popular aversion to extending the Union’s legal mandate in culture and 
education all were signs of this. What is more, the Union’s cultural and 
educational initiatives found a poor reception among many national opinion 
formers -  journalists, academics, columnists and so forth. The scorn widely 
heaved on the Commission-sponsored European history textbook, television
channel and many of its ‘information and communication’ campaigns bears 
this out. Their critics were quick to portray such initiatives as a waste of 
taxpayers’ money, or even as sinister and manipulative attempts to brainwash 
national publics in the name o f‘Euro nation-building’. Some of this criticism 
came from the usual suspects such as the conservative press and Conservative 
politicians in the UK. However, some of it also came from those who were 
relatively benevolent towards the EU in other respects.
This resistance ‘from below’ could only strengthen the determination of 
many national governments to deny the Union a greater cultural, audiovisual 
and educational role. It also meant that those policies which were enacted 
were less likely to accomplish their objective of improving the Union’s 
popular standing. Partially as a result of this, the dynamic familiar from 
domestic state- and nation-building contexts whereby ‘top-down’ political 
symbolism triggers ‘bottom-up’ responses which in turn makes further ‘top- 
down’ policies more viable could never take root in the EU. Generally weak 
spillover pressures in conjunction with strong resistance from national 
governments and mass publics alike account for the Union’s meagre cultural, 
audiovisual and educational record.
None of this is likely to change significantly any time soon. In the first 
place, Eurobarometer still suggests strong public opposition to involving the 
Union in areas such as . culture, education and the audiovisual sector. 
Likewise, the media in many member states are as keen as ever to denounce 
anything that remotely reeks of attempted ‘Euro-nation-building’ or 
‘Commission propaganda’. Most importantly, many national governments 
have remained staunchly opposed. Even if enlargement should eventually 
lead to a deepening of the Union’s powers in some areas, cultural, audiovisual 
and educational policy will probably not be among them. Still in the early 
stages of consolidating their own democratic institutions and polities, the 
new members from Central and Eastern Europe have so far seemed no less 
keen on defending their symbolic prerogatives than many of their West 
European counterparts (see Auer 2004).
But even if the Union did manage to initiate more symbolically charged 
policies in culture, audiovisual policy and education these would still face 
formidable challenges. Above all, they would continue to have to grapple with 
the wider social and cultural realities in the EU as well as with the practical 
limits of an analogy between historical cases of state- and nation-building on 
the one hand and contemporary European integration on the other. For 
unlike the former, the EU must legitimise itself in the eyes of populations that 
inhabit industrialised democracies, boast high average levels of education and 
advertising literacy, are politically enfranchised and, for the most part, remain 
firmly socialised into their existing national contexts. These continue to be 
reproduced through by and large stable and well-functioning mechanisms 
inside the member states, involving not least national policies in culture and 
education. To further complicate matters, apart perhaps from the vaguest
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notions o f‘Western heritage’ and the like, Europeans share few meanings and 
reference points on which EU political symbolism could draw. The widely 
perceived artificiality of the ‘non-national’ programming formats attempted 
by Eurikon, Europa TV and their commercial counterparts and the low popu­
larity of domestic audiovisual productions beyond their country of origin 
(both of which were not merely due to linguistic barriers) all are signs of this. 
The inability of the authors of the would-be European history textbook to 
agree on a shared version of European history illustrates much the same 
point.
Following the example of some culturally divided domestic systems, the 
Union could seek to mitigate these problems through symbolic ‘targeting’ -  
something the Commission’s ‘information and communication’ strategists 
have increasingly sought to do. But to be effective even such a strategy prob­
ably must draw on some kind of underlying common psychological 
denominator -  a shared denominator which has remained elusive among 
Europeans, as the fate of many cultural and educational projects suggests. It 
might well turn out to be still more elusive in an enlarged EU which encom­
passes populations long disconnected from the West European mainstream.
Again, the point here is not to argue that political legitimacy requires 
fully-Sedged cultural homogenisation. Post-national theorists as well as 
empirical examples such as Switzerland convincingly show this not to be the 
case. What is required, by contrast, is at the very least a shared cultural base­
line which allows ‘thinner’ (e.g. ‘civic’) myths and symbols to be transmitted 
to and ‘processed’ by the different national publics at which they are aimed. 
So far, the few more symbolically oriented cultural, audiovisual and educa­
tional measures which the Union managed to put in place failed to appeal to 
national publics not because their largely ‘thin’ and ‘civic’ content would have 
been intrinsically meaningless to them (after all, they all inhabit broadly 
defined liberal democracies), but because their ‘denationalised’ cultural pack­
aging proved impenetrable. The European story has potential appeal, but 
there is no shared language in which to communicate it, both literally and 
metaphorically.
Cultural denominators are, of course, socially constructed and as such 
they are malleable. As was shown in Chapter 2, there are many examples of 
political elites moulding cultural patterns among their subjects and using this 
as a basis for their political symbolism campaigns. This ranged from a 
cautious ‘cognitive compatibilisation’ in Switzerland to full-blown cultural 
and linguistic homogenisation in many other countries. But here, too, the 
domestic analogy may be of little relevance for the Union, as its margin of 
manoeuvre is much narrower. The early twenty-first century liberal and 
culturally pluralist ethos within which the Union operates and which under­
pins its ‘thin’ and ‘civic’ self-understandings is incompatible with overt 
attempts to ‘denationalise’ cultural patterns and such attempts have remained 
unacceptable to national governments and mass publics alike. The strong
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resistance to plans by the Commission and the EP to influence cultural 
content (e.g. through their various ill-fated audiovisual coproduction and 
‘European content’ in school curricula proposals) illustrates this well. In 
some ways, the very ethos on which the Union seeks to predicate itself rules 
out some of the means it would need to further propagate that ethos in the 
first place.
The road to effective political symbolism in the EU faces many additional 
obstacles. Of those, the EU’s frequently noted lack of definitive geographical 
boundaries might well be among the most important. Since, as was shown, an 
overarching ‘entity process’ thrives in part on the drawing and accentuation 
of boundaries with outgroups, this further reduces the feasibility of such a 
process in the EU for the time being (Risse in press; Delanty 1995). More 
broadly, demarcating ‘Europe’ is complicated by the absence of commonly 
recognised cultural, geographical or historical others against which this 
demarcation could take place, even assuming for the moment that it would 
not be frustrated from the outset by the inclusivist and culturally pluralist 
self-understandings on which the Union seeks to predicate itself. In fact, 
many EU member states were each other's primary ‘others’ during much of 
their history and in some instances it was not until quite recently that this 
legacy of fervently pursued national self-differentiation faded. Even the 
United States, perhaps the EU’s most ‘obvious’ cultural and increasingly also 
political competitor has not amounted to a suitable ‘EU-other’. The 
Commission’s unsuccessful attempts to link its audiovisual initiatives to the 
cultural anti-Americanisation theme throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
demonstrate this.
In light of this, the most plausible and most widely recognised ‘EU other’ 
is Europe’s violent past -  something the Union stresses with almost ritualistic 
regularity, not least in its educational material for schools. Time and again, 
the Commission and the EP -  along with many governing elites in the 
member states -  contrast Europe’s ‘bloody nationalist past’ with a ‘peaceful 
European future’ while depicting further integration as a safeguard against 
slipping back into the horrors of the past (Shore 2000; Waever 1996). For the 
Union to make the past its other is probably more practicable and by most 
accounts also more palatable than focusing on cultural or geographical 
outsiders -  be they Islam, Asia, third-world would-be immigrants, the United 
States or whatever. All the same, its long-term viability, too, is far from clear. 
Paradoxically, the very fact that in most readings another war in Western 
Europe has become almost unimaginable regardless of what happens to the 
EU makes the ‘integration or war’-theme an increasingly implausible ration­
ale for present-day European integration -  even for those who afford the 
Union a causal role in building the West European security community over 
the past half century in the first place. In this regard the Union may well have 
become a victim of its own success.
For all these reasons, the social, political, cultural, and psychological
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obstacles in the way of effective EU political symbolism are substantial. For 
the time being they may well remain insurmountable, even in the unlikely 
event that the member states decided to give the Union greater cultural and 
educational powers at last.
Such an insight leads to the second broad question growing out of the 
account in this study, which pertains to its possible consequences. More 
precisely, one must ask whether in the long term the Union could sustain a 
sufficiently high level of public commitment even without being able to 
resort, or at least resort effectively, to the kinds of symbolic strategies that 
once helped foster domestic political legitimacy and popular consent.
By so asking one moves into largely uncharted waters, much in line with 
the sui generis character of the European Union itself. Going by the earlier 
discussion, one factor to consider is the impact of cultural and educational 
exchanges (along with other contact- and circulation-enhancing measures) 
on popular perceptions of the EU. This was one area of cultural and educa­
tional policy where the Union made significant progress and where the 
potential for further expansion seems greatest, augmenting the at any rate 
growing volume and density of economic and social interaction between 
European societies.
Yet as was suggested, while such interaction may well induce some level­
ling of lifestyles and consumption patterns, this would not necessarily 
translate into greater legitimacy and support for the policies and institutions 
of the European Union. Underpinning this is a core postulate of social 
constructivism, namely that material transformations do not have inexorable 
(i.e. pre-determined) social and ideational consequences. Empirically, the 
state- and nation-building literature bears this out: no successful project of 
domestic political identity formation has ever relied on exchanges and other 
forms of interaction alone.
Nonetheless, a continuously high volume of interaction between its 
member societies may benefit the Union in two ways. First, following 
Deutschian thinking it could steadily improve mutual perceptions between 
these societies and thereby help solidify and further entrench the security 
community they have built over the past half-century. Possible reservations 
notwithstanding,1 it is reasonable to assume that a growing interaction and 
mutual interpenetration in Western Europe has had, on balance, a tolerance­
building and pacifying effect. Attitude surveys have long pointed in this 
direction. While popular perceptions of the EU are often fragile, perceptions 
among its constituent populations towards each other have improved dramat­
ically since the end of the Second World War, just as many transactionalist 
scholars predicted. For instance, for French respondents Germany became 
the second most Trusted’ country on earth (Inglehart 1991). Of course benev­
olent mutual perceptions between different societies do not equate to an 
overarching sense of community (some transactionalists were too quick to 
draw this link), nor do they necessarily help legitimise overarching institu­
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tions. Yet overall they are more likely to benefit rather than to impede 
European integration. Above all, they could constitute a kind of horizontal 
social ‘glue’ between the EU’s member populations, which in turn is a neces­
sary (though not sufficient) psychological condition both for the emergence 
of an overarching sense of community and ‘entitativity5 and, by extension, 
quite possibly for European integration in its more vertical (i.e. institutional) 
dimensions (see C hapter 1).
Second, at a more tangible level a partial homogenisation of cultural 
patterns among the EU’s member populations could help bring about a 
‘denationalised’ cultural baseline which, as suggested, is a prerequisite for 
successful political symbolism (no matter how ‘thin’ and ‘acultural’) yet 
which the Union has been prevented from trying to generate through more 
proactive and interventionist policies. To return to the earlier metaphor, it 
could help develop a shared ‘language’ in the form of common cultural expe­
riences and reference points through which the Union’s symbolic project 
could be communicated more effectively to its member societies. Moreover, 
in principle this could happen regardless of whether these shared cultural 
patterns were specifically European or linked to broader globalising tenden­
cies. Speaking the same symbolic language is more important than where that 
language comes from.
Granted, on this score the evidence is not particularly strong so far. While 
there are signs of some cultural levelling in Western Europe (whatever its 
origins), policies which could have ‘activated’ the resulting common cultural 
patterns and thereby turned them into symbolic budding material or 
symbolic transmission channels have largely remained elusive, as was shown 
throughout this study. It would be fascinating to analyse Europa TV’s popular 
appeal had it been allowed to survive into the present or, still more interest­
ingly, twenty or thirty years hence. Perhaps a growing cultural levelling in the 
meantime would have made its ‘denationalised’ programmes more palatable 
to viewers; perhaps the EU might even have succeeded in subtly instrumen­
talising it as an outlet for its symbolic agenda, akin to many national public 
service broadcasters. Yet neither of this would of course be certain. European 
integration is still a relatively young project, it lacks close historical prece­
dents, and many of the cultural tendencies in evidence today are still weak 
and contradictory.
What about the Union’s public relations measures -  one area in which it 
made relatively strong inroads by comparison? As was argued, the effect of 
Union PR on public attitudes is hard to gauge. This is due to a lack of reliable 
impact studies and to their increasingly narrow focus on specific policies such 
as enlargement and the single currency. Moreover, it is difficult to isolate the 
impact of Union PR from that of other factors that might affect public atti­
tudes towards the EU such as changes in economic conditions and in the 
popularity of domestic governments. Nonetheless, given that the Union’s PR 
initiatives have predominantly sought to convince citizens of the practical
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benefits o f European integration, it was in this area that whatever impact they 
have had is likely to have been greatest.
Another way of capturing this is with reference to the three levels of legit- 
imisation outlined in Chapter 1. Many of the earlier political symbolism 
proposals put forward by the EP and the Commission were aimed at creating 
third-level legitimacy; they sought to symbolically represent and transmit 
notions of the EU as a corporate actor and of Europeans as an overarching 
communal category, both with values, needs and aspirations and a self-refer­
ential claim to survival. Later, more PR-oriented initiatives, by contrast, have 
sought to contribute primarily to first-level legitimisation by highlighting the 
utilitarian benefits of integration. Their aim is less to promote the EU qua 
communal category and corporate entity than to shore up support for partic­
ular EU policies. To a lesser extent they also involve second-level moves by 
seeking to ‘reshape’ the member states’ interests as perceived by their citizens 
so as to make them more amenable to European integration. For instance, 
this is reflected in the Union’s constant assurances to its member populations 
(seconded by many national governments) that ‘pooling’ sovereignty in 
certain areas comes naturally to advanced European democracies and 
strengthens rather than weakens their ability to shape their destiny in an 
interconnected world.
Of course these different levels overlap in practice. Even the most 
narrowly targeted PR initiative typically features the European ‘logo’ as an 
overarching corporate symbol, and the very talk of ‘Europe doing’ and 
‘Europe benefiting’ contributes to its reification and to some overarching 
‘entity process’ (more below). Nonetheless, conceptually the distinction 
between these different legitimacy mechanisms is quite sharp, and attitude 
surveys reflect this. On the one hand, public interest and participation in EU 
affairs has remained chronically low -  the poor turnouts for the 1999 and 
2004 EP elections are potent signs of this. But on the other hand, with the UK 
being the most important exception public attitudes towards the EU seem to 
have settled once more into something resembling the ‘permissive consensus’ 
of the pre-Maastricht era: marked by relative apathy, low mobilisation and 
few participatory ambitions but also by a conviction that on balance integra­
tion produces practical benefits and should therefore be tolerated? 
Interestingly, prompted by Eurobarometefs questioning a growing propor­
tion of EU citizens in most member states profess feeling ‘European’ in 
addition to harbouring their national affiliations. But this sense of 
Europeanness has remained so weak as to have few behavioural consequences 
and it does not seem to have translated into stronger identifications with the 
EU. For example, this is evident in the lack of ‘European’ issues debated 
during EP election campaigns in many member states.
Returning to the earlier question, could the EU secure a requisite level of 
popular support in the long term without at the same time generating a 
strong sense of overarching community, ‘entitativity’ and corporate actor-
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hood, and the kind of self-referential quality and ‘end in itself -status that 
flows from third-level legitimacy? Going by the discussion in Chapters 1 and 
2 the prospects for this are far from certain, despite the Union’s relatively 
secure standing in recent public attitude surveys. After all, from Rousseau to 
Habermas, almost all political theory on offer sees the development of shared 
political loyalties as contingent on an overarching sense of community -  or, 
more cautiously, sees communal sentiments as giving rise to a shared discur­
sive realm within which such political loyalties may develop over time. 
Empirical observations seem to bear this out: even the most politically decen­
tralised and culturally plural domestic systems have acquired a measure of 
third-level legitimacy, though it is typically weaker than in their more 
centralised and culturally homogenised counterparts.
Whether the European Union can remain an exception to this depends 
on several factors. Most obviously, it would require that national mass publics 
continue to believe that integration yields economic (and/or other tangible) 
benefits while not gravely threatening their respective national identifica­
tions. If first- and second-level legitimacy remain strong, moving to the third 
level becomes less urgent.
Furthermore, taking the earlier concept of the authority-legitimacy 
balance as a guide much hinges on the Union’s broader political develop­
ment. In particular, in the absence of strong third-level legitimisation 
processes the Union would do well to emulate the central authorities in 
culturally plural and political decentralised states and minimise its impact on 
its citizens: by acting as discreetly and as inconspicuously as possible, by 
curbing its intrusiveness and visibility in relation to national and sub-national 
levels of government, and by generally under rather than overstating its 
significance and clout. In part this would be a matter of the EU adjusting its 
appearance. But most importantly, it would require a curb on the formal and 
de facto transfer of power from national and sub-national levels of govern­
ment to European-level institutions. While by itself more power means more 
visibility and intrusiveness, it would also add pressure for a corresponding 
expansion of the pan-European democratic process -  through Europe-wide 
referendums, directly elected Commission presidents or similar measures. 
But this would carry significant risks in its own right. For one thing, more 
democracy means still more visibility and intrusiveness. For another, once 
one rejects the assumption that communal sentiments and a shared public 
sphere arise as a mere reflex to democratic institutions and practices, the 
expansion of the latter in the absence of the former could turn transnational 
democracy into a force for division rather than cohesion (Cederman 2001a; 
Chapter 1 above).
To conclude this chapter two further observations are relevant. Both tie 
in well with the broader social constructivist framework outlined at the begin­
ning of this study and they help qualify -  though not obliterate -  the central 
argument outlined so far. Moreover, from the Union’s perspective they give
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somewhat more cause for optimism regarding its chances of retaining 
popular support in the long-term.
First, one central assumption of this study was that political practices and 
institutions are not self-legitimising. Democracy does not become legitimate 
simply by holding elections, and political institutions and hierarchies do not 
acquire legitimacy by just ‘being there’. Instead, political legitimacy results 
from a complex interplay involving the ‘top-down’ creation and dissemina­
tion of symbolic categories and £bottom-up’ communicative and deliberative 
processes, which leads to these categories becoming internalised and self- 
sustaining. Yet as was also suggested, ‘purpose built’ policies in areas such as 
culture and education are not the only activities with a symbolic impact. 
Other policies in other policy areas -  indeed, ultimately all policies in all 
conceivable policy areas -  can serve as vehicles for political symbolism, 
regardless of whether this stems from actual symbolic intent.
This is an important point, and it has led some political anthropologists 
to attribute to political power a kind of self-legitimising quality. Power needs 
legitimacy, but the very act of exercising (and obeying) it has an inevitable 
‘dramatic’ -  or ‘theatrical’ -  dimension, and thereby helps generate symbolic 
representations which help foster its internalisation and the development of 
corresponding political identities (Balandier 1980). In an EU context, the 
rituals and media attention surrounding the regular European summits 
(which in part is consciously orchestrated, but which also reflects the fact that 
these summits are occasions where powerful leaders meet to take important 
decisions) is an example of such ‘auto-symbolism’.
A similar logic applies to other aspects of European integration. For 
example, the fact that all Europeans vote simultaneously for a common 
parliament once every five years helps to entrench the concept of ‘pan- 
European democracy5 in the minds of at least some of those who do, observe 
and talk about the voting. Similarly a (however faintly developed) European 
corporate ‘entity process’ is both reflected in and reinforced by the fact that 
even the most ardent ‘anti-Europeans’ tend to frame their arguments in terms 
o f‘Europe’ doing this or that. In the end, what all this bears out is the broader 
postulate that social practice and social ‘substance’ mutually reinforce each 
other. Doing something and thinking and talking about it solidifies its exis­
tence, thus further reinforcing the social practices linked to it, and so on. This 
is the ‘performative’ function of discourse and the constitutive and ‘structur­
ing’ effect of social practice and agency that inspires, in various forms, most 
constructivist approaches to the social world.
But what does all this mean for political legitimacy in the EU? On the one 
hand, it may enhance it in so far as it allows EU-related institutions and prac­
tices to be symbolically signified, transmitted and internalised even in the 
absence of conscious ‘top-down’ symbolic policies. But on the other hand, it 
may also aggravate the problem. For as suggested in Chapter 1, by becoming 
more visible and more ‘talked about’, political institutions augment their
S y m b o l ism  a n d  th e  f u tu r e  of in t e g r a t io n 159
need for legitimacy in the first place. Herein lies one of the most intriguing 
paradoxes of political symbolism: to be effective in legitimising political prac­
tices and institutions it must make them more visible; but this increases the 
need for their legitimisation still further.
The second observation is connected to this and flows from another key 
postulate of social constructivism. Some of the most interesting recent work 
on European integration explores how the EU acts back upon its member 
states and continuously impels their re-definition and ‘re-imagination’. 
Underpinning some of these accounts is a type of ‘identity incorporation’ 
model that differs from more conventional ‘multi-level’ identity renderings. 
As national self-definitions adjust to participation in the European integra­
tion process, ‘Europe’ becomes gradually incorporated into the national 
identity equation proper: ‘Irish and European’ becomes ‘Irish as European’ 
and to some extent the two melt into one (see Hayward 2002). This is a subtle 
difference to more conventional ‘multilevel’ identity accounts, but one with 
profound implications. For in this scenario, the ‘meaning of Europe’ is 
nationally defined and thus continues to diverge from one national context to 
the next. By extension, generating a sense of belonging to ‘Europe’ and 
support for the EU becomes part and parcel of national identity maintenance 
and an objective of national political symbolisms. By shaping representations 
of ‘Europe’ to fit in with those of the member states they at the same time fit 
the member states into the EU.
Such a process is compatible with the ‘auto-symbolism’ dynamic 
outlined above, and the two can unfold alongside each other. On the one 
hand, by virtue of its very existence and functioning the EU has a symbolic 
effect on its citizens, becoming more ‘real’ to them as it develops and pene­
trates into their everyday lives. But, on the other hand, perceptions of Europe 
are mediated by the different national contexts in which these citizens live, 
giving rise to different nationally defined ‘Europes’ and ways of ‘being 
European’. The member states remain the most important symbolic and 
deliberative spaces, and national rather than supranational elites continue to 
be the central symbolic actors.
Conceptually, this ‘incorporation’ model is not easy to grasp. It is ‘second 
level’ in that the meaning of ‘Europe’ and of ‘being European’ is nationally 
defined and varies from one society to the next. But it is also ‘third-level’ in 
that it still entails notions of ‘Europe’ as a real existing entity and community 
with aims, needs and meanings attached to it. Yet in this rendering there are 
various nationally defined European ‘entity processes’ rather than a single all 
subsuming one. By extension, there are still multiple ‘levels’ of identification, 
but the boundary between them is fluid and the symbolic content and 
meaning of the outermost -  European -  layer fluctuates from one member 
state to the next.
In many ways this is not a new argument: ‘Europe’ has always meant 
different things in different member states and the EU has helped shape
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national re-definition processes ever since its founding (Marcussen, Risse, 
Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher 1999). Moreover, the example of 
some culturally fragmented domestic systems as discussed earlier is once 
more relevant here: the Swiss state probably survived in part precisely because 
it allows its member societies to define their ‘Swissness’ in different ways, 
shaped by their different cultural and historical contexts.
Even so, important dangers lurk in all this. If for its member populations 
‘Europe’ becomes little more than a projection of their national values onto a 
larger plane, the resulting discrepancies between the different national 
‘Europes’ could provoke friction (Risse in press). Perhaps this serves as yet 
another sign of caution that ‘talking about Europe’ across national bound­
aries might not inevitably generate shared political loyalties and communal 
sentiments in the process. Rather, for the different member societies it may 
bring into sharper relief the contrasts between their respective ‘Europes’, 
thereby weakening their perception of integration as a shared overarching 
project.
Against this backdrop, the Union and the member states face three main 
challenges. First, they must limit the Union’s authority, visibility and intru- 
siveness to a level where it can be incorporated into national symbolic 
processes without overpowering them. The second challenge is to subject 
European integration to more intense democratic and deliberative processes 
first and foremost inside the member states. This could help generate -  
inevitably national -  answers to some of the central questions of ‘purpose’ 
and ‘meaning’ that have overshadowed the European project since its incep­
tion yet that have remained underproblematised in many national discourses 
on Europe, only to resurface and haunt the European project in recent years. 
Finally, the different nationally defined ‘Europes’ emerging from this must be 
reconciled into a more or less coherent overarching political framework. This 
‘Europe’ will then of course feed back into the different national identity 
equations and the various ‘Europes’ they contain. In this rendering, then, 
‘being national’ and ‘being European’ are in permanent negotiation, and 
tensions between them could lurk all around. But ultimately they may also 
come to sustain each other, constituting a peculiar form of post-national 
identity mix.
Theoretically, such a scenario is less tidy and less elegant than the various 
‘Russian dolls’, ‘concentric circles of allegiance’ and ‘multi-level identities’ 
models that seek to construct ‘Europe’ as an outermost identity layer featur­
ing invariant symbolic content and meaning for all its citizens. Practically, it 
demands more subtlety and produces more ambiguity and fluidity than a 
more centralised approach to European identity construction roughly 
modelled after state- and nation-building projects in centuries past, at least in 
form and method if not necessarily in content and intensity. Yet as this study 
has shown, the latter has remained politically unacceptable to national elites 
and culturally indigestible to broader publics, and there is little to suggest that
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this will change soon. In the meantime, a gradual incorporation of -  nation­
ally produced and therefore idiosyncratic and mutually divergent -  
‘European content’ into the domestic political symbolisms of the member 
states might well be the most viable source of political legitimacy for the 
European Union.
Notes
1 As was argued, even for Deutsch himself the impact of interaction on mutual percep­
tions is ambiguous, an d  here, too, the constructivist claim that material processes do 
not have inexorable ideational consequences is relevant. Finally, there remains the 
question of whether it was the democratisation of Western Europe after 1945 rather 
than a growing level of interaction between its societies that most laid the foundations 
for the West European security community and thus for European integration.
2 Admittedly, a causal link between the two attitudes is not self-evident: a belief that the 
EU is economically beneficial may be conditioned by a greater liking of the EU in the 
first place, rather than vice versa (see Theiler 2004a).
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